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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
September 24, 1984 Conference 
Summer List 13, Sheet 2 
No. 83-2004-CFX 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUS-
TRIAL CO., et al . (Japa-
nese television m ufac-
turers) 
Cert to £A3 (Seitz, Gibbons, Meskill 
[CA2]) ' 
v. 
ZENITH RADIO CORP., et 
(American televi~ io 
facturers) Federal/Civil 
iJudge Seitz wrote the Antidumping Act opinion and Judge 
Gibbons wrote the antitrust opinion. 
Timely 
' I 1. SUMMARY: Petrs seek review of two judgments of the CA3, re-
versing summary judgments entered in favor of petrs in suits alleging 
antitrust and Antidumping Act violations. The issues presented are 
whether, in reviewing the summary judgment record, the CA3 applied the 
correct legal standards for: (a) inferring the alleged conspiracy; (b) 
determining the effect to be given a statement by the Japanese Govern-
ment attesting that certain conduct challenged by resps was directed 
by that government acting within its sovereignty; and (3) determining 
the admissibility of expert testimony that the DC found to be based on 
false and unsupported factual assumptions. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resps are two American televi-
sion manufacturers, Zenith Radio Corporation and National Union Elec-
tric Corporation. Petrs comprise the principal Ja:e._anese television ------. 
( manufacturers doing business in the United States, their trading com-
panies and their United States subsidiaries, and others. Resps 
brought suits, which subsequently were consolidated, alleging a con-
spiracy by petrs and others to drive all American manufacturers of 
television receivers out of business by a scheme to raise, fix and 
maintain artificially high prices for television receivers sold by 
~ petrs in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low price~ ' 
for television receivers exported to and sold in the United States. 
Resps sought treble damages and injunctive relief pursuant to §§4 and 
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §§15, 26, for petrs' violations of 
§§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. §§1, 2; §7 of the Clayton Act, 
15 u.s.c. §18; §2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 u.s.c. §13(a); §73 
of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 u.s.c. §8; and the Antidumping Act of 
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The DC (ED Pa., Becker, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of 
petrs on all charges. On the §1 Sherman A~ and Wilson Tariff Act 
' claims, the TC held that there was no admissible evidence raising an 
issue of fact as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy. Since 
) l . f ''-the existence o concerted action is ial element of §1 Sher-
man Act and Wilson Tariff Act claims, the DC entered summary judgment 
for petrs on those claims. On the §2 Sherman Act claim, the DC held 
that the "aggregate share" monopoli~ation theory relied on by resps 
required proof of concert of action. Since in disposing of the § 1 
Sherman Act claim the DC found no admissible evidence from which con-
cert of action could be found, the DC entered summary judgment for the 
petrs on the §2 claims as well. The DC read the Robinson-Patman Act 
claim to be inseparable from the conspiracy charge, and thus it, too, 
( fell with the §1 Sherman Act and Wilson Tariff Act claims. In addi-
tion, the DC held that resps had produced no evidence of injury to 
competition from the alleged price differential, which is an element 
of a Robinson-Patman Act violation. Finally, on the §7 Clayton Act 
claim, the DC held that Zenith had failed to show any injury traceable 
to the acquisitions complained of. 
In granting summary judgment, the DC excluded a substantial part 
of resps' exert opinion testimony. The DC noted that under Rule 703 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the facts or data on which an expert 
bases his opinion need not them~elves be admissible "[i]f of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject." The DC held that it must 
make~ factual determination under Rule 104(a) as to whether this con-




, 1 tradicted affidavits submitted by resps' experts, alleging that the 
materials upon which they relied in forming their opinions were of a 
type generally relied upon by experts in their respective fields, were 
not determinative of the issue of reasonable reliance. Instead, the 
Voe developed its own standards for determing reasonable reliance. Us-
...,___ __ -- - -~------------------------------------- '--------
i ng these standards, the DC excluded a considerable amount of resps' 
expert opinion evidence on the ground that it was bas~d on materials 
that the court concluded were not "of a type reasonably relied upon." 
This excluded evidence included, inter alia, expert opinion that there 
was a Japanese television industry cartel (the DePodwin Report); an 
economic analysis suggesting collusive efforts to stabilize domestic 
prices and concert of action with respect to sales at low prices in 
the United States (the Nehmer Report); expert opinion that collusive 
( price stabilization in the home market enables Japanese firms to sup-
port sustained sales at low prices ~n the export market (the 
Saxonhouse Report); and expert opinion that there was horizontal con-
cert of action in price fixing in Japan (the Haley Report). ~ 
held that the exclusion of this evidence was erron ous, and that the 
proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts 
in the relevant discipline deem reliable. 
( 
The CA3 also disagreed with the DC about whether resps' evidence 
could iupport an inference of concert of action. The CA3 agreed that 
conscious parallel conduct, standing alone, is legally insufficient to 
support an inference of concert of action. The CA3 concluded, howev-
er, that "this case presents a record in which there is bot~ irect 
evidence of certain kinds of concert of action a ~ ircumstantial evi-
dence having some tendency to suggest that other kinds of concert of 
- 5 -
, ,•. 
• ~ action may have occurred." App. to Jet. for Cert. 165a (emphasis 
( 
v 
added). In particular, there was direct evidence of an agreement to 
stabilize prices in the Japanese home market that, according to resps' 
theory below, generated profits that supported sales at low prices in 
the United States. In addition, there was direct evidence of certain 
agreements respecting the export of consumer electronic products to 
the United States. One feature of these alleged agreements was that 
each manufacturer would confine itself to sales to five companies in 
the United States. Other features weie secret rebates and sales at 
prices that produced losses. The CA3 reasoned that: 
"Price stabilization in Japan coupled with customer alloca-
tion in the United States would permit separate Japanese 
manufacturers to concentrate their predatory tactics on sep-
arate selected American mass merchandisers, insulated from 
price competition at home and from Japanese competition 
here. The full brunt of the support derived from home mar-
ket price stabilization could thus be concentrated against 
the American manufacturers competing for sales to the re-
tailers in question." App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. 
Petrs argued below that they were entitled to summary judgment 
because their activities in Japan were undertaken at the direction of 
the Japanese Government, as an integral part of its trade policy to-
ward the United States. The CA3 rejected this "defense of sovereign 
compulsion." The CA3 stated that it was uncertain that the minimum 
export prices were in fact determined by the Japanese Government; that 
there was evidence that many Japanese manufacturers departed from the 
agreed-upon minimums and took steps to conceal their departure from 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MIT!), that there 
was no evidence that the five-company rule originated with the Japa-
nese Government; and that evidence suggested that the price stabiliza-
tion in the Japanese home market violated the laws of Japan. The 
- 6 -
CA3's opinion did not mention an official statement of the Government 
of Japan (the MITI Statement) that was transmitted to the DC through 
diplomatic channels in 1975 and that attested that MITI directed petrs 
to enter into an export agreement and to establish an export regula-
tion. 
In conclusion, the CA3 held that there was sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to participation by petrs in 
the conspiracy alleged by resps. Accordingly, the CA3 reversed the 
summary judgments in favor of petrs. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr: (a) Inference of conspiracy. The CA3 
failed to follow the Court's holding in First National Bank of Arizona 
v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968), that antitrust plain-
tiffs seeking to infer a conspiracy from parallel acts and other cir-
cumstantial evidence must demonstrate that the challenged conduct is 
contrary to the independent self-interest of the defendants, and 
therefore more consistent with an inference of the alleged conspiracy 
than with an inference of independent behavior. See also Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Corp, 104 s. Ct. 1464, 1473 (1984): Theatre Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). In 
the present case, there was no "direct evidence" of the alleged 20-
year conspiracy to destroy United States competitors by selling at 
artificially low export prices. The "direct evidence" relied on by 
the CA3 to reverse the DC's grant of summary judgment--the minutes of 
meetings and other documents relating to alleged price stabilization 
in the Japanese domestic market for the two-year period 1964-1966, and 
the MITI~mandated export controls--provides no support for resps' 





• I in an alleged conspiracy to sell at high prices in the home market 
cannot be used to infer participation in a conspiracy to sell at low 
prices in the export market, at least in the absence of any independ-
ent probative evidence to connect the two conspiracies. The DC ex-
pressly found that there was no evidence of such a connection. More-
over, there is no rational basis for inferring the existence of a "low 
price" export conspiracy from an alleged "high price" conspiracy in 
Japan. The MITI export controls also provide no "direct evidence" of 
a "low price" export conspiracy. Those controls set minimum prices 
and allocated customers--practices that, as the DC found, could have 
led only to higher export prices. Finally, there is no rational basis 
for inferring a conspiracy from the "parallel" act of each Japanese 
competitor in charging lower prices in the United States than in 
( Japan. As the DC found, this is precisely what any new entrant would 
be expected to do in order to get established in a new market. Thus, 
contrary to Cities Service, the CA3 has created a rule that a price-
fixing conspiracy may be inferred from parallel acts without any evi-
dence that the behavior is inconsistent with individual self-interest 
and thus unlikely to occur without collusion. v 
(b) Sovereign compulsion. The CA3's conclusion that there are 
tri~ fact concerning th:--role of the Japanese Ga vernment -in directing and effectuating the export control agreements and regu-
lations, and that those export controls might be found to constitute 
or be a "feature" of the alleged conspiracy, directly contradicts the 
1975 Statement of the Japanese Government. Formal representations of 
forei~n governments concerning their sovereign acts are to be given 
conclusive effect. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220 (1942). 
- 8 -
. I Business conduct by Japanese nationals pursued within Japanese terri-
tory relating to Japanese exports and required by the Japanese Govern-
ment can neither constitute nor be considered by American courts and 
juries as a "feature" of an alleged unlawful antitrust conspiracy. 
(c} Expert opinion evidence. The CA3 erred in ruling that once 
an expert has filed a conclusory affidavit stating that the data upon 
which he relied in forming his opinion are of a type relied upon by 
other experts in his field, and no other expert has testified to the 
contrary on this issue, then the DC loses its power to exclude the 
expert testimony even if it finds it to be based upon factual assump-
tions that are indisputably false. This ruling conflicts with Rules 
104(a} and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which require dis-
trict courts to make a factual inquiry into the bases of an expert's 
( opinion, and with decisions of other courts of appeals. Indeed, the 
CA2, in Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (CA2 
1984), and the CA5, in Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 
(CA5 1983), directly relied on the DC's opinion in the present case in 
holding that a district court has the discretionary power to exclude 
expert testimony based upon false or unsupported factual assumptions. 
Thus, the CA3's reversal of that opinion presents a square conflict 
among the circuits. 
Note: The above contentions also are advanced in briefs as amici 
curiae in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by 
the American Association of Exporters and Importers and the Consumers 
for World Trade, and by the Government of Japan. Resps do not consent 
to th~ filing of the amicus brief by the Government of Japan. 




, I contend that petrs' "Questions Presented" embrace only issues in the 
antitrust conspiracy case, and do not fairly include the question of 
the sufficiency of resps' showing of the element of specific intent 
under the Antidumping Act of 1916. Thus, the Antidumping Act claims 
must be tried in any case. 
(a) Inference of conspiracy. The CA3 did not depart from con-
trolling law and employ a rule that permits an inference of conspiracy 
solely from circumstantial evidence that is equally or more probative 
of competition among the Japanese manufacturers than of collusion. 
The CA3 repeatedly emphasized that the summary judgment record con-
tains direct evidence as well as circumstantial evidence of the con-
spiracy that resps alleged. Resps alleged? single conspiracy to 
maintain and stabilize high television receiver prices in Japan and to 
( establish and maintain low, dumping level prices in the United States. 
Direct evidence of the conspiracy to set high prices in Japan exists. 
The cases that petrs allege "conflict" with the CA3's decision in this 
case are readily distinguishable, because in each of those cases, the 
only evidence of conspiracy was circumstantial. 
(b) Sovereign compulsion. Petrs did not raise the issue of the 
"sovereign compulsion defense" before the CA3. In any case, the ex-
port controls allegedly mandated by MIT! did not even purport to au-
thorize all of the conduct of petrs complained of in this case, in-
cluding price fixing in the home market; dumping; and fraud against 
the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Treasury Department, and MITI. The 
significance of the MIT! Statement itself is unclear, considering 
petrs~ unconditional ability to withdraw from the formal cartel ar-
rangements, the absence of any sanction for non-compliance, the ab-
.. 
- 10 -
· , sence of any formal decree, the absence of any statement of any Japa-
nese legal officer as to the legal effect, if any, of the "direction," 
the existence of an unexercised legal right to review of any "direc-
tion," the fact that MITI's "administrative guidance" is not even a 
defense to charges under the Japanese antimonopoly laws, and petrs' 
failure to conform their conduct to the "direction." Final disposi-
tion of the legal issues involved should await the development of a 
full factual record and the determination of all the legal and factual 
questions in the lower courts. 
t 
(c) Expert opinion evidence. The CA3's pretrial, interlocutory 
ruling on the admissibility of the expert opinion evidence in this 
case was correct, involves no conflict, and raises no important ques-
tion warranting further review by this Court. 
4. DISCUSSION: Antidumping Act judgment. Although the "Ques-
tions Presented" do not expressly refer to the CA3's Antidumping Act 
judgment, it seems clear that the Court has jurisdiction to review 
those aspects of the Antidumping Act decision that are expre~sly de-
pendent upon the CA3's conspiracy analysis. The petn points out that 
the CA3 based its determination that there was sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to petrs' "spe-
cific intent" under the Antidumping Act on the very same inference of 
conspiiacy that it found to be permissible in its antitrust decision. 
Since the legal standards for drawing such an inference of conspiracy 
are precisely the issues set forth in the questions presented, the 
identical Antidumping Act issues should be considered "fairly includ-
~ 
ed" Jithin the petn. 
~




• t having two components: concerted action to sell at high prices in the 
Japanese home market and concerted action to sell at low prices in the 
export market in the United States. Petrs' position seems to be that 
resps actually are alleging two unrelated conspiracies. According to 
resps, only the low price, export market conspiracy could have injured 
resps, and only that conspiracy is subject to the American antitrust 
laws. There is no "direct evidence" indicating that the low export 
market prices resulted from concerted action rather than from the 
petrs' independent pursuit of their individual economic self-interest. 
Therefore, under Cities Service, summary judgment was proper. Resps, 
. ' 
on the other hand, seem to argue that the low export market prices 
were only possible because of the profits generated by the collusively 
maintained high prices in the home market, so that the two components 
( of the conspiracy are inseparable. Thus, there is only a unitary con-
spiracy involved in this case, and there is "direct evidence" of one 
component of that conspiracy. Cities Service, involving no direct 
evidence, is distinguishable. Resps apparently introduced expert eco-
nomic opinion testimony to support their position that the two sides 
of the alleged conspiracy are interrelated. Petrs argue in their petn 
that this is bad economics, and that it would be irrational for them 
throw away the profits generated at home by selling at a loss in the 
United States. 
It does not seem that there is any controversy here concerning 
the Cities Service rule in general. Rather, the controversy is over 
the scope of the alleged conspiracy. If the conspiracy is narrowly 
defin~d to include only the low price, export market conspiracy, then 
there is no direct evidence of the conspiracy, and summary judgment is 
,. 
- 12 -
' proper under the Cities Service rule. If the conspiracy is broadly 
defined to include the high price, home market conspiracy as well, 
then there is direct evidence of the conspiracy, and the Cities Serv-
ice rule is inapplicable. It is not clear how much impact resolution 
of this controversy would have outside the context of this particular 
case. Moreover, resolution of the issue may involve choosing as a 
matter of law between two competing economic arguments. 
(b) Sovereign compulsion. There seems to be no merit to resps' 
...__ _ -
argument that petrs did not raise the issue of the soVEreign compul---
sion defense below. As resps concede, petrs did address this issue in 
their briefs on appeal before the CA3, and the issue was expressly 
ruled on in the CA3's opinion. 
Petrs' contention is that the CA3 erred by not giving the MIT! 
( Statement conclusive effect. In order to give the Statement conclu-
sive effect, however, it is necessary to interpret the Statement. The 
MIT! Statement appears to be ambiguous. According to the Statement, 
MIT! directed petrs to enter into an agreement "with respect to" mini-
mum prices and "other matters," and "supervised" the preparation of 
the agreement. It is not clear that this amounts to "sovereign com-
pulsion." 
(c) Expert opinion evidence. There appears to be a direct con-
flict among the circuits on the question whether a trial court has 
discretion to exclude expert opinion evidence on the basis of the tri-
al court's own assessment of whether the underlying facts or data are 
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field 
in fotming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 




the questions presented in this case. The < nference of conspiracy" 
and < xpert opinion evidence" issues af feet the ability of anti trust 
defendants to obtain summary judgment and thereby avoid lengthy and 
costly trials involving possibly unmeritorious claims. The "sovereign 
compulsion" issue affects diplomatic relations. Presumably, the Court 
could address the purely legal issues presented by petrs, and then 
remand to the CA3 for de novo review of the massive summary judgment 
record in light of the Court's holdings. Without a careful review of 
the record, it is not clear how resolution of the issues presented 
actually would affect the outcome of this case. 
I recommend that the Court call for the views of the Solicitor 
General, at least on the "sovereign compulsion" issue, and possibly 
also on the "inference of conspiracy" issue, with a view to granting 
( cert. 
There is a response and a reply. 
-----
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-2004, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., et al. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., et al., relist for March 29, 1985 Conference 
In 1971, Zenith Radio Corp. and National Union Electric 
Corp., American television manufacturers, brought this action 
against 24 Japanese television manufacturers. Zenith and 
National, respondents, contended that the Japanese companies had 
participated in a 20-year conspiracy to drive American television 
manufacturers out of business by selling televisions at -------------
artificially high prices in Japan and at artificially low prices 
in the United States. Respondents claimed that various aspects 
of the alleged conspiracy violated §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
and the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 u.s.c. §72. 
After ruling that much of the expert testimony preferred 
.....----
by the respondents was inadmissible, the DC entered a summary 
' 
judgment in favor of the petitioners. In its 430 page opinion, / ----
the DC held that the respondents had not presented any evidence 
that the Japanese companies had conspired to sell televisions at 
low prices in this country in order to drive their American 
competitors out of business. 
CA3 reversed the DC's judgment in favor of petitioners. --The CA recognized that the respondents could not overcome 
petitioners' motion for summary judgment simply by showing that 
the Japanese companies all sold televisions in the United States 
for less than they sold similar sets in Japan. A price-fixing 
conspiracy, of course, may not be inferred solely from "parallel 
acts," without any evidence that the behavior is inconsistent 
with individual self-interest. First National Bank of Arizona v. 
Cities Services Co., 391 u.s. 253 (1968). Nevertheless, CA3 
found that there were three factors (other than this "parallel 
conduct") that precluded a summary judgment: (1) the Japanese 
companies collusively maintained high prices in Japan; and (2) 
the Japanese companies set minimum prices for sales in the United 
States; and (3) the Japanese companies agreed that each would 
sell televisions to only five customers in this country. The CA 
was willing to assume that the Japanese government compelled the 
companies to enter into the latter two agreements. 
The Japanese companies filed a writ of certiorari 
raising three issues@,ether a summary judgment should be 
granted to antitrust defendants when all of their actions are 
consistent with their independent economic self-interest; ~ - , 
whether the CA erred in holding that conduct mandated by a 
foreign government may "constitute or be a 'feature'" of an 
antitrust conspiracy; and (3) whether the DC erred in excluding 
the expert evidence it found to be based on false or unsupported 
factual assumptions. You and three other Justices voted to call 
for the views of the Solicitor General. 
The Solicitor General's brief, which was filed during 
your absence, recommends a grant on the first two issues. It 
argues that the CA's holding is inconsistent with Cities 
Services, supra. The petitioners' parallel conduct was perfectly 
consistent with independent self-interest. The conspiracy to 
.. 
• I 
At the last Conference, Justice~ ennan and Justice 
v'Blackmun voted to grant cert. Justice Marshall said that he 
would "join three." 
./ 
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Cleans Up Its OY/ll State ACtiOn Mess 
Mr. Sims is a.partner at Jones; Day, 
Reavis & Pogue in Washington, D. C. · 
. . 
In 1943, the Supreme Court decided 
in Parker v. Brown1 that the Sherman 
Act was not intended to ·apply to anti-
competitive conduct by a state acting 
through its legislature. During the next 
32 years, however, the Court left the 
development of this notion _to the lower 
courts. . 
Aided by the fact that Parker was 
one· of those opinions with a quote for 
any purpose, a very broad expan·sion of 
the state action shield resulted. In fact, 
according to the 4th Circuit in 1971, ifa 
state agency had the power to review 
and disapprove the challenged conduct 
but did nothing, it was "sensible to in-
f er that silence means consent, i.e., 
approval."' 
In 1975, the Supreme Court broke its 
three-decade fast on this issue in a spec-
tacular way. lo Goldfarb l'. Virginia 
State Bar, 3 the Court rejected the "si-
lence is golden" rule of the 4th Circuit 
and went all the way to the other end of 
the spectrum. In order for a private par-
ty or state agency to claim immunity 
fr.om antitrust attack, the Court held, 
"It is not enough that ... anticompeti-
tive conduct is 'prompted' by state ac-· 
tion; rather, anticompetitive activities 
must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as a sovereign."• 
In the next nine years, the Court re-
visited the state action issue seven more . 
times,' each time attempting to apply 
the relatively clear bl.It simplistic rule of 
Goldfarb ·to more difficult and complex 
fact situation!: conduct required by a 
state agency but in fact initiated by a 
private party:' conduct by a municipal 
subdivision of a state;' commands of a 
state 'Supreme court;' and regulatory 
schemes involving participation by pri~ 
vate parties .' . 
It would be generous to describe the 
result of this constant attention as con-
fusion , but some things seemed clear. It 
was clear after Bares in 1977 and crys-
ta l-clear after Ronwin in 1984 that law-
yer regulation was going to be exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny as a practical 
matter . It was also clear after Cir_1· of 
La fa 1 cne in 1976 and Boulder in 19~ 2 
th ~t · municipalities were in real a r ti -
tru st trouble (my first commentar) or, 
City of Lafaye11e was entitleq '"Anti-
trust Comes to City Hall").'0 but the 
rele,·ant legal standard was at oes t 
opaque. Finally, it seemed clear t:-i at 
pr i,·ate actions must be compelled b.:, 
the m ite in order to claim the pr0:r· 
1 ion of I he state action shidd, but " · ~: 
C an1or and Mi deal it was al so clear 1: : • 
co:;:ru !~ ion was not by itself sufficir ·: 
Indeed, after Midcal, some radical 
observers argued that compulsion was 
no longer even a relevant factor, since 
Midcal articulated a two-part test that 
never mentioned compulsion. 11 Of 
course, the fact that the Supreme Court 
had discovered a violation of§ I of the 
Sherman Act in Midcal-in which the 
anacK was on a state statute and there 
was no private defendant o'r any agree-
ment in restraint of trade-led some to 
conclude that the Supreme Court was 
itself more than a little confused in this 
art: :.i . 
Now, 10 years after Goldfarb, the Su-
preme Court has stepped back, looked 
at its work product in this area, con-
cluded that it wasn't very good, and 
essentially decided to start over." Thus, 
antitrust lawyers-at least those of us 
who have been around for the last de-
cade-have had the rare privilege of be-
ing witness to an entire life cycle of an 
antitrust practice care: birth, flowering, 
decay. and nov. death. It has been an 
interesting trip . 
The two new decisions-Southern 
Moro, Carriers Rare Conference ·:. 
L-n ired S1ares'i and Tok•n of Hallie i · 
Ory of Eau Claire' 3-are unique in two 
respects . First. they were obvious!:, 
treated as companion cases and wrillen 
to be consistent and reconcilable. One 
of the problems with past Supreme 
Court opinions in this area has been the 
ad hoc character of each opinion, seem-
ingly written with little regard for earli-
er decisions. 
Second, they were written from the 
perspective of a clean slate, instea~ of 
being treated as merely another little 
side street off a defined broad avenue. 
Since their predecessors amounted to at 
best a muddv back road, this was an im-
portant dec.ision . Finally, they _differ 
from most of their predecessors in yet 
another important respect: Right or 
wrong. they are relatively clear_. It 
seems obvious that the Court decided 
that it had mucked up this area and set 
out to clean up the stable. 
The most obvious problem created 
by the Court's nine-year ran:,bre 
through the ·state action bushes was the 
increase in municipal exposure. While 
all state subdivisions faced the same 
/l/11.,1ro1i,m h_rJu.,rph A:or 
theoretical problems, it was municipal 
action that created incentives for pri-
vate litigation, and it came by the ton. 
City of Lafayerre opened the door in 
1978, and Boulder's conclusion that 
home rule powers were not sufficient 
state action to ·protect municipal con-
duct in 1982 turned the stream into a 
flood. Municipalities sought legisla-
tion, 'and in 1984 they got it. The Local 
Government Antitrust Act of· 1984'~ 
barred antitrust damage actions against 
municipalities or . actions directed by 
them, in a clear sign of dissatisfaction 
with the results of the Court's work in . 
this area. 
Thus, Town of Hallie is to some ex-
tent an anticlimax. Nevertheless, the 
opinion is instructive because it really 
leads the way to the result in Southern 
Motor Carriers. In Town of Hallie. the 
complaint was that Eau Claire, which 
had created a sewage treatment facility, 
was using its monopoly over that facili-
ty to force neighboring towns to agree 
to annexation, thus forcing them also to 
use Eau Claire's sewage collection and 
transportation services . Wisconsin stat· 
utes gave cities the power to establish a 
sewage treatment facility and to refuse 
to serve areas outside the city. 
To a unanimous Supreme Court, any 
anti-competitive effects of the type 
complained of were clearly foreseeable 
and thus contemplated by the state. As 
such, this amounts to the kind of 
.. clearly articulated'' state policy re-
quired for the invocation of the state 
action doctrine. In addition, the Court 
held, neither state compulsion nor ac-
tive state supervision was necessary 
when municipal conduct was involved, 
since "'[w]e may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the mu-
nicipality acts in the public interest." 11 
This decision undoubtedly proceeds 
from a different emphasis than did Ciry 
of Lafayeue. In Lafayerre, Justice Wil-
liam J . Brennan' Jr. and a majority of 
\he Court. (including Justice Lewis F. 
.Powell Jr.) were clearly concern ('d 
about permitting "62.437 diffm n: 
units of local government" 16 to "m,, ~c 
economic choices counseled sole!;- t- : 
their own parochial interests ano with-
out regard to their anticompetitive cf. 
fects" 1' for fear of creating a "serious 
chink in the armor of antitrust protec-
tion ... at odds with the comprehensive 
national policy Congress 
established.'' 11 
And both Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger and Justice Thurgood Marshall 
would have applied even tougher stan-
dards than. did the majority. The chief 
justice said he would insist-even in a 
municipality case-that "the State com· 
pel the anticompetitive activity,"" and 
in addition, make the municipality 
"demonstrate that the exemption was 
not only part of a regulatory scheme to 
superseclc competition but that it was 
e.uenrial to the Sta tes' plan ." 1c ~L.ir-
, :-i ,!1 1 agreed with Burger and nottd t ~.i , 
he read the majority opinion as requir-
ing that "the State must 'impose' the 
practices 'as an act of government' '' in 
order for there to be an antitrust 
cxemption. 21 
Now, in Town of Hallie, a unanimous 
Court says it docs not want to examine 
closely "a state legislature's intent 10· 
determine whether the federal antitrust 
laws apply [because that] would be un-
desirable ... because it would embroil 
the federal'courts in the unnecessary in· 
terpretation of state statutes."21 It goes 
on to concede that "our cases have not 
'been entirely clear"23 on whether active 
state supervision is required, but con-
cludes it should not be required in mu-
nicipality cases because "'there is little 
or no danger that [the municipality) is 
involved in a private price-fixing 
arrangement."24 
62,437 Fewer Worries 
According to the 1984 Court, "Once 
it is clear that state authorization exists, 
there is no need to require the State to 
supervise actively the municipality's ex-
ecution of what is a properly delegated 
function." 2! Those 62,437 local govern-
ment units that the I 978 Court was so 
worried about arc no longer a subject of 
great concern. 
This new-found emphasis on the joys 
of ·federalism over the dangers of anti· 
competitive conduct carries over to 
Southern Motor Carriers Rare Confer-
ence r. United States, which involved 
trucking rate bureaus that established 
joint trucking rates for both intrastate 
and interstate carriers. The interstate 
carriers' rates were fixed by the ICC 
and thus were exempt from the anti-
trust laws. 
In contrast, the .activities of the rate 
burl!aus in setting intrastate rates were 
not covered by any federal immunity 
legislation or regulation, and the con-
duct was not compelled by any of the 
states in question. Collective ratcmak-
ing was permitted (and -even cncc,ur-
aged) as desirable conduct by the rele-
vant state agencies. but the trucking 
companies involved had the option ,1.• 
S!!ek individual rates from the state if 
they so desired . 
The Justice Department sued. argu-
ing that si nee no state or state a gene: 
compelled the private price-fixing con-
duct. it was not immune from federal 
antitrust liability. To hold otherwise . 
argued Justice, would allow states to 
oust the federal antitrust laws without 
. neces~rily serving any legitimate stat e 
interests . To the department, t.his issue 
was governed by the statement in 
Parker that a state may "not give im-
munity to those who violate the Sher-
man .Act by authorizing them to violate 
it, or by declaring that their action is 
Jawful .. 16 and the statement in Cantor 
that "state authorization, approval, cn-
cou ragement, or participation in re-
strictive private conduct confers no 
antitrust immunity.'' 27 Thus, Justice ar-
gued. in order for private parties to 
claim the state action shield. the st ;itc 
must compel their anti-competitive 
conduct. 
Al least until Midcal. the Justice De- · 
partment's position undoubtedly was 
the correct state of the law. Remember 
Goldfarb's language that to be exempt, 
the conduct must be "compelled by ... 
the State acting as a sovercign.'" 21 And 
in Cantor. a majority of the justices 
concluded that compulsion was a nec-
essary but not a sufficient fact. because 
even if state regulation was inconsistent 
with the antitrust laws, the antitrust 
laws must prevail: 
Congress could hardly have in-
.fencid"l st~ie ;~1-~Jatory ag~; 
"cies to . ·have . broader power 
than f ederaL agencies · to ex· 
empt private conduct fro~ the 
federal antitrust laws.29, ~- : 
Even Justice Potter Stewart, a constant 
d issentcr . in ·these . cases, . wrote in hi~· 
Cantor dissen_t that: ·. ,. 
Goldfarb ·clarified Parker by 
holding that private .conduct, if 
it is to come within the state· 
action exemption, must .be not 
merely "prompted" but "com-
pelled" by state action. Thus 
refined, the doctrine performs 
the salutary function of isolat· 
ing those areas of state regula• 
tion where the State's sover-
eign interest is, by the State's 
own judgment, at its strongest 
and limits the exemption to 
those areas.30 
Burger joined the relevant parts of Jus-
tice John Paul Steven's opinion in Can-
ror, as did Justices Byron R. White, 
Brennan, and Marshall. Justices Powell 
and William H. Rehnquist joined Stew-
art's dissent. Nevertheless, only Stevens 
and White now adhere to that view. 
Classic Re1isionism 
Today, in a classic piece of revisionist 
history, Powell writes that the Court in 
Goldfarb didn'.t mean to emphasize the 
word "compelled" in the previously 
quoted phrase; rather, the proper em-
phasis is on the phrase "the State acting 
as . a sovereign." Midcal is controlling 
here, says the Court, because-like 
. Southern Mo10r Carriers-Midcal in-
volved "state regulation restraining 
competition among private parties.'' 31 
That is rather like saying that ice-
bergs and ice cubes are similar because 
both consist of frozen water. Midcal 
dealt with a state statute compelling cer-
tain conduct; Southern Motor Carriers 
deals with voluntary conduct encour-
aged by a state agency operating under 
a very general grant of legislative 
authority·. 
Powell goes on to say that "Goldfarb 
.. . is not properly read as making com-
pulsion a sine qua non to state action 
immunity ." 31 The lawvers were com-
pelled after all, but n·ot by the state 
··acting as sovereign": 
Although we recognize that the 
language in Goldfarb is not 
without ambiguity. 11 ·e do nor 
read that opinion as m:.iking 
compulsion a prerequisite to a 
finding of state action 
immunitv_l! 
. . 
That is a carefully crafted statement 
with which it is difficult lo quarrel . 
However, assuming its accuracy, the 
seven Supreme Court justices who 
don't read Goldfarb that way arc proba-
bly the only people in the world that 
properly understand Goldfarb. and 
some of them were late bloomers. In 
addition to Stewart's dissent in Cantor, 
Stewart's dissent in City of Lafaye11e-
joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, 
and Harry A. Blackmun-sct forth this 
reading: 
In Goldfarb and in Cantor . .. 
the Court held that private ac-
tion must bt: compelled by the 
. stale legislature in order to es-
cape the reach of the Sherman 
Acl. Stale compulsion is an ap• 
propriate requirement when 
private persons claim that their 
anticompetitive actions are not 
their·own b~t 1h~'. si.ate's, since :. : -
a State cannot . immuniie pri-
vate anticompetitive conduct . 
merely by permittin_g il.-M 
. ..- ,, .. ~· .. 
Making th~ Gracie . .:'~." 
.Still; even if the Court.gets an A+ for 
creative writin·g and a D- for candor, 
what grade should it get for the subjec-
tive standards articulaled in these 
cases? I give it a . B+. The notion that 
municipalities should be treated essen-
tially as private parties. was a failure, 
and the Court was right to discard it. · 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen 
whether the standard . a_rticula.ted for 
state subdivisions· will. put us back in . 
the dark ages of state rubber stamping 
of private anti-competitive initiatives. · 
In the same sense, the compulsion no-
tion for private conduct was also a fai·l-
urc as sensible public policy, for it had 
the anomalous result of making the 
identitv of the defendant more impor-
tant than the character and context of 
the challenged conduct. 
As one who was around at the initia-
· The notion that 
municipalities should be 
treated essentially as 
private parties was a 
failure, and the Co~rt was 
right to discard it. 
l ion of Southern Motor Carriers almost 
nine years ago (only 17 months after 
Goldfarb and less than six months after 
Cantor) . I can assure you that it seemed 
like;; perfectly logical c2se. Nine years 
la ter. the complexities and unfairness of 
basing antitrust liability (with ~ts auto-
matic treble damages) on the precise 
language of state regulatory statutes are 
more obvious. 
Stil l. there is obviously a danger tha t 
loosened standards will provide a shield 
1 r thos e who merelv use the existence 0 f 
sta te regulation as· a cover for pri\' :o t~ 
;ni ,:::onduct Whether the "active su p: :-
, ;~;o,,·· reau ire:nent embraced b~ t ": 
Court as a prerequisite· lo 1mmumty lor 
priva_le conduct _will prove 8 sufficient 
screen remains robe seen. 
In any event, this is the end of an era. 
Stewart must feel vindicated. While he 
joined the · unanimous Court in _Gold-
farb, he came .lo understand the prob-
lems of an overly simplistic approach 
earlier than most and dissented in Can-
. tor and City of Lafayeue. His argu-
ments have ultimately prevailed. 
In a similar vein, Stevens-who 
wrote the plurality opinion in Cantor, 
which was the most important single 
contributor to the confusion that char-
acterized this area, and joined the ma-
jority in Midcal and Boulder-has now 
clearly lost his innuence in this area. 
This began to show in Ronwin. in which 
Powell spent several pages responding 
to Stevens' unusual perspective on 
Parker. Now only White remains as a 
Stevens ally on this point. 
Finally. it also seems clear that the 
Court has had enough of th~se cases. 
On the Monday following these two lat-
est opinions, the Court denied all the 
pending state action petitions,H thus 
clearly indicating that it wanted to for-
get this particular problem. 
With luck, maybe the Court will turn 
some of its" antitrust energy to more im-
portant areas of-substantive· interpreta-
tion. such as the parallel conduct issue 
in the Ja anese cl ctr nic · roducts 
antitrust litigation that t e ourt has 
just decided to review.36 We can hope _ 
that this biz.arre chapter in the Supreme 
Court's book on how lo make antitrust 
policy is closed, at least for a while. 
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MATSUSHITA, ~ c)( 
v. 
ZENITH, ~ ol_ 
Motion for Leave to 
Dispense with the Joint 
Appendix 
SUMMARY: Petrs seek leave to dispense with the requirement 
of a printed joint appendix. Petrs estimate that a printed 
appendix, if required, would cost $660,000 and encompass 25 
volumes. 
BACKGROUND: In this case, resps, two American television 
manufacturers, are suing petrs, the principal Japanese television 
manufacturers doing business in the United States, for treble 
' 
- 2 -
federal antitrust laws and the Antidumping Act of 1916. The DC 
(ED Pa., Becker, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of petrs 
on all claims, finding no admissible evidence of conspiracy or 
concerted action on the part of the Japanese manufacturers. 
The CA3 reversed, finding sufficient evidence of concerted 
action to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
liability under federal antitrust laws and the Antidupming Act. 
This Court granted cert on April 1, 1985 to (1) determine the 
sufficiency of resps' showing of conspiracy for summary judgment 
purposes and (2) review the merits of petrs' allegation that the 
challenged marketing techniques were compelled by Japanese law.1 
The motion to dispense with the joint appendix was filed by 
the petrs on May 10, 1985. Resps submitted their opposition on 
May 16, 1985 and a reply to the opposition was received by the 
Clerk on May 21, 1985. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs allege that, because of the magnitude of 
the case, the joint appendix in the CA3 totalled 18,780 pages and 
encompassed 44 volumes. This appendix has been designated as the 
record in this Court and is presently being transmitted to the 
Clerk for storage. 
In the meantime, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 30, petrs 
designated 154 pages of the record for inclusion in the joint 
appendix before this Court. Thereafter, resps designated 
approximately 6,000 pages for inclusion in the appendix as 
"essential" to the Court's consideration of this matter. 
Petrs allege that resps' designation is excessive and 
"appears to be merely a tactic designed to obscure the legal 
lThe Court granted cert on only two of the three questions 
presented by petrs. 
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issues presented in this case." Petrs estimate that a printed 
appendix, which includes all documents designated by the parties, 
would encompass 25 volumes and cost approximately $660,000. 
Although resps have agreed to front the cost of the appendix, 
petrs note that the expense may eventually be passed on to petrs 
under Supreme Court Rule 50. Petrs also assert that the 
"enormous" appendix will be a burden to the Clerk. They 
therefore urge the Court to dispense with the requirement of an 
appendix and, instead, allow the parties to cite directly to the 
record from the CA3. 
Resps take issu·e with petrs' allegation that resps' 
designation is excessive and accuse petrs of attempting to 
"discourage review of the sufficiency of the • evidence of 
conspiracy in this case" by failing to designate the documents in 
the record which support the CA3's findings. Resps allege that 
they have made a good faith effort to designate only those 
documents necessary to support the CA3's decision and suggest 
that a review of the record is essential to their claims. Resps 
argue petrs' proposed solution (i.e., "burying" their evidence of 
the alleged conspiracy in a single copy of the CA3's 18,780-page 
appendix) would prejudice resps' position by hindering the 
Court's review of the pertinent documents. 
Resps also contend that petrs' estimates of the cost and size 
of the appendix are greatly exaggerated. Resps state that they 
have further pared down their designation to 5,700 pages. Resps' 
printer estimates the documents can be contained in 9 volumes at 
a cost of approximately $182,560. Such an appendix, petrs note, 
- 4 
does not materially exceed the appendices of other antitrust 
) cases which have previously come before the Court.2 
• I 
Finally, petrs point out that resps have not proposed any 
alternatives to the CA3's record. Petrs suggest that a procedure 
similar to that used in the CA3 be adopted by the Court (i.e., 
each side to provide its own joint appendix, pagination and 
volume numbering to be consecutive between the two segments of 
the appendix, both parties may be permitted to file their 
appendices with their respective briefs and each side will bear 
their own costs despite the outcome of the case). 
DISCUSSION: Supreme Court Rule 30.1 states that all 
appendices must be reproduced in typographic printing or 
typewritten form on 6 1/8 by 9 1/4 inch paper. The Court has, in 
the past, waived some or all of the requirements respecting the 
preparation of the appendix. See Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court 
Practice (5th Ed. 1978), §12.13, pp. 668-690. In fact, Supreme 
Court Rule 30.7 provides: "The Court by order may dispense with 
the requirement of a joint appendix and may permit a case to be 
heard on the original record (with such copies of the record, or 
relevant parts thereof, as the Court may require), or on the 
appendix used in the court below, if it conforms to the 
requirements of this Rule." 
In this case, the Court may, of course, strictly impose the 
requirements of Rule 30 upon the parties. The Rule is, after 
all, for the convenience of the Court and the cost of a printed 
appendix is an expense of litigation. The parties do not allege 
that they are unable to pay the cost of printing. 
2In their opposition, resps cite several cases in which the 
joint appendices ranged in size from 3,500 to 16,500 pages. 
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However, as a practical matter, the exorbitant cost of the 
) appendix in this case may be prohibitive, even for these large 
corporate clients. If the Court is inclined to grant the parties 
relief from the rigorous requirements of Rule 30 because of the 
, , estimated cost of the proposed appendix in this case, there are 
(at least) three alternatives available. First, the Court could 
order a deferred appendix under Rule 30.4 which would include 
only those documents specifically referred to in the parties' 
briefs. Once given the opportunity to reflect on the need for 
their designations, the parties may voluntarily reduce the size 
(and therefore the cost) of the appendix. However, this 
alternative leaves the matter in the hands of the parties and, in 
any event, will not substantially reduce the projected size of 
the appendix. 
Second, the Court could permit the parties to Xerox those 
portions of the record, which otherwise meet the spacing 
requirements of Rule 30, on 8 1/2 x 11 inch paper. The parties 
would then be required to retype only those documents which do 
not meet the spacing requirements of the Rule. This would 
substantially reduce the cost of the appendix without 
significantly compromising those requirements of Rule 30 aimed at 
ensuring a readable record for the Court. 
Finally, the Court could waive Rule 30 and use the appendix 
of the CA3. This option is certainly the most economical for the 
parties. However, the record below is nearly 44 volumes and 
includes numerous documents which have no bearing on the two 
. ' 
- 6 -
issues before the Court. This would probably be the least 
convenient alternative for the Court. 
I recommend that the Court deny the motion to dispense with 
the appendix and, instead, adopt the second alternative discussed 
above. In particular, I suggest that the Court permit the 
photographic reproduction of those documents which otherwise meet 
the spacing requirements on 8 1/2 x 11 inch paper and require all 
documents that include small print, or are eligible, to be 
: retyped on 8 1/2 x 11 inch paper. This option achieves the 
desired goal for the parties (i.e., reduction in cost) while, at 
the same time, fulfilling the purposes of Rule 30 (i.e., 
convenience and clarity of record for the Court). An appendix in 
the proposed form would encompass 5-10 volumes and cost 
substantially less than the estimates submitted by both parties.3 
CONCLUSIONS: The Court, in its discretion, may waive all or 
part of the requirements of Rule 30. Petrs' suggestion that the 
Court use the CA3's appendix is the most economical for the 
parties, but does not solve any of the other problems resulting 
from the enormity of the proposed appendix in this case. The 
motion to dispense with the appendix should therefore be denied 
and a modified appendix allowed. The Legal Office recommends the 
Court waive the printing and page size requirements of Rule 30. 
The parties could then be allowed to submit an 8 1/2 x 11 inch 
appendix which includes (1) photographic copies of those 
documents in the record which otherwise comply with the spacing 
13
The Clerk also recommends this option because it meets the 
concerns of both parties and the needs of the Court. In 
addition, the Clerk suggests that the Court waive the requirement 
of 40 copies. If the Court is inclined to grant the parties some 
relief from the financial burden of producing the appendix in 
this case, it is possible for the Court to get by with as few as 





requirements of the Rule and (2) typewritten reproductions of all 
designated documents which do not meet the spacing requirements. 
The Court may also wish to consider relieving the parties of 
their obligation to provide 40 copies of the appendix. The Clerk 
suggests that the Court could get by with as few as 12 copies. 
There is a response. 
5/23/85 Niddrie 
.. 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.l'uprtmt Ol1tnri &tf tfrt 'Jimtb .itatt. 
Jfaglfington. ~- QJ. 20JJl, 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 83-2004 - Matsushita v. Zenith 
June 3, 1985 
This case is here on petitioner's motion to dispense with 
printing of the record and to hear the case on briefs and a 
single copy of the record in the Court of Appeals. We voted last 
week to hear the case on that record but would have required the 
usual number of copies. After talking with Al Stevas, I asked 
that the matter be relisted. 
The record in the Court of Appeals consisted of 44 volumes 
of photocopied materials. Petitioner asserts that each volume 
contained about 500 pages. Respondent claims that there were 
18,780 pages in the entire record. The Court of Appeals 
permitted 600 pages of briefs and heard argument for two days. 
The case was and is heavily factbound; the evidence will be 
argued at length. 
Petitioner, who claims the Court of Appeals erred, 
designated only 154 pages in this Court, Respondent some 5700 
(although Petitioner asserts the designation was far larger). 
Whatever the total designated, the record here would be 
voluminous and fill 15 or so volumes if printing were dispensed 
with. If that is so, to the extent that in deciding the case we 
would be required to resort to the record, we would in any event 
be going from one of many volumes to another, and I'm not sure 
that there would be much advantage in cutting the volume number 
from 44 to 15. Hence, my vote to hear the case on the Court of 
Appeals' record. Al tells me that the parties have 9 copies of ~' 
the Court of Appeals' Appendix on hand and, if that were enough, 
there would be no need to reproduce anything. Except for the 
concern indicated below, that would be my course. 
What was not altogether clear to me, however, is the fact 
that a sizable number of the pages in the Court of Appeals' 
appendix are illegible or at least difficult to read. The scope 
of this problem, particularly as it might relate to the 5700 
pages designated by respondents, is not at all clear. Whatever 
its scope, if we allowed the filing of an unprinted version of 
the designated portions of the Court of Appeals' record, this 
problem would be solved since we would not accept illegible 
... 
materials and the parties would have to retype and duplicate the 
unreadable pages. But it is not suggested that the Court of 
Appeals had problems with illegibility, and it may well be that 
the designated portions would not pose an insuperable problem in 
this respect. If a party actually intends to refer in brief to 
an illegible part of the record, that party should attach to its 
brief a legible copy of the material referred to. It also seems 
to me that the dispute will not be about what the record says but 
what inferences of fact and conclusions of law may properly be 
drawn from it. 
As presently advised, I would adhere to the vote last week, 
except that I would require only 9 copies to the record below. 
But if the foregoing considerations suggest that we should not 
hear the case on 9 copies of the 44-volume record made up of 
photocopied materials, there remain other choices. We could 
refuse to waive printing of the designated record. Both sides 
would like to avoid that expense, although these parties are no 
less able to pay than parties in prior antitrust cases who filed 
very large printed records. The very problem of illegibility 
that is urged against hearing the case on the Court of Appeals' 
record suggests that we should insist on printing. Short of 
that, of course, we could dispense with printing and certain 
other requirements and permit the filing of photocopies of the 
designated record. Third, we could dispense with designations 
now and permit each party, as it files its brief, to file in 
unprinted but legible form what it deems to be the necessary part 
of the record. This is the way the Court of Appeals proceeded.* 
* There is a 4th option: reconsider the grant. 
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MEMORANDUM 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
Re: Relist of Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
No. 83-2004. 
This antitrust case was relisted for you from the last 
Conference. 
0 SG's motion 
We gave JUSTICE REHNQUIST your votes on both the 
for time to a~~tion- to~ ow a 
reduced appendix. I therefore doubt that it was relisted for you 
for either of these reasons. On the list we gave JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST I asked to have the case relisted for yo~ the Con-
ference was to reconsider its original grant of cert, as your 
notes from the June 6 Conference indicated it might. ( See your 
annotations to docket sheet for June 6.) Thus, at Thursday's 
Conference you might well be asked to vote on whether to DIG the 
case or vacate the original order granting cert. I bring this to 
------your attention because your notation at the top of this week's 
docket sheet contains a recommendation only for the two motions, 
not for reconsideration of the original grant of cert. , I have 
attached the file for this case just in case you want to recon-
sider the certworthiness of this case. 
June 20, 1985 
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To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
MEMORANDUM 
Re:Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., No 83-2004. 
After looking over the materials on this case, I share 
many of your concerns that the Court should not take it. Ques-
tion 1 is extremely factbound, would require this Court to wade 
through an extremely long and complex record, and is unlikely to 
lead to any rule of general applicability in future cases. It 
also presents at most a tolerable conflict and the Court is not 
institutionally competent to decide the first issue well. Ques-
tion 3, the expert testimony issue, is not certworthy independ-
ently of Question 1. So, at the least, I recommend digging or 
vacating the original grant of cert on these two questions. 
Ii '' the foreign state action issue, presents a 
different It centers on interpretation of the MIT! 
statement, which is somewhat ambiguous and was prepared only in 
response to the litigation. In the best of all possible worlds, 
the Court would wait to decide this issue until it had a case 
before it where the foreign country's "statement" ordering anti-
competitive behavior was unambiguous and issued at the time of 
the behavior itself. Considering the circumstances of this case, 
page 2. 
I'm not sure that this Court can disagree with the CA3's decision 
to remand to the DC for factf inding to determine whether there 
really was compulsion by a foreign sovereign. Thus, I would 
probably have originally recommended--had we known all we know 
now--against granting cert even on this issue. 
The Court has already grant~ cert, however, so one 
concern--institutional embarrassment--militates in favor of pre-
serving the grant, if only on one issue. If the Court digs or 
completely vacates the original grant at this point, it will ap-
pear that it is doing so only because there is a lengthy record. 
I am unable to judge the importance of this concern, however. If 
you feel it is important, I would recommend that you vote to va-
----- ----------""""""""'"' 
cate the grant as to questions 1 and 3. Question 2 by itself 
should not require the Court to dip too far into the record. If 
this institutional concern is not very important, I recommend 
that you vote to vacate the grant across the board. 




Re: 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp. 
At the Conference yesterday I learned that the relist 
for me was on the substantive motion, made by Bill 
Brennan, to vacate our grant or simply DIG this case. As 
I had not maturely considered this rather unusual action, 
I asked that the case be again relisted. 
At a prior Conference this question was discussed. 
John Stevens in particular made a persuasive argument that 
the issues were essentially factual, that the record wa~ ,, 
enormous, and that after all the case involves questions 
that are likely to be decided by the Executive and 
Legislative Branches. Several of the Justices agreed. 
I do think the case would be a difficult one for this 
Court to address fairly. I wrote an antitrust decision 
involving bank acquisitions when Jack Owens, John Jeffries 
and John Buckley were my clerks. As I recall, the record 
consisted of 7 or 8 large printed volumes. I realized 
-
2. 
then that we are not a court that should undertake the 
resolution of complex factual issues. I therefore am 
sympathetic to WJB's motion, but would like your views. 
You can give them to me orally or in a very brief memo, as 
I think I understand the basic considerations. 
LFP 
June 22, 1985 
83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio Cocp. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
My understanding i.s that at the Conference on June 
13 - when I was absent - Bill Brennan moved that we vacate 
our qrant of certiorari o~ nIG this case. 
In view of my absence, the caEte was reli.sted f.or 
me at the June 20 Conference, but I did not understand that 
the purpoc:;e of the rf:>1:fsting was to have me nresent when 
Bill's motion was discussed. Again, the case was relisted 
and wilJ come up at our Conference on the 27th. 
I ~ave taken ~nothPr look at thls casP. It is 
certai.nly true that Question 1 is extremely factbound, anfl 
would require us to consi.<ler a lonq ant' complex record. Any 
dee is ion we malie wou 1a have little or no app l icab i U. tv to 
future cases in whi.cl-\ the facts were different. To the ex-
tent it is argued that there is a conflict, I doubt that we 
could resolve it on the basis of the factual record. 
At least, I woul~ join Bill's motion to vacate or 
DIG our grant of cert on this question. 
Question 2 (the foreign "state action" issue} in-
volves intPrPretatinn of the MITI statement. This statement 
was pr.epared - as T understand it - in response to this lit-
igation and is not a model of claritv. Accordingly, if I 
had been as fami.liar with the case as perhaps I should have 
been, I would not have voted to grant it. 
My only concern now is an institutional one: that 
is, whether the Court itself would suffer if we now decided 
that the grant was a mistake. I would like to hear the dis-
cussion of this question before I commit myself. 
, 
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i'upr tnu <!fttmi ttf tlft ~nittlt ~hdtl\' 
11hwlfinghtn, ~- <ir, 2llc?~, 
CH"MBERS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 24, 1985 
Re: 83-2004 - Matsushita Electric v. 
Zenith Radio Corp. 
Dear Chief: 
If a vote is taken at the Conference tomorrow morning 
on Bill Brennan's motion to DIG our grant of cert in this 
case, I vote in favor of the motion. 
If some intermediate action, other than a straight DIG 
or a straight refusal to DIG--such as perhaps a limitation 
on the grant--Lewis has my proxy. 
In my judgment the institutional concern that Lewis 
mentioned in the last paragraph of his memorandum of June 
22, 1985, is outweighed by the interest in not expending the 
Court's scarce resources on this particular case. 
Finally, if there is any sentiment for a brief 
explanation of an order, I would submit the following as a 
possible draft: 
"The parties' recent filings with this Court have 
brought home the exceedingly fact-dependent nature of 
this controversy. After careful reexamination of the -
petition for certiorari, as well as the additional 
filings, we have concluded that plenary review is 
premature at this stage of the proceedings, that the 5~ 
writ was improvidently granted, and that it should be 
dismissed. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
It is so ordered." 
Respectfully, 
J~ J . J,rl)~ ~ 
Q, /J5 .,LoJ)J&-'. 
/~~M 
LMJ~ ,lo]) I 6-~ 
C),-~~~ 
~. s~ ~ 
~4 . ~12-~ 
,uvrtutt a+ourt of tqt ~a jlta:ttit 
Jruqinghtn. ~- cq. 2llffe'!-~ 
June 25, 1985 
Re: 83-2004 - Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., et al., 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation, et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
With four others, I voted to deny cert. 
Now that four wish to be shown on the public record that they 
wish to hear the case, the explanation for this phenomenon will 
never be understood. 
I resolve it by voting now to DENY the motion to vacate the grant 
of certiorari. 
June 27, 1985 
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., et al. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., et al., No. 83-2004 
Cert to CA3 
Argument date: November 12, 1985 
0-iestions Presented 
1. May antitrust plaintiffs survive summary judgment on a 
predatory pr icing conspiracy claim by introducing evidence that -
is consistent with both predatory and non-predatory conduct, when 












2. May foreign corporations be held liable under American 
mtitrust laws for acts which were compelled by a foreign 
sovereign? 
Statement of Facts 
Although it has generated mountains of paper, the case as ~ 
~ /3-' 
this Court has it is actually relatively simple. Respondents M-J>t 
~ 
(plaintiffs below) are two American television manufacturers. LI 
~ . 
Petrs (defendants below) are 21 Japanese corporations that sell 
~levisions. Basically, respondents allege that petrs conspired 
to fix artificially low prices for their televisions in the 
Ulited States market, in order to drive respondents out of 
business. This "predatory pr icin II conspiracy is said to have 
taken place over a 20-year period. Respondents claimed below 
that petrs' conduct violated the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman 
Jct, the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 1 
After a series of incredibly long opinions on evidentiary 
~ -v 
issues, the DC (Becker, J.) granted petrs summary judgment on all 
claims. On the main claim -- the predatory pricing conspiracy ------




In particular, the DC found that there was no basis in 
1 The parties do not discuss either the Robinson-Patman 
or Wilson Tariff Act claims, except to say that the CA3's 
finding of a Sherman Act conspiracy is er i tical to those 
claims. The issue before this Court !-9- therefore limited 




the record for finding that petrs had priced their TVs below cost 
A 
in the u.s. market. 
CA3 issued two opinions, one on the anti trust claims and ------------
one on the Antidumping Act claim. Both opinions reversed the 
OC's grant of summary judgment. In its anti trust opinion, CA3 
found that a factfinder could reasonably draw the followirg 
mferences from the record (the following points are drawn from 
App to Petn for Cert 169a to 180a): 
~ 
{.,~ i'IJ~f:. f~-h ~ £<. ~ ~ /2-V. 
,.~--- (i) Petrs conspired to create artificially high prices for 
---=--
their products in Japan. 
(ii) Petrs had higher fixed costs than their U.S. 
counterparts, and therefore needed to operate at full capacity in 
crder to make a profit. Meanwhile, petrs' capacity was 
substantially in excess of what they needed to produce for their 
tome market. Thus, petrs had to break into overseas markets. 
(iii) In cooperation with Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MIT!), petrs fixed minimum ---------- , 
pr ices for export of TVs to the u. s. market. ( These minimum 
prices are referred to by the parties as ~ The 






(iv) Petrs also "engaged in various schemes to rebate part 
of the sales price to a number of mass marketing retail customers 
in the United States." Id., at 179a. Petrs sought to conceal 








(v) There was expert testimony that export sales were at 
pr ices that produced substantial losses, "often as high as 
twenty-five percent on sales." Ibid. 
~i) Petrs operated under a "five-customer" agreement that 
permitted them to sell to no more than five u.s. retailers. This 
allowed petrs to monitor each other's compliance with the 
conspiratorial objectives. 
(A$ ~ ~ hese were ~11 permissible inferences on the record, 
 
CA '3 ~ ~ that a reasonable jury could find a conspiracy to 
-------- Et"ice predatorily in the U.S., in order to drive out American 
competition. 
Petrs argued that, to the extent they conspired to set ________ ______________. 
pr ices in the Arner ican market, their behavior was compelle_d ~ 
MI.TI, an agency of the Japanese government. 
;:::::;;, ----- ------------- CA3 rejected this 
argument, finding that no compulsion had been shown. 
Discussion 
It the outset, it's important to note what is and is not 
before the Court. Respondents made claims under a variety cf. 
statutes. CA3 found a conspirac to price predatorily and 
thereby drive respondents out of business. That finding was then 
used to reverse the DC' s summary judgment ruling on all claims 
save the Antidumping Act claim. On the Antidumping Act claim, 
C'A3 issued a separate opinion, in which it concluded that there 
was a sufficient showing of intent to drive American companies 
rut of business to survive summary judgment. App to Petn for 
,, 
5. 
Cert 205a-223a. (Under the Antidumping Act, plaintiffs must show 
that a foreign business (1) has priced substantially lower in the 
American market than in its home market, and ( 2) that the lower 
B:ice was set with the intent of driving American companies out 
of business. 15 u.s.c. §72.) 
The relevant question presented, as stated in the cert 
petition, reads: 
Whether, in an anti trust conspiracy case based upon 7hL 
'parallel' acts and other circumstantial evidence, (y 
rummary judgment for the defendants may be reversed a.c.. /2.-/-d-,f 
when the District Court has found that all of the '---- c-.,._;, 
e,idence is entirely consistent with the independent 
economic self-interest of each defendant, and the Court f.LI-. 
~a;i.s has neither _,reje_Eted t!}at finding nor even 
considered wfietner ~ de"fendants- actions were more 
consistent with an inference of conspiracy than with an 
inference of independent action? 
'lhe cert petition goes on to discuss, in detail, CA3's 
conclusions as to the existence of a conspiracy to price 
.._____. { predator ily. The petition mentions the Antidumping Act holding 
V"' . ( on~g, saying that it was wrong for the same reasons 
~ tha:i the conspiracy holding was wrong. Petn for Cert at 8. The ~ 
~ ~,'.:: u.:' almos_~...-!:'.'.~!:.':.''...~:~'.:::Y on the find in-;",. ~/1 'a preda t ;iry / ~ 
,~ ~ ricing conspiracy, although petrs again argue briefly (one-and----,  - ~--------
;:. ~ {r 
I 
one-half pages, with no citations to any legislative history) 
1r that the Antidumping Act holding is also mistaken. Brief for 
q- /ft A• J.i~ 
~ 
f J/"'Tr· Petrs 46-47. 
w"" Under these circumstances, ,,,._",-
I don't think th~ ntidum~ ing 
Act holding is ~ roperly before the Court. Rule 21.l(a) of this 
Cburt 's Rules states that 11 [o] nly the questions set forth in the 
pe,tition or fairly included therein will be considered by the 
Cburt. 11 Despite the fact that CA3 treated the Antidumping Act 
' ( 
6. 
claim separately (deciding it in a completely separate opinion), 
the questions presented do not mention the Antidumping Act or its 
elements. Neither the body of the petition nor petrs' brief on 
the merits discusses the Antidumping Act except to say that 
reversal on the other claims would require reversal on the 
P.ntidumping Act claim. I think the fairest conclusion is that 
petrs' claim focuses on whether a predatory pr icing conspiracy 
muld be found on this record. The Court should therefore 
analyze the legal standard for predatory pricing claims and their 
interaction with Rule 56. To the extent that discussion bears on 
Antidumping Act analysis, CA3 can consider it on remand. But I 
cbn' t think the Court should undertake to reach out to discuss 
the Antidumping Act when the parties have not done so. 
I. Did CA3 Apply the Proper Standard to the Question Whether a 
Conspiracy Could be Found? 
I'll begin by summarizing what CA3 held, and what was 
wrong with that holding. I'll then proceed with my own analysis 
of the case. 
A. Summary/Conclusions 4CA-_i 
=- 1\ 
CA3 noted that .,..,consciously parallel conduct ~ I}9t in ----
itself give rise to an inference of an illegal antitrust -
conspiracy. App to Petn for Cert 164a. The court concluded that -
the problem was different, however, when the evidence of 
conspiracy was direct rather than circumstantial. In the case of 






defendants actually agreed to act together "the court must 
simply determine whether, if the fact-finder were to credit the 
direct evidence of the fact in issue, the existence of that fact 
YOuld have 
at 165a. 
the legal significance urged" by the plaintiffs. Id., 
c. A 3. 
Here, the court found, there was direct evidence of ._______, ---
pieces of the conspiracy together with circumstantial evidence of ,r-; 1 -other pieces. The court concluded that the combination was 
s..Ifficient to raise a genuine fact issue as to the existence of 
an illegal conspiracy to monopolize the American TV market. 
The problem with this analysis is that it fails to focus 
on the particular violation that respondents allege in this case. 
fespondents cannot recover because petrs fixed prices in Japan; 
that conduct caused no injury to American businesses. Nor can 
respondents recover damages if petrs fixed minimum prices in the 
American market or agreed to restrict competition among Japanese 
products; once again, respondents suffer no injury from that 
conduct. The only conspiracy for which respondents can recover 
--------------is a conspiracy to price predatorily in the American market. As 
tn that conspiracy, the evidence is almost wholly circumstantial. 
Consequently, the problem of inferring an illegal conspiracy from 
ambiguous conduct cannot be avoided in this case. 1 The court should have asked whether a reasonable 
factfinder could have found a predatory pricing conspiracy on 
this record. The answer to that question obviously depends in 
part on the economic context in which the question arises. Here, 
thelie are very strong contextual reasons to believe that there -- ~












~~ ~ T v /"h,...~ -
and do not now hold the kind of dominant position in the TV 
rrarket that would permit them to charge monopoly pr ices, yet 
without that ability it makes no sense to take substantial losses 
fur a long period of time in order to drive competitors out of 
business. In light of this economic context, respondents should 
b: required to bring forward evidence (either direct or 
circumstantial) that would support a finding that petrs in fact 
I;t"iced their goods below cost over some extended period of time. 
That evidence should be strong, since the context renders the 
1115 
~~ alleged conspiracy 
~~i,JAA,nduct in this area is usually consistent with vigorous price 
facially implausible, and since ambiguous 
; ~ oompetition. Since CA3 did not apply this kind of standard, the 
Court should remand for a redetermination of the issue. ~JS,, 




In order to establish an antitrust conspiracy, the 
!laintiff must "present direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably tends to prove that the [defendants] 'had a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful 
cbjective. '" Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 s.ct. -- -1464, 1471 (1984) (POWELL, J.) (quoting Edward J. Sweeny & Sons, 
.Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 
451 U.S. 911 (1981)). Evidence of such conspiracies may often be 
circumstantial, since violators will naturally tend to cover ~ 
their tracks. But in relying on circumstantial evidence to find 
an illegal conspiracy, courts must take care that the evidence 
will support a reasonable inference that the conspiracy existed. 
9. 
'Illus, in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 
391 u.s. 253 (1968), this Court affirmed a grant of summary 
j.ldgment in an antitrust conspiracy case where (1) the only 
evidence supporting plaintiff's theory was a parallel refusal to 
&al, and (2) there was no natural incentive for the defendant to 
j:>in the alleged conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 285-288. Cities 
fervice distinguished other cases in which consciously parallel 
conduct had given rise to an inference of illegal conspiracy by 
noting that in those cases the competitive context made a 
conspiracy finding plausible. 1...9...!_, at 285 (discussing Poller v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 u.s. 464 (1962)); :i,_fL, at 
287 (discussing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 
us. 208 (1939)). Where such a finding is not plausible in light 
cf. the "competitive relationship[s] ," id. at 285, mere evidence --of parallel conduct will not suffice. 
Monsanto is really nothing more than an application of 
this principle. In Monsanto, the Court held that evidence that a 
mmufacturer terminated a distributor in response to complaints 
from other distributors was not enough to support a finding of an 
illegal conspiracy. The Court noted that manufacturers were free 
to exchange information with their distributors, and also that 
rranufacturers were free independently to terminate a distributor. 
104 s.ct. at 1469-1470 (citing, inter alia, United States v. 
Cblgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). If fact-finders were 
permitted to infer an illegal conspiracy from "highly ambiguous 
evidence 0 i.e., termination in response to complaints -- the 
freedom to exchange information and to unilaterally terminate 
10. 
might 0 be seriously eroded. 0 Id., at 1470. To avoid this 
problem, the Court required plaintiffs to put forward eviden<::l:! 
~hat tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and 
the nonterminated distributors were acting independently. 0 Id., 
at 1471. 
The point of Cities Service and Monsanto is this: In many 
anti trust conspiracy cases, there is a large body of evidence 
fuat is consistent with a finding of conspiracy, but also 
mnsistent with other, innocent explanations. Such evidence 
cannot support a finding of conspiracy when the innocent 
explanations are the more plausible. The point is a pretty 
obvious one. If two manufacturers who have a tiny share of the 
relevant market and (consequently) no market power over pr ice 
meet for lunch, their meeting might be relevant to the question 
w-iether they conspired to fix prices. But since the overall 
context renders a price-fixing conspiracy completely implausible, 
fue evidence of a meeting (even if combined by parallel pr ice 
conduct) should not support a finding of an illegal conspiracy. 
C. The Illegal Objective 
~ Uties 
'lhis case presents a complication in applying Monsanto and ____________,. 
Service, and . it's a complication that apparently confused 
l A '3 ------------------ --CA3. Here, there are a number of potential and actual 
0 conspiracies 0 which respondents allege. There is evidence that 
:r;etrs cartelized the Japanese market, and also that petrs have 
adopted a 0 five-company rule 0 that limits their freedom to sell 








may be unlawful, but they cannot be the basis for holding petrs 
liable in damages to respondents. Respondents do not suffer any 
injury from supracompetitive prices in Japan. Nor do respondents 
ruffer any injury from supracompetitive prices (or from nonprice 
restrictions that serve to raise prices) in this country. 
Ies~ ts, after all, are petrs' competitors: resp~ _:lE:.£tS ~e C91r 
helped and not hurt by conspiracies which r~ the price of TV ~ t 
~ts"-: Cf. ~:unswi : k ~ v ~ Pueblo Bowl-0-~~t, 429 U.S. 477, ___,,, 
488 (1977) ("It is inimical to the purposes of" the antitrust 
laws to award damages for lost profits due to increased 
competition). The only conspiracy for which respondents can 
recover is a conspiracy . to monopolize the American TV market 
through predatory pricing. 
~A~ Just what ricing is predatory? There is universal 
tfk; ~?. I ~ 
~ cgreement that predatory pricing ~eans pricing b elow some measure 
of cost. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 u.s. 
685, 698, 701, 702 n. 14 (1967). In the seminal article 
argued that predatory 
in this~4'.&,.--area, -rofessors Areeda and Turne 
--,.,,_""'--~~ - pr1c1ng +-r~ 
should encompass only pr icing below short-run average variable --~ --- - -
cnsts. 2 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pr icing and Related Practices 
lhder Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
This Court did not adopt a clear standard in Utah Pie (which was 
in any event a Robinson-Patman case and therefore focused rn 
--
2 The average variable cost formula was intended as a 
convenient substitute for short-run marginal cost, which 
is usually very difficult to determine. 
12. 
p:-ice discrimination), but CAs have generally applied some 
variant of the Areeda & Turner proposal. See, e.g., Barry Wright 
\.,._ --"'-.. "--
Corp. v. IT'I' Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983) 
(Breyer, J.) ("incremental cost"); Northeastern Telephone Co. v. 
Anerican Telepone & Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86-88 (CA2 1981) 
(Kaufman, J.) (marginal cost). See also Southern Pacific 
Communications v. A.T.& T., 740 F.2d 980, 1002-1007 (CADC 1984) 
(Edwards, J.) (discussing cases). That trend is a sensible one, 
since pricing at or above variable costs simply promotes 
efficiency. 
'!here is an additional concern in predatory pricing cases 
apart from the question of what prices are predatory. The theory ~ 
l
e:£ a predatory pr icing claim is that the defendant (s) took losses ~ -
i : the short run in order to eliminate competition and charge ~ d 
rupracompetitive prices later. This theory can only work if it ~ 
is possible to dr ;;e the competition out of business in ~-
rt.<_ 
reasonably brief period, and then keep competition out for lo~ 
C.a..._!f 
enough to recoup the losses suffered while pr icing predator ily. /4k_ 
Cbnsequently, courts should look to the structure of the industry~ 
in question to see whether a predatory pricing strategy is :;:;:; 
plausible or not. See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for 
Jnalyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213 (1979). 
Thus, the illegal objective in this case should be defined 
as follows: a desire to price below variable or incremental cost 
as a means of driving out competitors, in order to then charge 
supracompetitive prices in a monopolized market. 
13. 
D. Reasonableness of the Inference of Violation 
Petrs, in moving for summary judgment, were required to -set forth evidence that negated respondents' theory of the case. 
/ ~e Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 u.s. 144 (1970). But see 
'17 0). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 F.2d 181 (CADC 1985), cert. 2 granted, No. 85-198 (Nov. 4, 1985) (raising the question whether 
f~· .-- defendant need produce ,any evidence in order to obtain summary 
/~j)>dgment). The DC found that bu den, and CA3 did r p V' r ;.,t reverse that f. 
f""'° /~~Respondents, in order to rebut petr s • showing, were li!--/, , 
~ ·vr required to point to sufficient evidence to enable a factfinde~ 
~ ' to infer that petrs conspired to pr ice predator ily in the U. s • ..J- J-,, 
~ {f g ~ rket. Evidence of other conspiracies (such as the conspira~ 
, G 'y_ :~aise prices in Japan, or the asserted conspiracy to avoi~ 
V /u.s. customs regulations) are only circumstantial evidence of ~~ 
,-,/ 
predatory pr icing conspiracy. ~ k 
~ 1he probative value of that circumstantial eviden~ 
~ depends on of respondents' theor~ . Here, the 
~ theory seems very implausible. Predatory pricing is in all 
~ nts a very ~ . because it requires the violator to 
i"Tf{ .Pf, 1Dsorb sig~ s before attaining success. It seems 
unlikely that any business would even attempt such a strategy 
mless it could reasonably hope to monopolize the relevant market 
fairly quickly and begin recovering its losses. ------ Here, the after two decades, has still not resulted in 
monopoly by the Japanese manufacturers. Professor 







~ ongoing litigation about Japanese television sets 
cffers a perfect illustration. The plaintiffs maintain 
that for the last fifteen years or more at least ten 
J:ipanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than 
cost in order to drive United States firms ouc of 
~ ness. Such conduct cannot possibly produce profits 
by harming competition, however. If the Japanese firms 
drive some United States firms out of business, they 
could not recoup. Fifteen _y_ e rs of losses could be 
nade u onl b ver ~~s for the indefinite 
future. ( The losses are like investments, which must 
l::e recoverd with compound interest.) If the defendants 
should try to raise prices to such a level, they would 
at.tract new competition. There are no barriers to 
entry intQ,_ electronics, as the p o 1 eration of 
compu t er and audio f l r ms shows. The competition would 
come from resurgent United States firms, from other 
fbreign firms, (Korea and many other nations make TV 
sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to 
recoup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress 
competition among themselves. On plaintiffs' theory, 
the cartel would need, to last at least thirty years, 
far longer than any in history, even when cartels were 
rot illegal. None should be sanguine about the 
prospects of such a cartel, given each firm's incentive 
to shave pr ice and expand its share of sales. The 
predation-recoupment story therefore does not make 
~nse, n we a e et wit the more plausible 
inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below 
cost in the first place. They were just engaged in 
hard competition. 
14. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Anti trust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 
(1984). I have only to add two points. -- ~ ' the number of ~ wpposed conspirators in this case (there are 21 petrs) makes it ~7Ts 
p:b 
especially implausible that the scheme would work for a 
wfficiently long period of time to be worthwhile. ~ ' in 
predatory pricing cases, it's especially important not to 
O\lershoot the mark and deter legitimate conduct, since most price 
rutting is pro- competitive, and since most efforts to monopolize 
will fail and punish themselves: if petrs were trying to 




American consumers by incurring enormous losses which they cannot 
recoup. 
Under Monsanto and Cities Service, the only evidence that 
\Ould suffice to support an illegal conspiracy theory in these 
circumstances is evidence that is inconsistent with ordinary, 
ron-preda tory pr icing conduct. Conduct that is consistent with 
non-predatory pr icing cannot possibly support an inference of 
illegal conspiracy, because the context renders the conspiracy so 
naturally implausible. None of the points on which CA3 relied 
rreets this test, see App to Petn for Cert 169a-180a, with the 
sole exception of respondents' expert testimony that petrs had 
S'.)ld as much as 25% below cost. 
Report) . 
See App Vol. 11 (DePodwin 
Even the expert testimony cannot support an inference of 
illegal conspiracy, however. The relevant materials are not 
themselves cost data; rather, they consist of a mathematical 
construction that rests on assumptions about cost data. See App 
to Petn for Cert 1068a (DC opinion, discussing DePodwin report). 
The assumptions are three: (1) a "unit value equivalency 
instruction," ( 2) an "opera ting profit equ i valency assumption," 
c11d (3) a "cost equivalency assumption." Id., at 1068a-1075a. 
The DC found that each of these assumptions was contradicted by 
l):!trs' evidence. Ibid. The most important of the assumptions 
Wls the third. DePodwin assumed that the cost of producing a TV 
for the Japanese market was the same as the cost for producing a 
'IV, for the American market. But DePodwin's own data showed that 
this assumption was inaccurate for the majority of TV models he 
l 
16. 
considered. Id., at 1071a. DePodwin appears to have gotten 
around this problem by averaging cases in which U.S. costs were 
hi.gher with cases in which U.S. costs were lower. Ibid. But the 
average was not weighted to account for the number of sets 
produced. Ibid. Thus, the factual assumptions on which the 
ecpert testimony rests render its conclusions very questionable, 
as the DC concluded. 
I do not mean to suggest that the Court analyze the record 
independently 
cppropr ia te. 
to determine whether summary judgment 
I don't think such an inquiry is required. 
was 
I do 
think the Court should set forth the standard by which the 
rummary judgment issue needs to be addressed, and then hold 
simply that ambiguous conduct won't suffice to meet respondents' 
turden in this case. The CA3 can, on remand, dee ide whether, 
applying the correct standard, its decision was correct. My 
discussion of the expert report is only meant to suggest how weak 
CA3's support was. 
My recommendation, then, is that the Court reverse and 
remand for redetermination of the summary judgment issue in light 
cf the proper standard, defined by Cities Service and Monsanto. 
. d-G~il>--f)~ .qrvr 
II. Sovereign Compulsion (P....e.h---z_ L~f~ ~ k · 
CA3 found that the "check price" arrangement and the 1 
"five-company rule" were both part of the illegal conspiracy in 
this case. Petrs, the SG, and the Japanese government argue that 
that, finding violates the act of state doctrine, because the 
"·· 
' ,,. 









Japanese government required both the check prices and the limits 
m export distribution. 
1f respondents' anti trust claims are analyzed correctly, 
this issue disa~ ars. Petrs' sovereign compulsion argument 
rests primarily on a statement made by MIT! to the DC in 1975 in 
connection with this litigation. Petn for Cert 8a. That 
statement, at most, provides that MIT! required petrs to set 
rd.nimum pr ices for export and supervised the check-price 
arrangement. See id., at lla. The illegal objective in this 
case is predatory pricing, not supracompetitive price-fixing. 
Assuming petrs fixed minimum prices for TVs in the u.s. market, 
respondents cannot recover anti trust damages for that action, 
regardless of whether it was compelled. The same is true for the 
five-company rule, the other action which was supposedly 
compelled by the Japanese government. 
In other words, petrs cannot be held liable for actions 
regardless of 
any sovereign compulsion defense. I think that takes care of the 
issue. 
Ill. Conclusions 
I recommend reversal on the summary judgment issue. I do 
not think the Court should reexamine the record in this case; a 
simple remand for consideration under the proper standard would 
be appropriate. 
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TO: Justice Powell 
--------\\.. 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: November 14, 1985 
.RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Argued Nov. 12, 1985 
Market shares of American companies 
1. At oral argument, the parties referred to a 
chart showing the market shares of various TV 
manufacturers. The chart covers the years 1969-1978, and 
does not include all manufacturers. Therefore, it doesn't 
show how many American firms have been driven out of 
business since petrs entered the TV market in the early 
1960s. 
As of 1978, Zenith-brand TVs held a 21.5% share of 
RCA brand TVs held a 18. 9% shar~- , -was Sears, at 8.4% (Sears' TVs were 
manufactured in Japan). In 1969, RCA led the pack with a 
23. 4% share of the market, followed by Zeni th at 21. 1%. 
The next highest share was Magnavox at 11.1%. 
. ' 
With regard to ~ -and-whi~3 , the pattern is 
similar. In 1969, Zenith and RCA led with shares of 17.2% - ~
and 14.1% respectively; in 1978 they still led with shares 
of 16.8% and 14.4% respectively. 
Af:. the very least, this shows that petrs' supposed 
plan to monopolize the TV market has been something less 
than a raging success: the two leading sellers are both 
American firms, and their market shares have remained -·---- - ------- --.:> 
relatively constant. - -·-
2. Despite respondents' claim that they have 
suffered losses in recent years, the market share 
statistics are powerful evidence that the predatory 
pricing scheme can't work. As Areeda & Turner emphasized 
- - ----....,_.___. 
in their article on this subject, it never makes sense for 
a manufacturer to pr ice below its marginal cost (or, to 
use a convenient substitute, average variable cost) • On 
the other hand, if a manufacturer pr ices above marginal ' 
cost, the manufacturer is making a profit on the 
individual sets. This is so whether or not fixed costs 
wipe the profit out. 
The point is that Zenith and RCA have continued to 
sell a lot of TV sets notwithstanding petrs' supposed 
·l t)la.pt, 1 e,wr-1~ Gr tk. ~vt,v·lU.'h.'.lt'hA.rJlr wil:O i.t fry;·'j ·h, WlfnltcpoL,u.. ·te..t 
r~~ w-M.µ:f-, 
3. 
predatory pricing. Zenith and RCA can't claim that they 
were pr icing below their own marginal cost: that would 
make no sense unless they were trying to monopolize the TV 
narket. Thus, Zenith and RCA must have been pricing above 
their own marginal cost, and at that price level they 
continued to sell something between one-third and two-
fifths of the TVs sold in the U.S. That being the case, 
petrs would presumably have to lower their own prices even 
further in order to succeed in their alleged 
rronopolization plan. 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j\nprtnU Cfl&mrl of tltt ~th ~hdte 
'lla.eqinghtn. ,. Cfl. 21lgi,.~ 
November 15, 1985 
J 
Re: No. 83-2004, Matsushita Elec. v. Zenith Radio 
Dear Chief: 
I have carefully reexamined my position in this case 
and would like to change my vote from Affirm to Reverse. 
The Chief Justice 





November 18, 1985 
83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith 
Dear Chief: 
Thurgood',; note to you of November 15 has just co:rne 
to my attention. He advises that, after careful reexamina-
tion, his vote now is to reverse. 
As I now understand the situati.on, Thurgood's vote 
provides a majority of five who would reverse and remand: 
You, Thurgood, Bill Rehnquist, Sandra and me. 
Accord:!.ng to my Conference notes, after our consid-
erable discussion (and I must say, possibly some confusion), 
those who voted to DIG or affirm were Bill Brennan, Byron, 
Thurgood, Harry and John. On the basis of t~ls vote of five 
Justices to DIG, as we left Conference I understood it was 
agreed that Bill Brennan would write a brief explanation of 
why the Court was dismissing the case as improvidently 
granted. In walking aown the cot'ridor with Bill after the 
Conference, I saia that given the five votes to dismiss I 
would not write in dissent. 
t have iust discussed this situation with you on 
the telephone, and I agree with you that in light of 
Thurgood's letter we now have five votes to reverse and 
remand. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: January 5, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Court Opinion--First Draft 
13 t.LL ~ ryµ- "1 ~ /WA-~-~ - -
I - '°' 
 ~a.-t.  ~ ~ ~~ 
The attached opinion is rather long, so I thought a 
quick discussion of how it's organized might be helpful. 
The opinion is also incomplete in one respect: you'll 
note that there is one place in the text where I have 
indicated I need to add a cite; the corresponding footnote ______________...... 
is also unwritten. The point is a collateral one and I'm 
satisfied that it's correct, but I haven't determined yet 
what the best case(s) are on which to rely. 
In general, the thrust of the opinion is this: The 
anti trust conspiracy alleged in this case is one that, 
rational businesses would be unlikely to join, because it 
is almost certain to cost the conspirators much more than 
it's worth. The implausible nature of the alleged scheme -requires that respondents produce something more than 
ambiguous evidence to carry their burden of establishing a 
"genuine [fact] issue for trial" under Rule 56 (e). CA3 
did not take into account any of the factors that rendered 
the scheme implausible, and did not apply the Monsanto 
as the inference of competition. Accordingly, the case is ....__--
remanded to CA3 for a proper analysis of the summary 
judgment motion. The opinion does not reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue, as that issue disappears when the merits 
are properly analyzed. 
1. Part I (pp. 1-14) is, of course, the facts. It 
is broken into 2 sub-parts, the first of which takes us 
--(pp. 1-7), and the second of which describes CA3's opinion 
(pp. 8-14). 
2. Part II, A (pp. 16-30) begins by laying out the ,, 
nature of the alleged scheme: a horizontal combination t~ 
price below market levels in order to drive out the --
competition (pp. 16-19). Then, part A discusses the --------f reasons why the alleged scheme is highly unlikely as a practical matter (pp. 20-29). The reasons, basically, are 
inherently speculative, 
.J • 
guaranteed long-run gains, (ii) the gains in turn depend 
on a host of imponderables, including keeping would-be 
entrants out of the market, allocating losses and gains 
(if any) among the conspirators, and avoiding antitrust 
liability down the line, and (iii) the length of time that 
has passed in this case suggests it would be impossible 
ever the recoup the losses that petitioners are said to 
have suffered. Finally, part A concludes by noting that 
the problems with the alleged scheme exist whether or not ----petitioners are getting supracompetitive profits in the --
Japanese market (pp. 29-30). 
3. Part II, B (pp. 31-40) discusses the relevance 
of these problems to summary judgment analysis. It begins 
with the fairly obvious proposition that in order to 
survive summary judgment ( the burden is on respondents 
under Rule 56 (e)), respondents must show that there is a , 
genuine fact issue as to the particular conspiracy that 
caused respondents injury: it isn't enough to show other 
conspiracies that couldn't have harmed respondent (pp. 31-
32). Next, the opinion notes that the issue of fact must 
be "genuine"--slight doubts aren't enough (pp. 33-34). 
--:::::2-, 
Two points logically follow. First, when there is reason 
to doubt that rational actors would engage in the conduct 
being charged, the evidence required to create a "genuine" 
fact issue is greater than when the scheme is plausible 
(pp. 34-35) • (This point is based on Cities Service; 
there is a short case discussion.) Second, when the 
evidence of the alleged conspiracy is ambiguous, the 
inference of conspiracy must be as plausible as the 
inference of legitimate competition in order for the case 
to go to t ~ al (pp. 35-37). 
opinion in Monsanto; there 
case.) 
(This point derives from your 
is a brief discussion of that 
Both propositions apply with special force here 
(pp. 37-39). The conduct in question is price-cutting; if 
conspiracy is too easily inferred from such conduct then 
competition will be thwarted rather than advanced. Also, 
there is no reason to worry that conspiracies of this sort 
will proliferate: unlike other kinds of anti trust, 
violations, unsuccessful predatory pr icing schemes cost 
They are, in a sense, self-deterring. 
~ 3. Part Ill (pp. 40-43) explains that CA3 ap~~ d 
neither of the principles outlined in part 11, B. 'Fheir 
decision must therefore be reversed. This section closes 
..... 
.., . 
by disclaiming any intent to review the weight of 
particular pieces of evidence--the opinion leaves that to 
CA3. 
4. Finally, part IV (pp. 44-45) explains why the 
sovereign compulsion issue need not be decided. 
I hope this 
J 
summary made your reading a little ) 't4- · 
easier. All of us hope you feel better soon~ we also hope 
that (to use some of your own advice that I ignored to my 
regret) you don't come back too quickly, but take things 
easy. 
know. 
If there is anything else we can bring you, let us 
lfp/ss 01/07/86 MAT SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Bill DATE: January 7, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-2004 Matsushita v. Zenith 
Reading the exceptionally well written first 
draft of our opinion has improved at least the mental 
state of my health. I think it is a fine opinion, 
although we are addressing principles of anti trust law 
that I have not heretofore had to consider with care. 
As you will note, I have done considerable 
editing in the margin, and suggested some documentation -
perhaps by adding footnotes - where a textual statement is 
likely to raise a question on the part of the reader. 
Part IIA(3), pp. 20-30, reads like an essay on 
economics. Although in order to support Jo when we were 
first married I taught a course in economics at th~ 
University of Richmond, I need a good deal more background 
to be a fully informed er i tic of what you have written. 
At least I am persuaded by it, and agree that it is 
central to our position that at best respondent is relying 
on inferences that are not economically rational. I do 
have the feeling, Bill, that there is a certain amount of 
repetition in these ten pages, some of which is repeated 
in your subsequent summary. I suggest only that you 
reread this important section of the draft with my 
reaction in mind, and seek opportunities to eliminate 
language that may be repetitious or marginal. Your 
citation of the law review articles by the best known 
scholars on antitrust law is impressive. 
Please do a second draft, and then have your 
"editor" review it. As I do not believe Cabell has a 
Court opinion, perhaps he could serve as your editor. It 
may not be feasible, but it would it be great if we could 
circulate by Friday. As I do not suggest any changes in 




P.S. The above was dictated by Justice Powell but not 
seen by him. 
.,. 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: January 7, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Revised First Draft 
a 
~l b.--~ 
(J. ~:;:c...,c../4-,l. t-,,-( I 
.,,,9 ~ «-< 11 0 I ,'-~~ I 
a~ s .1,9,.~;.;-
I've made some changes in part II, B--mostly around 
pages 35-37--that I think will clarify the relationship 
between Rule 56 and the limits on inference drawing in 
antitrust conspiracy cases. It may well be that more 
tinkering is needed in that section: Mike (who will be my 
editor on this one) should be able to help me with that. 
The footnotes are unchanged. 
soon.) 
(Footnote 5 will be coming 
You asked yesterday whether the opinion was 
generally along the lines of my bench memo, and the answer 
is yes. The opinion really· makes only three substantive 
points, and I think only one of them is potentially 
controversial. Fir st, predatory pricing is inherently a 
little implausible, and conspiracies to price predatorily 
are implausible 
plainly right as 
in the extreme. 
anything can be, 
2. 
I think that is as 
al though the 
will no doubt take issue with it. Second, 
dissent 
when the 
context renders a necessary element of a plaintiff's case 
seriously implausible, the plaintiff has to come forward 
with stronger evidence in order to survive summary 
judgment. This proposition flows directly from Rule 56's 
standard: there must be a genuine issue of fact for the 
case to go to trial. Nevertheless, it is a proposition 
that might attract some opposition, since it implies that 
judges must ( to a limited extent) "weigh" the evidence 
before them to determine whether the issue of fact is 
"genuine" rather than insubstantial. Third, as a matter 
of substantive antitrust law, conduct as consistent with 
competition as with conspiracy cannot, standing alone, 
support an inference of conspiracy. This is the principle' 
of Monsanto, and I don't think anyone will have any 
problems with it. 
I mention all this because my bench memo wasn't too 
clear about when it was relying on Rule 56 and when it was 
relying on substantive antitrust law. The two work 
,. 
3. 
together in this case, and I think it's worthwhile to 
emphasize both. 
Happy reading. I hope you're feeling better; 
please let us know if we can assist your recovery in any 
way. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
.§nµrtnu <!Jcurt cf tqt ltnitt~ .§tatts 
'llasJrittgfon. ~. QJ. 2llffe'1;1 
January 22, 1986 
Re: No. 83-2004-Matsushita v. Zenith 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~nvrttttt <lf1tttrt cf tqt ~nitth ~tatt,g 
JIMltittgfon. ~. <!f. 2llffe,., 
January 23, 1986 
No. 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.f1tprtnu Q1aurt rl t4, 'Jnittb .ftatt,e-
JIMftington, J. Q1. 2llffe~, 
January 23, 1986 
No. 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis, 
I 
Although I have joined your excellent op1n1on in this 
case, I offer a suggestion for a minor change. 
On p. 17 n. 16, the opinion states that petitioners 
"can recoup their losses only by engaging in some form of 
price-fixing after they have succeeded in driving 
competitors from the market." The full paragraph in the 
text on p. 19 similarly states that successful predatory-
pricing conspiracies "can be identified and punished once 
they succeed, since they require some kind of minimum price-
fixing agreement in order to reap the benefits of 
predation." 
These statements seem an accurate description of this 
case given the large number of allegedly participating 
manufacturers. Without a recoupment conspiracy, the 
recoupment price presumably would be driven down to a 
competitive level as 21 manufacturers competed for 
customers. Nonetheless, I am not sure that, asp. 19 
implies, every predatory-pricing conspiracy must use a 
price-fixing conspiracy to recoup. Suppose that just two 
manufacturers, for example, were able to enter the US market 
and destroy all competitors through predatory pricing. With 
only two firms left in the industry, the equilibrium price 
will, without the need for any price-fixing, be higher than 
the competitive price--the firms remaining will each have 
some oliopoly market power. The resulting supra-competitive 
price could be sufficient for recoupment. 
I therefore suggest the following reformulation of the 
sentences on pp. 17 n. 16 and 19 that contain the statements 
I quoted above: 
"The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if 
petitioners can recoup their losses, but, ,, in litht of the 
large number of allegedly participating manufaeYurers, 
~D '\f J,CQ.{+ /~ih~f' fD ~O'C ~o__cluJ1 -
~u 
2. 
petitioners are likely to be able to they-ean recoup their 
losses only by engaging in some form of price-fixing after 
they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market." 
"Finally, unlike a predatory pricing scheme tn which each 
remaining firm has some market . power, 6y-a-!5~ng±e-¥~P11'17 a 
successful predatory pricing conspiracyiee te-pP¼ee -
p!."e~atet."i!y-ean is likely to be identiTied and punished once 
they it succeeds, since ifiey the many remaining firms are 
virtua'Ily certaln to require some kind of minimum price-





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~U¥ttntt {!Jltttrt ttf fqt ,.ttittb ~bdt,1\' 
Jla.sftiugton, ~. QJ. 2llbt~, 
January 23, 1986 
No. 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis, 
Although I have joined your excellent opinion in this 
case, I offer a suggestion for a minor change. 
On p. 17 n. 16, the opinion states that petitioners 
"can recoup their losses only by engaging in some form of 
price-fixing after they have succeeded in driving 
competitors from the market." The full paragraph in the 
text on p. 19 similarly states that successful predatory-
pricing conspiracies "can be identified and punished once 
they succeed, since they require some kind of minimum price-
fixing agreement in order to reap the benefits of 
predation." 
These statements seem an accurate description of this 
case given the large number of allegedly participating 
manufacturers. Without a recoupment conspiracy, the 
recoupment price presumably would be driven down to a 
competitive level as 21 manufacturers competed for 
customers. Nonetheless, I am not sure that, asp. 19 
implies, every predatory-pricing conspiracy must use a 
price-fixing conspiracy to recoup. Suppose that just two 
manufacturers, for example, were able to enter the US market 
and destroy all competitors through predatory pricing. With 
only two firms left in the industry, the equilibrium price ~ 
will, without the need for any price-fixing, be higher than 
the competitive price--the firms remaining will each have 
some oliopoly market power. The resulting supra-competitive 
price could be sufficient for recoupment. 
I therefore suggest the following reformulation of the 
sentences on pp. 17 n. 16 and 19 that contain the statements 
I quoted above: 
"The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if 
petitioners can recoup their losses, but, in light of the 
large number of allegedly participating manu£ac!urers, 
2. 
petitioners are likely to be able to ~hey-ea" recoup their 
losses only by engaging*1n some £arm of price-fixing after 
they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market." 
"Finally, unlike a predatory pr icing scheme in, which each 
remaining firm has some market ower, 6y-a-s-r"g±e-~·u•m, a 
success u pre a ory pricing conspiracyies te-~riee =-
~reflater-r¼y-ea" is like!y to be identiried and punished once 
they it succeeds;·since €hey the many remaining firms are 
virtuaI'ly certaln to require some kind of minimum price-




TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: January 24, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Justice O'Connor's letter of Jan. 23, 1986 
Along with her join, Justice O'Connor suggested two 
minor language changes. The relevant sentences state that 
predatory pricing conspiracies generally (and this 
conspiracy in particular) require some kind of price-
fixing after they have monopolized the market in order to 
recoup predatory losses. Justice O'Connor argues that 
this point isn't correct if the conspiracy only involves 
two or three firms--once they have driven out th~ir 
competitors, the market price will settle at a high level 
naturally. 
Justice O'Connor is right, although the point is 
somewhat picky. l don't like the particular wording she 
suggests--the sentence at the top of page 2 of her letter 
is incomprehensible--so the attached draft letter suggests 
alternative changes. These alternatives are meant to take 
2. 
care of her substantive concern without overexplaining the 
point. 
January 25, 1986 
83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Sandra, 
Thank you for your join and your helpful suggestlons. 
I agree that the sentences in question should be quallfied. 
I will make clear that a subsequent price-fixing conspiracy 
will be necessary when a larae number of fi.rms conspire to 
price predatorlly. We need not comment on the somewhat dif-
ferent si.tuation of oreaation by two dominant firms. Ac-
cordinqly, I suggest the following chanqes in wording: 
1. For the first sentence of note 16 (page 17), sub-
stitute the following: "The allegen predatorv scheme makes 
sense only if oetitioners can recoup their losses. In light 
of the large number of firms involved here, petitioners can 
achieve this only by engaging in somP for.m of price-f'xing 
after they have succeeded in driv~nq competitors from tl-te 
market." 
2. For the next-to-last ~entence of the first full 
paragraph on page 19, substitute the followinq: "Finally, 
unlike predatory pricing hy a single firm, successful preda-
tory pricing conspiracies involving a large number of firms 
can be identified and punished once they succeed, since some 
form of minimum price-fixing agreement would he necessary in 
order to reap the benefits of Predation." 
I will include these changes in my next circulation. 
If you would like more elaboration of the difference between 
a conspiracy like the one alleqed here and a conspiracy be-
tween two dominant firms, I wi 11 add a footnote on page 19--
though I think the point will be clear from the changes not-
ed above. 
Again, with my thanks, 
., -
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
, _ _J ---- -- --
.intttttttt <lf®rt of f4t 1!lnitth .ihtft.G' 
1!1l~lp:ttgton, 19. <!f. 2llffe'!;l 
January 27, 1986 
/ 
Re: 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial Company 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis, 
Thanks for making the minor changes proposed 
in your letter of January 25. I think they will be 
entirely adequate to take care of my suggestion. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra D. O'Connor 
SO 'C/mrd 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
J;ttJtrtmt Q}o-url o-f tlrt 'Jttitth J;ta:it.tl' 
~fringtittt. ~. <!}. 2llffe~~ 
January 27, 
83-2004 -
Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio 
Dear Lewis, 
In due course, I shall circulate a 
dissent in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
-.JUSTICE -JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;ju.pu.mt <!Jo-ud o-f tqt 'Jl{nitt~ ;jta:ttg 
J)tag-4ittgfon. 1B. <!J. 21lffe~~ 
January 29, 1986 
Re: 83-2004 - Matsushita Electric v. 
Zenith Radio 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await Byron's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
'. 
f !. ; i 
















From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _J_A_N_ a_l_ l9_8_;_6 __ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1044 
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, APPEL-
LANT v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF 
CALIFORNIA ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment. 
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 
(1980), we held that a State could, consistently with the Fed-
eral Constitution, prohibit the private owner of a shopping 
center from using state trespass law to exclude peaceful ex-
pressive activity in the open areas of the shopping center. 
Concurring in PruneYard, I viewed the State's abrogation of 
the property owner's traditional right to exclude as raising 
the question of how the Federal Constitution limits a State's 
ability to redefine its common-law property rights. See id., 
at 92-93 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). Today we face a simi-
lar question. In the present case, California has taken from 
appellant the right to deny access to its property-its billing 
envelope-to a group that wishes to use that envelope for ex-
pressive purposes. Two significant differences between the 
State's grant of access in this case and the grant of access in 
PruneYard lead me to find a constitutional barrier here that 
I did not find in the earlier case. 
The first difference is the degree of intrusiveness of the 
permitted acces~. We noted in PruneYard: "the shopping 
center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use 
of [its owner]. It is instead a business establishment that is · 
open to the public to come and go as they please." Id., at 87. 
The challenged rule did not permit a markedly greater intru-
sion onto the property than that which the owner had volun-
84-1044-CONCUR 
2 PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. COMM'N 
tarily encouraged, nor did it impair the commercial value of 
the property. Id., at 83; see also id., at 94 (MARSHALL, J., 
concurring). 
In the present case, by contrast, appellant has never 
opened up its billing envelope to the use of the public. 1 Ap-
pellant has not abandoned its right to exclude others from its 
property to the degree that the shopping center owner had 
done in PruneYard. Were appellant to use its billing enve-
lope as a sort of community billboard, regularly carrying the 
messages of third parties, its desire to exclude a particular 
speaker would be deserving of lesser solicitude. As matters 
stand, however, appellant has issued no invitation to the 
general public to use its billing envelope, for speech or for 
any other purpose. 2 Moreover, the shopping center in 
1 The State seizes upon appellant's status as a regulated monopoly in 
order to argue that the inclusion of postage and other billing costs in the 
utility's rate base demonstrates that these items "belong" to the public, 
which has paid for them. However, a consumer who purchases food in a 
grocery store is "paying" for the store's rent, heat, electricity, wages, etc., 
but no one would seriously argue that the consumer thereby acquires a 
property interest in the store. That the utility passes on its overhead 
costs to ratepayers at a rate fixed by law rather than the market cannot 
affect the utility's ownership of its property, nor its right to use that 
property for expressive purposes, see Consolidated Edison Co . v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530, 534, n. 1 (1980). The State could have 
concluded that the public interest would be best served by state ownership 
of utilities. Having chosen to keep utilities in private hands, however, the 
State may not arbitrarily appropriate property for the use of third parties 
by stating that the public has "paid" for the property by paying utility bills. 
I hasten to add that nothing in this opinion nor, as I understand it, the 
plurality's opinion, addresses the issue whether the State may exclude the 
cost of mailing Progress from petitioner's rate base. See id., at 544 
(MARSHALL, J. , concurring). Indeed, appellant concedes that the State 
may force its shareholders to bear those costs. 
2 The State also argues that it frequently requires appellant to carry 
messages concerning utility ratemaking and the rights of utility consum-
ers. These messages, however, do not include political speech, and are 
directly relevant to commercial transactions between the ratepayer and 
the utility. The State's interest in requiring appellant to carry such mes-
84-1044-CONCUR 
PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. COMM'N 3 
PruneYard bore a strong resemblance to the streets and 
parks that are traditional public forums. People routinely 
gathered there, at the owner's invitation, and engaged in a 
wide variety of activities. Adding speech to the list of those 
activities did not in any great way change the complexion of 
the property. The same is not true in this case. 
The second difference between this case and PruneYard is 
that the State has chosen to give TURN a right to speak at 
the expense of appellant's ability to use the property in ques..: 
tion as a forum for the exercise of its own First Amendment 
rights. While the shopping center owner in PruneYard 
wished to be free of unwanted expression, he nowhere al-
leged that his own expression was hindered in the slightest. 
In contrast, the present case involves a forum of inherently 
limited scope. By appropriating, four times a year, the 
space in appellant's envelope that appellant would otherwise 
use for its own speech, the State has necessarily curtailed. 
petitioner's use of its own forum. The· regulation in this 
case, therefore, goes beyond a mere infringement of appel-
lant's desire to remain silent, see post, at 7-10 (REHNQUIST, 
J., dissenting). 
While the interference with appellant's speech is, conced-
edly, very slight, the State's justification-the subsidization 
of another speaker chosen by the State-is insufficient to sus-
tain even that minor burden. We have held that the State 
may use its own resources for subsidization, Regan v. Tax-
ation with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540 
(1983), but that interest, standing alone, cannot justify inter-
ference with the speech of others. See Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam); First National Bank 
sages is therefore particularly compelling. Cf. infra, at-. Somewhat 
analogously, the State could not argue that, because it may demand access 
for the State's agents to a private home to monitor compliance with health 
or safety regulations, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 
(1967), it may also grant access to third parties for nongovernmental 
purposes. 
84-1044-CONCUR 
4 PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. COMM'N 
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790-792 (1978). 3 In the 
instant case, the only state interest identified by appellee is 
ensuring that ratepayers are "expos[ed] to a variety of 
views," App. to Juris. Statement A-17, in order to provide 
"the most complete understanding possible of energy-related 
issues," id., at A-22. This is no different from the interest 
that we found insufficient to justify restraints on individual 
political expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo, supra. Even as-
suming that the State could assert a more compelling interest 
in, for example, curbing actual abuses of the ratemaking 
process, it has never demonstrated that its regulation is tai-
lored to serve such an interest. Indeed, it disclaims any 
duty to make that showing, based on its conclusion that rate-
payers "own" the extra space. See App. to Juris. Statement 
A-22. The regulation at issue here, therefore, differs sig-
nificantly from the SEC proxy regulation cited by JUSTICE 
STEVENS, post, at 5. 
3 JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent argues that a State may freely affect 
the mix of information available to the public, so long as it only "indirectly 
and remotely'' affects a particular speaker's contribution to that mix. See 
post, at 2. Even if I were to accept that proposition, I disagree with)t?" 
application to this case. 
While the interference with appellant's speech is small, it is by no means 
indirect. The PUC has effectively forbidden appellant to use its own 
forum fot its own speech one-third of the time. Contrary to JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's suggestion, post, at 5, the PUC's order does "prevent PG&E 
from using the billing envelopes ... to distribute Progress" during four 
months out of every year. See App. to Juris. Statement A-17 ("PG&E 
will be permitted to continue to insert the Progress during the remaining 
months.") (emphasis added). This infringement differs from the limitation 
on campaign contributions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per 
curiam), because the speech element of a contribution-the message of 
support for a candidate-was only indirectly related to the size of the 
contribution. Id., at 21. By definition, then, a limit on the size of 
contributions affected speech only indirectly. Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation, 461 U. S. 540 (1983), is likewise distinguishable. That 
case decided only that the Government could use its own funds to subsidize 
a preferred speaker. That subsidization caused no interference with 
anyone else's speech, much less indirect and remote interference. 
84-1044-CONCUR 
PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC UTIL. COMM'N 5 
In PruneYard, I recognized 'that the State may generally 
create or abrogate rights "'to attain a permissible legislative 
object."' 447 U. S., at 92 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 
U. S. 117, 122 (1929)). In the present case, the State has re-
defined a property right in the extra space in appellant's bill-
ing envelope in such a way as to achieve a result-burdening 
the speech of one party in order to enhance the speech of an-
other-that the First Amendment disallows. In doing so, 
moreover, it has sanctioned an · intrusion onto appellant's 
property that exceeds the slight incursion permitted in 
PruneYard. Under these circumstances, I believe that the 
State has crossed the boundary between constitutionally per-
missible and impermissible redefinitions of private property. 
In reaching this conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that I 
would hold, contrary to our precedents, that the corpora-
tion's First Amendment rights are coextensive with those of 
individuals, or that commercial speech enjoys the same pro-
tections as individual speech. In essentially all instances, 
the use of business property to carry out transactions with 
the general public will permit the State to restrict or man-
date speech in order to prevent deception or otherwise pro-
tect the public's health and welfare. In many instances, 
such as in PruneYard, business property will be open to the 
public to such an extent that the public's expressive activities 
will not interfere with the owner's use of property to a degree 
that off ends the Constitution. The regulation at issue in this 
case, I believe, falls on the other side of the line. Accord-
ingly, I join the Court's judgment. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u.p:rtmt C!t1tttrl af t ~th ;§tattg 
-ag!fm:gfon. ~. or. 2n.;r'1' 
January 31, 1986 
Re: 83-2004 Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 
Dear Lewis, 
--· ·~---.._ ___ / 
/ 
I voted to "reverse" at Conference, and have read your 
circulating draft opinion a couple of times. I have also 
asked my law clerk to fill me in on some substantive 
antitrust law, since it is an area in which I am justifiably 
modest about my own knowledge. The result of all this is 
that I have reservations about your present draft, because 
it doesn't~~ t9.....Jne t_o point out ~ch clarity exc!_9tly 
what the Court of Appeals did wrong when it concluded that 
summaryj"'uagmentsfiouidn-rt nave been granted intnTscase. 
On '"'t1'fe o er and, I realize that you as the opinion writer 
may feel "between a rock and a hard place" as the saying 
goes, being bound by what we both regard as unfortunate 
substantive antitrust doctrine (see your dissenting opinion 
in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 
(1982) which I joined) and the traditional law of summary 
judgment. But I am reafiy loath to create subcate or· s of 
e~e, or vaguel descr'b hi her burdens o of,Jor 
purposes 9- J;i,Umma~~ment law_ when the real progJem is 
wiffi the 1 substantive 1ar-in the area. 
My present intention is to write an opinion concuuing 
in the judg~ent on the grounds stated by Justice Harlan in ~ 
dissei'ic in Al6recht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-153 
(1968), and reiterated by you in Maricopa County Medical 
Society. But if there is some prospect that a separate 
concurrence in the judgment might jeopardize the judgment 
itself, I would certainly think twice about writing a 
broadside to this effect. I have a feeling that the sort of 
changes I would like to see made in your opinion might be 
ones that you would feel you could not make consistent with 
' .,, 
- 2 -
governing antitrust precedent. I will wait to hear from you 
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::::ice Powell /IJ:;p-v} [1 (< 
January 31, 1986 /;v- f - tP"'1- ~ '\ 1 
Matsushita, No. 83-2004 Jr, ~N'_ -V-S~ 
Justice Rehnquist 's letter of Jan ~ /A> . } v,v· ~ ~ 
I'm sure you'll be as disappointed as I was to see 
the enclosed letter, in which Justice Rehnquist says he 
expects to concur in the judgment only. I have a couple 
of observations about the letter, and l '11 recommend a 
possible response. (I haven't had time to draft a 
response yet, since the letter came in late this 
afternoon.) 
1. Justice Rehnquist's complaint with the opinion 
appears to be that it doesn't clearly define what CA3 did 
wrong. In particular, Justice Rehnquist seems to read the , 
opinion to establish a different burden of proof (for --------------
summary judgment motions) for predatory ricing 
conspiracies than for other conspiracies. 
,-,- -------
This may be nothing more than a drafting problem. 
In part V, the opinion states that CA3 erred because it 
failed to take account of the factors that make predatory 
.... 
pricing conspiracies implausible. An alternative (perhaps 
better) way of saying the same thing would be this: 1 
Petrs had no motive to enter into a conspiracy that 
was almost certain to cost them lots of money with little 
prospect of any gain. The absence of motive strongly 
suggests that petrs didn't conspire. The evidence of 
conspiracy relied on by CA3 is ambiguous--it's consistent 
with price competition as well as a price-cutting 
conspiracy. Where there is no motive to engage in the 
challenged conduct and the evidence of the challenged 
conduct is ambiguous, summary judgment is appropriate. 
That much is precisely what the Court decided in Cities 
Service. In this case, CA3 didn't even consider whether 
petrs would have any motive to engage in this conspiracy 
(in fact, the court appeared to assume that a motive 
existed). That was error. On remand, CA3 should consider , 
whether there is unambiguous evidence of conspiracy that 
would permit a finder of fact to find conspiracy despite 
the absence of any apparent motive. 
If we changed part V to something along these 
lines, it should be clear that the opinion isn't creating 
different burdens of proof. Instead, the opinion simply 
recognizes that when there is strong evidence against the 
plaintiffs, and only weak or ambiguous evidence in the 
plaintiffs' favor, there is no genuine issue of fact under 
Rule 56 (e). Perhaps such a clarification would clear up 
Justice Rehnquist's concerns. 
2. In addition to his problem with part V, Justice 
Rehnquist has a more general objection to the opinion. 
His view is that conspiracies to cut prices should not be 
per se violations of the Sherman Act, but should instead 
be evaluated under the Rule of Reason. (This appears to 
be the position taken by Justice Harlan in dissent in 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 o.s. 145, 165-166 (1968). It 
is also the position of your dissent in Arizona v. 
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 u.s. 332, 357-367 
(1982). I enclose copies of both dissents.) Under a Rule , 
of Reason approach, the conspiracy alleged in this case 
would probably not be actionable--because there is little 
likelihood that petrs will achieve a monopoly, the alleged 
conspiracy is not one that can cause any harm to 
consumers. Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 443 o.s. 330, 
343 (1979) (Sherman Act is a "consumer welfare 
prescript ion 11 ) • 
Justice Rehnquist's position makes a great deal of 
sense to me. But there are two strong reasons for not 
adopting it in your draft opinion in this case. First, 
Justice Rehnquist's argument squarely conflicts with 
several cases: not only the recent decision in Maricopa 
County, but also Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph 
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 u.s. 211 (1951). All three 
cases found maximum price-fixing conspiracies per se 
illegal. And it seems to me that a predatory pricing 
conspiracy is functionally no different from a conspiracy 
to set maximum prices. 
Second, the parties haven't briefed this issue at 
all. The questions presented in the petition for 
certiorari don't mention maximum price-fixing or the per 
se rule; instead, the relevant question revolves around 
CA3's application of summary judgment doctrine (and 
perhaps also of Monsanto). 
' 
Because the issue appears settled by the cases and 
wasn't raised by the parties, I think it unlikely that a 
Court would buy Justice Rehnquist' s argument. Based on 
your notes, no one mentioned this argument at conference. 
Jo 
And Justice Marshall (one of the five votes to reverse) 
voted with the Court in Maricopa County only three years 
ago. 
All this suggests that it is a poor idea to 
restructure the opinion along the lines Justice Rehnquist 
would like. It might be possible, however, to get Justice 
Rehnquist to join the opinion and write separately. 
Presently, the opinion states that the predatory pr icing 
conspiracy, if proved, is illegal per se. (page 9) That 
is a correct statement of governing law. It nevertheless 
might make sense to explicitly raise the possibility that 
the governing law merits reconsideration. That would 
perhaps enable Justice Rehnquist to join; and it would be 
more likely to avoid alienating Justice Marshall than a 
direct overruling of Maricopa County, Albrecht, and 
Kiefer-Stewart. 
3. In sum, you seem to have two alternatives. 
First, you can eliminate the discussion of summary 
judgment standards and Monsanto, and conclude that the 
alleged violation should have been analyzed under the Rule 
of Reason. I think that analysis is thoroughly sensible, 
but it conflicts with established precedent and the issue 
Vo 
wasn't argued by the parties. Second, you could (i) 
expressly raise the possibility that the maximum pr ice-
fixing cases should be reconsidered, and (ii) redraft part 
V to clarify what CA3 did wrong. My recommendation is to 
follow the second option, and keep our fingers crossed. 
I'll get to work on a proposed response to Justice 
Rehnquist immediately. 
4. For reference, I enclose copies of (i) your 
draft opinion, (ii) Justice Harlan's Albrecht dissent, and 
(iii) both the Court opinion and your dissent in Maricopa 
County. 
• 
wjs January 5, 1986 
83-2004 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., et al. v. ZENITH RADIO 
CORPORATION, et al. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. , 
~ 
This case requires that we again d4 scue£ the 
standard district courts must apply when deciding whether 
to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this massive case is a 
daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages~ the primary opinion of 




re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (CA3 1983); 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial 
Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.o. Pa. 1981). Two respected 
district judges have each authored a number of opinions in 
this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire 
volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court 
that is said to contain the distilled essence of the 
evidence on which the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals based their respective decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have 
already stated and restated, or summarize the mass of 
documents that comprise the official record on appeal· 
~ 
review the standard 
I\ 
~4 
wh ieh the Court 
A 
of 
L,,,oA., • • 
Appeals; decid ~ j:his case, and not the weight the Court of 
3. 
w~~ 
Appeals assigned to particular pieces of eviden~\we de 
~n~ ~ acts in great detail. What follows 
A 
is therefore only a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese 
corporations that manufacture sell "consumer 
electronic products" ("CEPs")--for the most part, 
television receivers and finished television sets. 
Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio 
Corporation ("Zenith") and National Union Electric 
Corporation ("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm that 
r:::;~~~ 
7 
~ uclls television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to 
~ ~"f"' c:f.- ;::, 
an American firm that 'sold Emerson Radio Company, 
A. 
television sets until 1970, when it withdrew from the 
/i }2!: j { NIA. c w1.)-·U-.,~  ~ 
~ L.-1- (-/- /l-~~ ~? !)~. $' 
~ :_1-~ -p -<--1-,,,.; ~ ,_;f--enJ-
Yf ~~- ? J,1..,Ji1CA c::.:..fa-~-w-1-,? 
4. 
market after sustaining substantial losses. 
NUE brought th is case in 197 3, claiming 
had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the 
,,a.~ 
--aLt.L~~~.,,~2./ 
American CEP market. /he gist of this conspiracy, ~----~' ~ ~-------
~ rding to~
1 
, was a "scheme to raise, fix 
and maintain artificially high prices for television 
receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same 
time, to fix and maintain low prices for television 
receivers exported to and sold in the United States." In 
re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d 238, 250 (CA3 
1983) (quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial 
Memorandum). Respondents claimed that various portions of 
this scheme violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, section 73 of the 
5. 
Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. Only 
the Sherman Act conspiracy claim is the at issue here. 
After several years of detailed discovery, 1 
petitioners filed motions for summary judgment on all 
claims against them. The district court directed the 
parties to file, with preclusive effect, a "Final Pretrial 
Statement" containing all the documentary evidence that 
would be offered if the case proceeded to trial. After 
these statements were filed, the district court 
entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the district court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The district court then turned to petitioners' 




court found that the admissible 
evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the existence of the alleged conspiracy. Zeni th Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., 513 F. 
Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). At bottom, the a-4..tt :i:-ct court 
found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that 
could be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the 
Japanese and Arner ican markets, and from the effects of 
that conduct on petitioners' American competitors. Id. , 
at 1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by 
category and in toto, the court found that any inference 
of conspiracy was simply unreasonable, because ( i) some 
portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners 
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and 
(ii) the evidence that bore directly on the alleged "low 
= 7 • 
.. 
price" conspiracy in no way rebutted the obvious inference 
that petitioners were cutting pr ices to compete in the 
American market and not to monopolize it. Summary 
/ µk.~$'I 
judgment was therefore granted on respondents' Sherman Act 
section 1 and Wilson Tariff Act claims. Because the 
~sk-J 
Sherman Act section 2 claims, W"fl4eh alleged that 
petitioners had combined to monopolize the American CEP 
market, were functionally indistinguishable from the 
section 1 claims, they were dismissed as well. Finally, 
the district court found that the Robinson-Patman Act 
claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as the 
Sherman Act claims. Thus, the finding that no fact issue 
had been raised on the conspiracy issue required that 
judgment be entered in petitioners' favor on those claims 




The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 4 The court began by examining the district 
court"s evidentiary rulings, and concluded that much of 
the evidence excluded by the district court was in fact 
admissible. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d, 
at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. 
Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 105 s.ct. 1863 (1985) (limiting grant of 
cert i or a r i ) . 
On the merits, the court found the district court's 
summary judgment decision improper based on the newly 
enlarged record. The court acknowledged that "there are 
legal limitations on the inferences that may be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence," 723 F.2d, at 304, but it found 
9. 
that "the legal problem is different" when "there is 
direct evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the 
court found, "there is both direct evidence of certain 
kinds of concert of action and circumstantial evidence 
having some tendency to suggest thajt other kinds of 
concert of action may have occurred." Id., at 304-305. 
It followed that cases concerning the limitations on 
inferring conspiracy from ambiguous evidence were not 
dispositive. Id., at 305. Turning to the evidence, the 
court found that a factf inder could reasonably draw the 
following conclusions from the record: 
The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of 
producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
10. 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because of significant barriers to 
entry imposed by the Japanese government. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs 
than their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order to 
make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs 
of the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation 
with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
("MIT!"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs 
exported to the American market. Id., at 310. The 
11. 
parties refer to these pr ices as the "check pr ices, 11 and 
to the agreements that spawned them as the "check pr ice 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products 
in the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by 
a variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MIT!, the former in 
order to avoid various customs regulations as well as 
action under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
12. 
In addition to these permissible inferences, the 
court noted that there was expert opinion evidence that 
petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices which 
produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on 
sales." Ibid. The court did not identify any direct 
evidence of below-cost pricing. 
Based on these permissible inferences, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find 
a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
1 
was funded by supracompeti ti ve profits obtained in the 
~~l-4 ~ 
Japanese market. The cour \ did not~ e whether it was 
as plausible, or more so, to conclude that petitioners' 
13. 
price-cutting behavior was competitive and not 
conspiratorial in nature. 
The court found it unnecessary to address 
petitioners' claim that they could not be held liable 
under the antitrust laws for conduct that was compelled by 
a foreign sovereign. The claim, in essence, was that 
because MITI required petitioners to enter into the check 
price agreements, liability could not be premised on those 
agreements. The court concluded that this case did not 
present the sovereign compulsion issue, since the check 
price agreements were being used as "evidence of a low 
export price conspiracy"~ further, the court found it 
unclear whether in fact the check prices were mandated by 
the Japanese government, notwithstanding a statement to 
that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. 
14. 
we granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the 
Court of Appeals properly analyzed petitioners' summary 
judgment motion, and ( ii) whether petitioners could be 
held liable under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy one 
of the central features of which was conduct compelled by 
a foreign sovereign. 105 s.ct. 1863 (1985). We now 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
11 
This Court has previously cautioned against lightly 
inferring illegal conspiracies in restraint of trade from 
ambiguous evidence. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 104 s.ct. 1464 (1984); First National Bank of 
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968). The 





because respondents ) CiliDe £.c~F~ .,Uh direct evidence of 
'1 
petitioners' conspiracy, and did not rely on 
circumstantial evidence alone. 723 F.2d, at 304-305. We 
believe the Court of Appeals' analysis misperceives both 
the nature of respondents' substantive anti trust claims 
and the import of our decisions in Monsanto and Ci ties 
? 
Service. Al though petitioners G ay ·have] engaged in a wide 
range of concerted action, respondents' claim is based 
solely on a purported conspiracy to drive out competitors 
in the American CEP market through artificially low 
prices. 
412-'-~ 




into success /\ u-nli.kel¥, and therefore call 
question whether rational businesses would enter into it. 
Our decisions counsel that, in such circumstances, the 
evidence necessary to create a genuine issue of material 
,; 
16. 
fact is correspondingly greater than when the alleged 





I\ beg in by emphasizing what 
respondents' claim is not. Respondents cannot recover 
antitrust damages from petitioners based on petitioners' 
supposed cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive 
conditions of other nations' economies. 5 [JUSTICE POWELL: 
cite to be added here] Nor can respondents recover 
damages for any conspiracy on petitioners' part to charge 
~~~~~~the American market. Such 
~ 
17. 
conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 u.s. 150, 223 
~ 
(1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil], but it · ~ not ~ 
injure respondents: as petitioners' competitors, 
respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the 
,( 
.. ,· 
market price in consumer electronics products. Cf. 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-
489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respondents 
cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose nonpri~e 
restraints that have the effect of either raising market 
price or limiting output. Once again, such restrictions, 
though harmful to competition, actually benefit 
competitors by making oligopolistic pricing more 
attractive. Thus, neither petitioners' alleged oligopoly 
18. 
pricing in Japan, nor the Five-Company rule that limited 
distribution in this country, nor the check prices insofar 
as they operated to fix minimum pr ices in this country, 
can by themselves give respondents a cognizable claim 
against petitioners for antitrust damages. The Court of 
Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it found 
evidence of these alleged conspiracies was "direct 
evidence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 
723 F.2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents never the less argue that these supposed 
conspiracies, though not themselves grounds for recovery 
of anti trust damages, are circumstantial evidence of a 
different conspiracy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to 
monopolize the Arner ican market by means of pr icing below 
the market level. 6 The thrust of respondents' argument, 
here as in the Court of Appeals, is that petitioners used 
their oligopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a 
concerted campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive 
respondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out 
of business. Once successful, according to respondents, 
petitioners would cartelize the American CEP market, 
restricting output and raising prices above the level that 
~~ 
fair competition would produce. The resulting oligopoly 
profits, respondents contend, would more than compensate 
petitioners for the losses they incurred through years of 
pricing below market level. 
(2) 
a.A,.., 
We may ~sume for purposes of deciding this case 
that a conspiracy to price predatorily, 7 if proved, is a 
t . 
20. 
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such a 
conspiracy is a horizontal combination whose purpose is to 
distort the market pr ice of a good or service. We have 
long held that horizontal conspiracies to raise or lower 
pr ices are per se illegal. Madison Oil, supra, at 221-
223. The predatory pricing conspiracy respondents allege 
here appears to fall within that proscription. We 
therefore consider the nature and economic context of the 
alleged conspiracy, as a necessary prelude to applying our 
decisions in Cities Service and Monsanto. 
(3) 
pricing conspiracy is by nature 
speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive 
level requires the conspirators to forego profits that 
-.· 
21. 
free competition would of fer them. The foregone profits 
~ ~ ~ I A.A-,, 
~, 1. in ef feet ,~ n investment. For the investment to be 
rational, the conspirators must be able to recover, in the 
~ ~ 
form of oligopoly profits, more than the amount of the 
losses plus any accrued interest. As then-Professor Bork, 
discussing predatory pricing by a single firm, explained ; 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes 
that the predator as well as his victims will 
incur losses during the fighting, but such a 
theory supposes it may be a rational calculation 
for the predator to view the losses as an 
investment in future monopoly profits (where 
rivals are to be killed) or in future 
undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be 
disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the 
present size of the losses. 
Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978). 
R. Bork, The 
•·' . ,. 
22. 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation makes 
clear, the success of such ~ is inherently 
uncertain: the short-run losses are definite, but the 
long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the 
competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve 
monopoly power, if monopoly pricing breeds quick entry by 
new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The 
success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining 
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the 
predators' losses and to harvest some additional gain. 
Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a 
significant period of time, "the predator must make a 
substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay 
23. 
off• II Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). 
For this reason, there is a strong consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
\ 
tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e.g., R. 
Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 699; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981); Koller, 
The Myth of Predatory Pricing--An Empirical Study, 4 
Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory 
Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & 
Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 
J.L. & Econ. 289, 292-294 (1980). See also Northeastern 
Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 
F.2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) (" [N] owhere in the recent 
24. 
outpouring of literature on the subject do commentators 
suggest that such pricing is either common or likely to 
increase"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply to predatory pricing by a 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, 
respondents allege that a large number of firms have 
conspired to charge below-market prices in order to stifle 
competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
~~~ 
difficult to carry out than an analogous seh•ffle e~~cuted 
by a single predator. The conspirators in such a scheme 
must allocate the losses to be sustained during the 
conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any 
eventual gains from its success. Precisely because ~ 
success is speculative and depends on a 




conspirators have ~ A strong incentive to cheat, 
letting their partners suffer the losses necessary to 
drive out the competition while sharing in any gains if 
the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary allocation is 
therefore difficult at best. Yet if conspirators cheat to 
any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, because 
its success depends on depressing the market price for all 
buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the 
artificially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be 
victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the 
"real" market price, and the conspirators' losses 
accomplish nothing. It is no accident that, while the 
last decade has spawned "a blizzard" of scholarly articles 
and proposals for rules to combat predatory pr icing by 
lone would-be monopolists, Easterbrook, supra, at 263, 
·' 
26. 
there has been a noticeable absence of scholarly interest 
a.~~ 
in the possibility of maA~ firms combining 
/\ 
to price 
predatorily. at poss1 1 ity appears too remote to mer1 
e tended discussion and analysis. 
__.:::.:.....----------
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are 
unlikely as a general proposition, they are especially so 
where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power 
seem so slight. In order to recoup any losses occasioned 
by their alleged below-market pr icing, petitioners must 
k1k~ 
obtain enough market power to set ~competitive prices, 
~ , 
and tRaA fft~t sustain those prices long enough to wiri :b:emk 
~ 
~-k,(-----, J:.n I\ excess profits -- what they earlier 
~ 1!!6-4,;/-
gave up in I\ row-
prices. 8 See Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 
~ ).--t.-,_~, 
supra, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 698. A Two decades after their 
27. 
conspiracy allegedly began operation, petitioners appear 
to be far from achieving this goal: the two largest shares 
of the retail market in television sets are held by 
~tA 
respondent Zenith~, not by any of the petitioners. 
I\ 
App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those 
nJ 
shares, w.lH-Gh together approximate 40% of sales of both 
black-and-white and color television sets, did not decline 
appreciably during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' 
collective share rose rapidly during this period, from 
one-fifth or less of the market to close to 50%. 723 
F. 2d, at 316. Neither the District Court nor the Court of 
Appeals found, however, that petitioners' share presently 
~Ju., 
allows them to charge ~ly pr ices; to the contrary, 
respondents contend that the conspiracy is ongoing--that 
petitioners are sti 11 ar ti f ic ially depressing the market 
;,:,L 
28. 
price in order to drive Zenith /\out of the market. The 
$' 
data in the record T strongly ;t sugges ~ that that 
goal is yet distant. 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its 
ends in two decades of operation is strong evidence that 
1 ~ 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. There is no 
rational reason to enter into a predatory pricing 
conspiracy unless the profits to be attained thereby, 
\ discounted by the likelihood of failure, outweigh the 
1 losses that must be suffered along the way. Since the 
, l' 
losses accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" wi~r 
in-.:_erest ·( Thus, the longer 
the competition, the longer 
the time needed to eliminattt i 
the time needed to recoup 1 
conspirators' losses. 1! Even if petitioners r succeet; 
in finally achieving the power to set supracompeti tive 
( 
29. 
prices, e profitable if they 
could maintain those pr ices for a substantial period of 
~
time. Maintaining ~pra~iti¥e prices in turn depends 
-"I 
S..Jof 7 on the continurc~ of the conspirators, on the 
inability of other would-be competitors to enter the 
market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators' 
ability to escape antitrust liability for their minimum 
price-fixing cartel. 9 Each of these factors weighs more 
heavily as the time needed to recoup losses 
osses have been substantial--as would likely be necessary 
in order to drive out the competition 10--petitioners would 
have to sustain their cartel for decades simply to 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have 
obtained supracompeti ti ve profits in the Japanese market 
;J ~ - ..f.t ~ ~ ~~.,_'1 ~ -s ~ 
4 ~h.. ~  ~ ~ 





change this calculation. Whether or not petitioners have 
~~~~ 
the means to sustain substantial losses over a long period 
I\ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
of time, tR-ey b~I/-Q- ~&-i'AQti~~ to sustain such losses absent 
I A 
some strong likelihood that the investment will pay off. 
CJ)£~ 
At most, the size of petitioners' Japanese profityight 
~ 
be relevant to show that, were the alleged scheme 
I\ 
otherwise plausible, and were the opportunity for 
successful predation present, petitioners might enter into 
the alleged conspiracy. The existence of supracompetitive 
profits in Japan does not somehow overcome the obstacles 




critical to a proper analysis of petitioners' motion for 
summary judgment. 
between the economic 
conspiracy 
~ 
We  consider the relationship 
I\ 
4 ) 
context __..t.l:t.at; st1rrot1ASS;\ respondent ~ 
'1 
~ ~~~~~~J<J 
I\ the standard/4 1 w~ summary judgment motions ~ 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
01.ll. - ~ 
~~""-
~ ~'?:: 




judgment, 11 respondents must establish that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners 
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents 
to suffer a cognizable injury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e); 
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 
u.s. 253, 288-289 (1968). This proposition has two 
components. First, 
~~~ ~1-~ 
i:-e- is net efiough tQ. show that 
32. 
petitioners illegally conspired and that ~ dents were 
hard Th"e injury must be causally linked to the conduct 
that violates the antitrust laws. 
~ ~.1:-ei~ A espondents charge petitioners with a ~ 
host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Ante, at 
Save for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the American 




conspiracies GaAn~t have caused respondents to suffer an 
1 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, 
supra, 429 u.s., at 489, because they actually tended to 
>I:' 
benefit respondents. Therefore, unless (-aione--- or togeth ~ 
~ . A.-w.,L& "Y-~ 
w-:1:~ i--..0.Jc.UJE!,i;.- ~ '-,1,.1,¼eiF¼v~l}. t: raises a genuine fact issue 
concerning the existence of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy, evidence of these "other" conspiracies cannot 
defeat petitioners' summary judgment motion. 
33. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. 
R. Civ. Proc. 56(c,e). When the moving party has carried 
its burden under Rule 56 (c) , its opponent must do more 
than simply show that there 
~ 
is A. some T doubt as to the 
material facts: as one of the Rule's draftsmen noted, "at 
least a slight doubt can be developed as to practically 
all things human." Clark, Special Problems in Drafting 
and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. 
Rev. 4 9 3 , 5 O 4 ( 19 5 O) • See also DeLuca v. Atlantic 
&->) . 
Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), cert. 
A 
denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1949); 10A Wright, Miller, & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §2727 (1983). In 
the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come 
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) 
34. 
(emphasis added). Where the record taken as a whole could 
not lead a reasonable factfinder to find for the non-
moving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." 
Cities Service, supra, at 289. 
It 
~ ~ /U..,1-U..L ~ 
follows that, when certain facts render 
" 
a 
necessary element of respondents' claim 
implausible, the strength of the evidence respondents must 
adduce to survive summary judgment increases. Cities 
Service is instructive. The issue in that case was 
whether the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff 
was enough to support an inference that the defendant had 
willingly joined an illegal boycott. The economic context 
strongly suggested that the defendant in that case had no 
motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-
279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the 
35. 
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed to 
l3J 
create a triable issue. Id. , at 277. /fhe defendant's 
~ 
refusal to deal had to be evaluated in Conte o h9WCVC!' (5° 
the lack of any rational motive to join the 
~ ~ 
alleged boycott, ~ refusal to deal could not by itself 
I\ 
support an inference of conspiracy. Id., at 280. 
It also follows that conduct that is as consistent 
with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy 
does not, standing alone, support an inference of 
antitrust conspiracy. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1470-1471 (1984): Cities Service, 
supra, at 280. Thus, in Monsanto, we held that evidence 
that a distributor was terminated in response to 
complaints from other distributors was not enough to 
support a finding of an illegal conspiracy. We noted that 
36. 
manufacturers were free to exchange information with their 
distributors, and also that manufacturers were free 
independently to terminate a distributor. 104 s.ct., at 
1469-1470. If factfinders were permitted to infer an 
illegal conspiracy from the mere fact of termination in 
response to complaints from other distributors, the 
freedom to exchange information 
terminate distributorship agreements might "be seriously 
eroded." Id., at 1470. To avoid this problem, we 
required terminated distributors to come forward with 
evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
manufacturer and the nonterminated distributors were 
acting independently" in order to survive a motion for a 
directed verdict. Id., at 1471. The plaintiff must, in 
other words, show that the inference of conspiracy is as 
plausible as the inference of independent 
conduct. Cities Service, supra, at 280: v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (CA3 1977), denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978). See also Venzie Corp. v. United States 
Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314-131 (CA3 1975). 
in Ci ties Service and Monsanto. The 
respondents seek to hold petitioners liable is pr icing 
74.-~~ ~ 
below market level. I~ r-e-spo1=1d9n-t :,,;---et-:t~"'+ 
took 
- ..... ~4--f J-o a  ~ ~, 
petitioners A., underpr iced respondents and thereby 
~~~~:1~~ r, ~~ 
" 
-.I\ ~ 4 ~
establish this conspiracy indirectly, t;h.r..e.u.gh evidence of 7? 
I\ ~ 
combinations whose natural tendency is to raise 
pr ice, and through evidence of rebates and other pr ice-
K 
cutting activities that respondents claim give rise to an 
* t,_, ~ ~ ~ '1 (J-{J (JA._., J~) 
~ ~ ~~ ~  ~ 
~~~~~~ 
0-~f-  ~4-z_ ! 
38. 
inference of a combination to suppress ptices. But 
cutting price in order to increase business is '1~e~ 
~ ~....?2-t..,~ ~A./_~' 9f- /,,1.J ~~~ 
.Gt compet ~ ·~e-r hap~ e "'most desirable activity ... 
that can take place in a concentrated industry where 
prices typically exceed costs." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
'-1-~~ 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235 (CAl 1983). 
mistaken"'"; i~ in cases such as this one are 
.> 
anti trust laws are designed to protect. Cf. id., at 234 
(" [W] e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that 
authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirabie 
pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price 
competition"). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced 
against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified 
-- -------





this one ,,.. oowrr- As we earlier explained ~ 
.. ~ h ~ . t t ff pr icing sc emes require conspira ors o su er 
/\ 
~order to realize their illegal gains; moreover, 
'1 
the gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such 
~ u/4,_ ,lo L/-l'kr; 
schemes r more likely to fail than to succeed . A These ~ 
~ ~~ ~ I-a 
p o,i n..t,.s may make predatory pricing conspiracies 
I\ ,1 
~ self-deterring., s±-na-ev /..lnlike other conduct that 
violates the antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing 
~ ~ ,k ~ ~ I 
schemes OG-S-t-mo.n.ey. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 
t\ 
63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory 
pricing by a single firm, conspiracies to price 
predatorily are likely to be easily identifiable if 
successful, since they require some kind of minimum price-
fixing agreement in order to reap the benefits of their 
40. 
predation. There is thus little reason to fear that by 
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 
~ a---t_. t-/ w u-~ L~ 




The Court of Appeals did not take account of the 
factors, discussed in part 11, A above, that render the 
alleged predatory pr icing conspiracy -highly implausible, 
and thereby call into question the notion that rational 
~ -~-~~ ~ ~ ~- -
businessmen
1 
would engage in the behavior with which 
petitioners are charged. Cf. Cities Service, supra, at 
~ 
279. This was error. Respondents may yet be entitled to 
I\ 
survive summary judgment: it may be that there is 
sufficient evidence of an illegal agreement to price below 
.. 
41. 
market level to overcome the evidence 
that such an 
_:!!.'Jr 
evidence of 
But if so, the 
agreement must be ~ substantial 
v14-~.,..-.J£,,c;..,t.4...,, ~ ~ ~ ryfa-l 3/ CA--L-1, ~ 
evaluated in light of th ~ -
disincentives to engage in a conspiracy of the kind 
respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals found 
inapplicable the principle that highly ambiguous conduct--
conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition 
as with illegal conspiracy--does not support an inference 
of conspiracy unless that inference is as plausible as the 
inference of permissible conduct. That principle applies 
fully to evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, of 
other combinations whose evident purpose is either to 
raise prices or to impose territorial restraints that 
42. 
ordinarily facilitate raising pr ices. Such combinations 
are not themselves direct evidence of a conspiracy to 
pr ice predator ily; the limitations on inference drawing 
that derive from our decisions in Cities Service and 
Monsanto therefore apply with full force. The same 
limitations apply to evidence of fundamentally competitive 
conduct, such as pricing "to get the sale," or widespread 
use of secret rebates and other price discounts as means 
of undercutting the check prices. This kind of activity 
~~ 
suggests nothing so much as arf e to compete 
~~ 
with more established firms. See Great Atlantic & Pacific 
1 
Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 80 (1979); United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 438 u.s. 422, 457 (1978). It is 
~ 
precisely t.ae kind of conduct one might expect from 
I\ 
foreign firms seeking to break into a market dominated by 
-. 43. 
American companies. It does not, by itself, support the 
inference that petitioners were lowering price not to 
compete but to monopolize the relevant market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' 
showing in the context of the whole record, but leave that 
task to the Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases 
as factually complex as this one is best limited to 
articulation of the governing legal principles; those who 
have lived longer with the case than have we, and who have 
developed greater familiarity with its mammoth record, are 
better able to apply those principles to the facts of the 
case. 
a=,· 
We therefore that the Court of Appeals did not 
~~ 
correctly apply 1;..b-s..,,.~r7 ci-f)-4r€ s -a:> f Rule 56 andl\ of our cases 




for further consideration in light of this Opinion. 
44. 
IV 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the 
sovereign compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' 
argument on that issue is that MITI--an agency of the 
Government of Japan--required petitioners to fix minimum 
prices for export to the United States, and that 
petitioners are therefore immune from antitrust liability 
for any scheme of which those minimum prices were an 
integral part. As we discussed in part II, A, supra, 
respondents cannot PQ;z~:ly have suffered a cognizable 
injury from any action that raised prices in the American 
CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is ~ distinct from the check price 
agreements. The sovereign compulsion issue that both 
.,. . 45 . 
petitioner and the Solicitor General urge us to decide is 
therefore not presented here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 
( and the case is remanded for 
l proceedings;--~~ 
~te further 
It is so ordered. 
1ouring this period, some petitioners unsuccessfully 
challenged both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, 
the latter on the ground that the court lacked power to 
impose anti trust liability for conduct that took place 
almost wholly in Japan. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electronic Industrial Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (personal jurisdiction); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. , 494 F. Supp. 1161 
(E. D. Pa. 1980). 
2The inadmissible evidence included various government 
records and reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electronic Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electronic Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), and a large portion of the expert testimony that 
respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
3The district court ruled separately that petitioners 
were entitled to summary judgment on respondents' 
Antidumping Act claims. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electronic Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 
1980). This ruling was appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning the rest of respondents' claims. In re 
Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' 
Antidumping Act decision along with its decision on the 
rest of th is mammoth case. The Antidumping Act claims 
were not, however, mentioned in the questions presented in 
the petition for certiorari, and they have not been 
separately briefed by the parties. See s. Ct. Rule 
21.l(a). We therefore decline the invitation to review 
the Court of Appeals' decision on those claims. 
4As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are 
the 21 defendants who remain in the case. 
5 [cite--maybe with short explanation--for proposition 
that antitrust laws don't govern competitive conditions of 
other countries' economies. Check Areeda & Turner 
treatise] 
6Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-
company rule, and the price-fixing in Japan are all part 
of one large conspiracy that includes monopolization of 
the American market through predatory pricing. The 
argument is either meaningless or mistaken. However orie 
decides to describe the contours of the asserted 
conspiracy--whether there is one conspiracy or several--
respondents must show that the conspiracy somehow caused 
them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide 
relief. Associated General Contractors v. California 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 u.s. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, supra; see also 
Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se 
Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309 (1984). That showing depends 
in turn on a showing that petitioners conspired to price 
predatorily in the American market, since the other 
conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have 
caused such an injury. 
7Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted 
conspiracy as one to price "predatorily." This term has 
been used chiefly in cases in which a single firm, having 
a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or 
perhaps to deter potential entrants from coming in. E.g., 
Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1002-1007 (CADC 1984). In 
such cases, "predatory pr icing II means pr icing below some 
~ cost. 
A 
E.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983); see Utah Pie Co. 
v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698, 701, 702 n. 
14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases 
and in the law reviews, about what "cost" is relevant in 
such cases. We need not resolve this debate here: unlike 
the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act section 1 
case, and therefore the per se - rule against horizontal 
combinations to raise or depress prices applies. For 
7 
~h~~ 
~,t. ~ ~~~/¥~ 
purposes of our d - ~ th,:-~ 't' ht 1s1on 1n 1s case, 1 1s enoug o 
note that respondents cannot have suffered an anti trust 
~1 
injury unless petitioners a~r (i) e below 
the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) ~ 
pr icl\rlbelow some (±easure of 
agreement with neither of these 
? 





respondents in the same position as would the market or 
actually ffl.ak~;':tf::dents better e.f f by 
A (, 
raising market 
prices. Respondents ~ ere ~ - ~ 111 a -
~ complain of conspiracies that, for example, 
set maximum prices above market levels, or that set 
minimum prices at~ level. 
~ 
~~ never to be available on a theory such as 
respondents' when the pr icing in question is above some 
• 
measure of 
JI-~~~--,;._. ~1.u.,t.,J.. ,I 
incremental cost. ,f ~ a practical matte ~ ~
ma that only direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference 
that rational businesses would not enter into schemes such 
as this one. Cf. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
8Respondents cite no evidence that entry into the 
relevant market is especially difficult, yet without 
barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to 
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time. 
ignificant of all. The 
y alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners 
can recoup their losses, but they can recoup their losses 
only by engaging in some form of price-fixing after they 
have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. 
Such price-fixing would, of course, be an independent 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Madison Oil, 
supra. 
lOThe predators' losses must actually increase as the 
conspiracy nears its objective: the greater the predators' 
market share, the more products the predators sell: but 
since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in 
market share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
/0 
7 
before the district court 
that petitioners had failed to carry their initial burden 
under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 u.s. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
756 F.2d 181 (CADC 1985), cert. granted, u.s. , No. 
85-198 (Nov. 4, 1985). That issue was resolved in 
petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
. . 
wjs January 6, 1986 
83-2004 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., et al. v. ZENITH RADIO 
CORPORATION, et al. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again discuss the 
standard district courts must apply when deciding whether 
to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this massive case is a 
daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of 
the District Court is more than three times as long. In 
2. 
re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (CA3 1983); 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial 
Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Two respected 
district judges have each authored a number of opinions in 
this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire 
volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court 
that is said to contain the distilled essence of the 
evidence on which the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals based their respective decisions. 
we will not repeat what these many opinions have 
already stated and restated, or summarize the mass of 
documents that comprise the official record on appeal. 
Because we review the standard by which the Court of 
Appeals decided this case, and not the weight the Court of 
3. 
Appeals assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we do 
not need to state the facts in great detail. What follows 
is therefore only a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese 
corporations that manufacture and/or sell "consumer 
electronic products" ("CEPs")--for the most part, 
television receivers and finished television sets. 
Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio 
Corporation ("Zenith") and National Union Electric 
Corporation ("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm that 
sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to 
Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that sold 
television sets until 1970, when it withdrew from the 
4. 
market after sustaining substantial losses. Zeni th and 
NUE brought this case in 1973, claiming that petitioners 
had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the 
American CEP market. The gist of this conspiracy, 
according to Zeni th and NUE, was a "scheme to raise, fix 
and maintain artificially high prices for television 
receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same 
time, to fix and maintain low prices for television 
receivers exported to and sold in the United States." In 
re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d 238, 250 (CA3 
1983) (quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial 
Memorandum). Respondents claimed that various portions of 
this scheme violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, section 73 of the 
5. 
Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. Only 
the Sherman Act conspiracy claim is the at issue here. 
After several years of detailed discovery, 1 
petitioners filed motions for summary judgment on all 
claims against them. The district court directed the 
parties to file, with preclusive effect, a "Final Pretrial 
Statement" containing all the documentary evidence that 
would be offered if the case proceeded to trial. After 
these statements were filed, the district court 
entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the district court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The district court then turned to petitioners' 
summary judgment motions. In an opinion spanning 217 
6. 
pages, the district court found that the admissible 
evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the existence of the alleged conspiracy. Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., 513 F. 
Supp. 1100 (E.o. Pa. 1981). At bottom, the district court 
found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that 
could be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the 
Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of 
that conduct on petitioners' American competitors. Id. , 
at 1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by 
category and in toto, the court found that any inference 
of conspiracy was simply unreasonable, because ( i) some 
portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners 
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and 
( ii) the evidence that bore directly on the alleged "low 
7. 
price" conspiracy in no way rebutted the obvious inference 
that petitioners were cutting pr ices to compete in the 
American market and not to monopolize it. Summary 
judgment was therefore granted on respondents' Sherman Act 
section 1 and Wilson Tariff Act claims. Because the 
Sherman Act section 2 claims, which alleged that 
petitioners had combined to monopolize the American CEP 
market, were functionally indistinguishable from the 
section 1 claims, they were dismissed as well. Finally, 
the district court found that the Robinson-Patman Act 
claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as t:he 
Sherman Act claims. Thus, the finding that no fact issue 
had been raised on the conspiracy issue required that 
judgment be entered in petitioners' favor on those claims 
as well. 3 
8. 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 4 The court began by examining the district 
court's evidentiary rulings, and concluded that much of 
the evidence excluded by the district court was in fact 
admissible. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d, 
at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. 
Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 105 s.ct. 1863 (1985) (limiting grant of 
certiorari). 
On the merits, the court found the district court's 
summary judgment decision improper based on the newly 
enlarged record. The court acknowledged that "there are 
legal limitations on the inferences that may be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence," 723 F.2d, at 304, but it found 
9. 
that II the legal problem . . . is different II when II there is 
direct evidence of concert of action. 11 Ibid. Here, the 
court found, 11 there is both direct evidence of certain 
kinds of concert of action and circumstantial evidence 
having some tendency to suggest thast other kinds of 
concert of action may have occurred. 11 Id., at 304-305. 
It followed that cases concerning the limitations on 
inferring conspiracy from ambiguous evidence were not 
dispositive. Id., at 305. Turning to the evidence, the 
court found that a factf inder could reasonably draw the 
following conclusions from the record: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of 
producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
10. 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. Arner ican f irrns could not attack 
such a combination because of significant barriers to 
entry imposed by the Japanese government. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs 
than their Arner ican .counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order to 
make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs 
of the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation 
with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
("MIT!"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs 
exported to the American market. Id., at 310. The 
11. 
parties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and 
to the agreements that spawned them as the "check pr ice 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products 
in the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by 
a variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MIT!, the former · in 
order to avoid various customs regulations as well as 
action under the antidumping laws, and the Jatter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements • 
. . 
12. 
In addition to these permissible inferences, the 
court noted that there was expert opinion evidence that 
petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices which 
produced losses, of ten as high as twenty-five percent on 
sales." Ibid. The court did not identify any direct 
evidence of below-cost pricing. 
Based on these permissible inferences, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find 
a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
was funded by supracompetitive profits obtained in the 
Japanese market. The court did not examine whether it was 
as plausible, or more so, to conclude that petitioners' 
13. 
price-cutting behavior was competitive and not 
conspiratorial in nature. 
The court found it unnecessary to address 
petitioners' claim that they could not be held liable 
under the antitrust laws for conduct that was compelled by 
a foreign sovereign. The claim, in essence, was that 
because MIT! required petitioners to enter into the check 
price agreements, liability could not be premised on those 
agreements. The court concluded that this case did not 
present the sovereign compulsion issue, since the check 
price agreements were being used as "evidence of a iow 
export price conspiracy"~ further, the court found it 
unclear whether in fact the check prices were mandated by 
the Japanese government, notwithstanding a statement to 
that effect by MIT! itself. Id., at 315. 
14. 
we granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the 
Court of Appeals properly analyzed petitioners' summary 
judgment motion, and (ii) whether petitioners could be 
held liable under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy one 
of the central features of which was conduct compelled by 
a foreign sovereign. 105 s.ct. 1863 (1985). We now 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
This Court has previously cautioned against lightly 
inferring illegal conspiracies in restraint of trade fiom 
ambiguous evidence. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 104 s.ct. 1464 (1984); First National Bank of 
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 u.s. 253 (1968). The 
Court of Appeals found that concern inapplicable here, 
15. 
because respondents came forward with direct evidence of 
petitioners' conspiracy, and did not rely on 
circumstantial evidence alone. 723 F.2d, at 304-305. We 
believe the Court of Appeals' analysis misperceives both 
the nature of respondents' substantive anti trust claims 
and the import of our decisions in Monsanto and Ci ties 
Service. Although petitioners may have engaged in a wide 
range of concerted action, respondents' claim is based 
solely on a purported conspiracy to drive out competitors 
in the American CEP market through artificially low 
prices. That conspiracy has serious difficulties that 
render its success unlikely, and therefore call into 
question whether rational businesses would enter into it. 
Our dee is ions counsel that, in such circumstances, the 
evidence necessary to create a genuine issue of material 
16. · 
fact is correspondingly greater than when the alleged 




It is best to begin by emphasizing what 
respondents' claim is not. Respondents cannot recover 
anti trust damages from petitioners based on petitioners' 
supposed cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive 
conditions of other nations' economies. 5 [JUSTICE POWELL: 
cite to be added here] Nor can respondents recover 
damages for any conspiracy on petitioners' part to charge 
supracompetitive prices in the American market. Such 
17. 
conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 u.s. 392 (1927); 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 u.s. 150, 223 
(1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil), but it cannot possibly 
injure respondents: as petitioners' competitors, 
respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the 
market price in consumer electronics products. Cf. 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 u.s. 477, 488-
489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respondents 
cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose nonprice 
restraints that have the effect of either raising market 
price or limiting output. Once again, such restrictions, 
though harmful to competition, actually benefit 
competitors by making oligopolistic pricing more 
attractive. Thus, neither petitioners' alleged oligopoly 
18. 
pricing in Japan, nor the Five-Company rule that limited 
distribution in this country, nor the check prices insofar 
as they operated to fix minimum prices in this country, 
can by themselves give respondents a cognizable claim 
against petitioners for antitrust damages. The court of 
Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it found 
evidence of these alleged conspiracies was "direct 
evidence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 
723 F.2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed 
conspiracies, though not themselves grounds for recovery 
of anti trust damages, are circumstantial evidence of a 
different conspiracy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to 
monopolize the Arner ican market by means of pr icing below 
the market level. 6 The thrust of respondents' argument, 
19. 
here as in the Court of Appeals, is that petitioners used 
their oligopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a 
concerted campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive 
respondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out 
of business. Once successful, according to respondents, 
petitioners would cartelize the American CEP market, 
restricting output and raising prices above the level that 
fair competition would produce. The resulting oligopoly 
profits, respondents contend, would more than compensate 
petitioners for the losses they incurred through years of 
pricing below market level. 
(2) 
We may presume for purposes of deciding this case 
that a conspiracy to price predatorily, 7 if proved, is a 
20. 
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such a 
conspiracy is a horizontal combination whose purpose is to 
distort the market pr ice of a good or service. We have 
long held that horizontal conspiracies to raise or lower 
pr ices are per se illegal. Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society, 457 u.s. 332, 348-351 (1982): Madison 
Oil, supra, at 221-223. The predatory pricing conspiracy 
respondents allege here appears to fall within that 
proscription. We therefore consider the nature and 
economic context of the alleged conspiracy, as a necessary 




A predatory pr icing conspiracy is by nature 
speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive 
level requires the conspirators to forego profits that 
free competition would of fer them. The foregone profits 
are, in effect, an investment. For the investment to be 
rational, the conspirators must be able to recover, in the 
form of oligopoly profits, more than the amount of the 
losses plus any accrued interest. As then-Professor Bork, 
discussing predatory pricing by a single firm, explained 
the matter: 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes 
that the predator as well as his victims will 
incur losses during the fighting, but such a 
theory supposes it may be a rational calculation 











undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be 
disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the 
present size of the losses. 
Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978). 
R. Bork, The 
22. 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 ( 1980) • As this explanation makes 
clear, the success of such schemes is inherently 
uncertain: the short-run losses are definite, but the 
long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the 
competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve 
monopoly power, if monopoly pricing breeds quick entry by 
new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The 
success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining 
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the 
predators' losses and to harvest some additional gain. 
23. 
Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a 
significant period of time, "the predator must make a 
substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay 
Off• II Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981}. 
For this reason, there is a strong consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely 
tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e.g. , R. 
Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 699; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies a·nd 
Counterstrategies, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981}; Koller, 
The Myth of Predatory Pricing--An Empirical Study, 4 
Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971}; McGee, Predatory 
Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & 
24. 
Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 
J.L. & Econ. 289, 292-294 (1980). See also Northeastern 
Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 
F. 2d 7 6, 88 (CA2 1981) ( 0 [NJowhere in the recent 
outpouring of literature on the subject do commentators 
suggest that such pricing is either common or likely to 
increase 0 ), cert. denied, 455 o.s. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply to predatory pricing by a 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, 
respondents allege that a large number of firms have 
conspired to charge below-market prices in order to stifle 
competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
difficult to carry out than an analogous scheme executed 
by a single predator. The conspirators in such a scheme 
must allocate the losses to be sustained during the 
25. 
conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any 
eventual gains from its success. Precisely because the 
scheme's success is speculative and depends on a 
willingness to endure short-term loss, all the 
conspirators have an especially strong incentive to cheat, 
letting their partners suffer the losses necessary to 
drive out the competition while sharing in any gains if 
the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary allocation is 
therefore difficult at best. Yet if conspirators cheat to 
any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, because 
its success depends on depressing the market price for all 
buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the 
artificially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be 
victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the 
"real" market price, and the conspirators' losses 
26. 
accomplish nothing. It is no accident that, while the 
last decade has spawned "a blizzard" of scholarly articles 
and proposals for rules to combat predatory pr icing by 
lone would-be monopolists, Easterbrook, supra, at 263, 
there has been a noticeable absence of scholarly interest 
in the possibility of many firms combining to price 
predatorily. That possibility appears too remote to merit 
extended discussion and analysis. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are 
unlikely as a general proposition, they are especially so 
where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power 
seem so slight. In order to recoup any losses occasioned 
_by their alleged below-market pr icing, petitioners must 
obtain enough market power to set supracompetitive prices, 
and then must sustain those prices long enough to win back 
27. 
in excess profits what they earlier gave up in low 
prices. 8 See Northeastern Telephone co. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 
supra, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their 
conspiracy allegedly began operation, petitioners appear 
to be far from achieving this goal: the two largest shares 
of the retail market in television sets are held by 
respondent Zenith and RCA, not by any of the petitioners. 
App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those 
shares, which together approximate 40% of sales of both 
black-and-white and color television sets, did not decline 
appreciably during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' 
collective share rose rapidly during this period, from 
one-fifth or less of the market to close to 50%. 723 
F.2d, at 316. Neither the District Court nor the Court of 
28. 
Appeals found, however, that petitioners' share presently 
allows them to charge oligopoly pr ices; to the contrary, 
respondents contend that the conspiracy is ongoing--that 
petitioners are still artificially depressing the market 
pr ice in order to drive Zeni th out of the market. The 
data in the record seems strongly to suggest that that 
goal is yet distant. 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its 
ends in two decades of operation is strong evidence that 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. There is no 
rational reason to enter into a predatory priclng 
conspiracy unless the profits to be attained thereby, 
discounted by the likelihood of failure, outweigh the 
losses that must be suffered along the way. Since the 
losses accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" with 
- ' 
29. 
interest. Thus, the longer the time needed to eliminate 
the competition, the longer the time needed to recoup the 
conspirators' losses. Even if petitioners could succeed 
in finally achieving the power to set supracompetitive 
prices, their scheme would only be profitable if they 
could maintain those pr ices for a substantial period of 
time. Maintaining supracompetitive prices in turn depends 
on the continued cooperation of the conspirators, on the 
inability of other would-be competitors to enter the 
market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators' 
ability to escape anti trust liability for their minimum 
price-fixing car tel. 9 Each of these factors weighs more 
heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If the 
losses have been substantial--as would likely be nec~ssary 
in order to drive out the competition 10--petitioners would 
30. 
have to sustain their cartel for decades simply to break 
even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have 
obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market 
change this calculation. Whether or not petitioners have 
the means to sustain substantial losses over a long period 
of time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent 
some strong likelihood that the investment will pay off. 
At most, the size of petitioners' Japanese profits might 
be relevant to show that, were the alleged scheme 
otherwise plausible, and were the opportunity for 
successful predation present, petitioners might enter into 
the alleged conspiracy. The existence of supracompetitive 
profits in Japan does not somehow overcome the obstacles 
31. 
: 
to success that are otherwise present in a scheme such as 
this one. 
B 
The irrationality of the alleged scheme in this 
case is critical to a proper analysis of petitioners' 
motion for summary judgment. We next consider the 
relationship between the economic context that surrounds 
respondents' conspiracy claim--the subject of our 
discussion above--and the legal standards of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56 and of substantive antitrust law. 
In order to survive petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment, 11 respondents must establish that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners 
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents 
32. 
to suffer a cognizable injury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e): 
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 
u.s. 253, 288-289 (1968). This proposition has two 
components. First, it is not enough to show that 
petitioners illegally conspired and that respondents were 
harmed: the injury must be causally linked to the conduct 
that violates the antitrust laws. As we have already 
explained, respondents charge petitioners with a whole 
host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Ante, at 
Save for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market through predatory pricing, however, these 
conspiracies cannot have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, 
supra, 429 U. s., at 489, because they actually tended to 
benefit respondents. Therefore, unless (alone or together 
33. 
with other evidence) it raises a genuine fact issue 
concerning the existence of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy, evidence of these "other" conspiracies cannot 
defeat petitioners' summary judgment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. 
R. Civ. P~oc. 56(c,e). When the moving party has carried 
its burden under Rule 56 (c), its opponent must do more 
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as 
to the material facts: as one of the Rule's draftsmen 
noted, "at least a slight doubt can be developed as to 
practically all things human." Clark, Specjal Problems . in 
Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 
Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504 (1950). See also DeLuca v. 
Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. Hand, 
J.), cert. denied, 338 u.s. 943 (1949); 10A Wright, 
34. 
Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 
§2727 (1983). Cf. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas ~ -, 
321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944) (moving party is entitled to 
judgment only "where it is quite clear what the truth 
is II) • In the language of the Rule, the non-moving party 
must come forward with "specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Ci v. Proc. 56 (e) 
(emphasis added). Where the record taken as a whole could 
not lead a rational factfinder to find for the non-moving 
party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Cities 
Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows that, when certain facts render a 
necessary element of respondents' claim seriously 
implausible, the strength of the evidence respondents must 
adduce to survive summary judgment increases. Cities 
35. 
Service is instructive. The issue in that case was 
whether the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff 
was enough to support an inference that the defendant had 
willingly joined an illegal boycott. The economic context 
strongly suggested that the defendant in that case had no 
motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-
279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the 
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed to 
create a triable issue. Id., at 277. The defendant's 
refusal to deal had to be evaluated in context, however: 
and given the lack of any rational motive to join the 
alleged boycott, the refusal to deal could not by itself 
support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that 11 [o] n summary 
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying 
36. 
facts ••• must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 369 u.s. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits 
the range of permissible inferences 
W\ 
from aJtbiguous 
evidence in a section 1 case such as this one. Thus, in 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 s.ct. 1464 
(1984), we held that conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 
not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust 
conspiracy. Id., at 1470-1471. See also Cities Service, 
supra, at 280. A plaintiff seeking damages for a 
violation of section 1 must, in order to survive motions 
for summary judgment or a directed verdict, come forward 
with evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. 104 s.ct., 
37. 
at 1471. The plaintiff must, in other words, show that 
the inference of conspiracy is as plausible as the 
inference of permissible independent conduct. Cities 
Service, supra, at 280; Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 
F.2d 434, 446 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1086 
(1978). See also Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral 
Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314-1315 (CA3 1975). 
These principles apply with special force where, as 
here, there is a serious danger of deterring pro-
competitive conduct. See Monsanto, supra, at 1470. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold 
petitioners liable for damages caused by petitioners' 
price cutting. In effect, respondents allege that 
petitioners underpriced respondents and thereby took 
customers away from them. Moreover, they seek to 
38. 
establish this conspiracy indirectly, through evidence of 
other combinations whose natural tendency is to raise 
pr ice, and through evidence of rebates and other pr ice-
cutting activities that respondents claim give rise to an 
inference of a combination to suppress prices. But 
cutting price in order to increase business is the essence 
of competition, "perhaps the most desirable activity ••. 
that can take place in a concentrated industry where 
prices typically exceed costs." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235 (CAl 1983). Thus, 
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are 
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
anti trust laws are designed to protect. See Monsanto, 
supra, at 1470-1471. "[W]e must be concerned lest a rule 
or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular 
39. 
type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by 
discouraging legitimate price competition." Barry Wright 
Corp., supra, at 234. 
ln most cases, this concern must be balanced 
against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified 
and punished. That balance is uniquely one-sided in cases 
such as this one, however. As we earlier explained, 
predatory pr icing schemes require conspirators to suffer 
losses in order to realize their illegal gains: moreover, 
the gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such 
schemes far more likely to fail than to succeed. These 
points make predatory pr icing conspiracies almost wholly 
self-deterring, since, unlike other conduct that violates 
the antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing schemes cost 
money. Easterbrook, The Limits of Anti trust, 63 Tex. L. 
40. 
Rev. 1,. 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a 
single firm, conspiracies to price predatorily are likely 
to be easily identifiable if successful, since they 
require some kind of minimum price-fixing agreement in 
order to reap the benefits of their predation. There is 
thus little reason to fear that by granting summary 
judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is 
ambiguous, courts will permit such schemes to flourish. 
III 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the 
factors, discussed in part II, A above, that render the 
alleged predatory pr icing conspiracy highly implausible, 
and thereby call into question the notion that rational 
businessmen would engage in the behavior with which 
41. 
petitioners are charged. Cf • Cities Service , supra , at 
279. This was error. Respondents may yet be entitled to 
survive summary judgment: it may be that there is 
sufficient evidence of an illegal agreement to price below 
market levels to overcome the strong contextual evidence 
that such an agreement would be senseless. But if so, the 
evidence of illegal agreement must be substantial, and it 
must be evaluated in light of the strong disincentives to 
engage in a conspiracy of the kind respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals found 
inapplicable the principle that highly ambiguous conduct--
conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition 
as with illegal conspiracy--does not support an inference 
of conspiracy unless that inference is as plausible as the 
inference of permissible conduct. This too was error. 
42. 
-; 
The principle of Monsanto applies fully to evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, of other combinations 
whose evident purpose is either to raise prices or to 
impose territorial restraints that ordinarily facilitate 
raising prices. Such combinations are not themselves 
direct evidence of a conspiracy to price predatorily; the 
limitations on inference drawing that derive from our 
decisions in Cities Service and Monsanto therefore apply 
with full force. The same limitations apply to evidence 
of fundamentally competitive conduct, such as pricing "to 
get the sale," or widespread use of secret rebates and 
other pr ice discounts as means of undercutting the check 
prices. This kind of activity suggests nothing so much as 
a fierce desire to compete with more established firms. 
See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 
.. 
. . 43 . 
80 (1979): United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 
u.s. 422, 457 (1978). It is thus precisely the kind of 
conduct one might expect from foreign firms seeking to 
break into a market dominated by American companies. It 
does not, by itself, support the inference that 
petitioners were lowering price not to compete but to 
monopolize the relevant market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' 
showing in the context of the whole record, but leave that 
task to the Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases 
as factually complex as this one is best limited to 
articulation of the governing legal principles: those who 
have lived longer with the case than have we, and who have 
developed greater familiarity with its mammoth record, are 
better able to apply those principles to the facts of the 
44. 
case. We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
correctly apply the principles of Rule 56 and of our cases 
to petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and remand 
for further consideration in light of this Opinion. 
IV 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the 
sovereign compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' 
argument on that issue is that MITI--an agency of the 
Government of Japan--required petitioners to fix minimum 
prices for export to the United States, and that 
petitioners are therefore immune from antitrust liability 
for any scheme of which those minimum prices were an 
integral part. As we discussed in part II, A, supra, 
respondents cannot possibly have suffered a cognizable 
• . 45 . 
injury from any action that raised prices in the American 
CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is wholly distinct from the check price 
agreements. The sovereign compulsion issue that both 
petitioner and the Solicitor General urge us to decide is 
therefore not presented here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for appropriate further 
proceedings. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this massive case is a daunting task. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs 
to 69 pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more 
than three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Prod-
ucts, 723 F. 2d 238 (CA31983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 
1981). Two respected district judges each have authored a 
number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone 
would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In 
addition, the parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in 
this Court that is said to contain the distilled essence of the 
evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals based their respective decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many able opinions have al-
ready stated and restated, or summarize the mass of docu-
ments that comprise the official record on appeal. We re-
view only the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in 
deciding this case, and not the weight the Court of Appeals 
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assigned to particular pieces of evidence. We therefore find 
it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What fol-
lows is a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese corpora-
tions that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic prod-
ucts" ("CEPs")-for the most part, ~V-el'S-ftfl 
-Bni'Shed'television sets. Respondents, plaintiffs below, are 
Zenith Radio Corporation ("Zenith") and National Union 
Electric Corporation ("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm 
that manufactures and sells television sets. NUE is the cor-
porate successor to Emerson Radio Company, an American 
firm that manufactured and sold television sets until 1970, 
when it withdrew from the market after sustaining substan-
tial losses. Zenith and NUE brought this case in 1973, 
claiming that petitioners had illegally conspired to drive 
American firms from the American CEP market. According 
to respondents, the gist of this conspiracy was a "scheme to 
raise, fix and maintain artificially high prices for television 
receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same time, 
to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers ex-
ported to and sold in the United States." In re Japanese 
Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d 238, 250 (CA3 1983) (quoting 
respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memorandum). These 
"low prices" were allegedly at levels that produced substan-
tial losses for petitioners. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1125 
(ED Pa. 1981). Respondents claimed that various portions 
of this scheme violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, section 73 of the 
Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
After several years of detailed discovery, 1 petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
1 During this period, some petitioners unsuccessfully challenged both 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the latter on the ground that the 
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The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, a "Final Pretrial Statement" containing all the 
documentary evidence that would be offered if the case pro-
ceeded to trial. After these statements were filed, the Dis-
trict Court entertained motions challenging the admissibility 
of evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' summary 
judgment motions. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 1981). At bottom, 
the court found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences 
that could be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the 
Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of that 
conduct on petitioners' American competitors. Id., at 
1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category 
and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy 
simply was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the ev-
idence suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did 
not injure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that bore di-
rectly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy in no way re-
butted the obvious inference that petitioners were cutting 
court lacked power to impose antitrust liability for conduct that took place 
almost wholly in Japan. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (ED Pa. 1975) (personal jurisdiction); Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (ED 
Pa. 1980). 
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1980). 
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prices to compete in the American market and not to monopo-
lize it. Summary judgment therefore was granted on re-
spondents' Sherman Act section 1 and Wilson Tariff Act 
claims. Because the Sherman Act section 2 claims, which al-
leged that petitioners had combined to monopolize the Ameri-
can CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from 
the section 1 claims, they were dismissed as well. Finally, 
the court found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims de-
pended on the same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act 
claims. Thus, the finding that no genuine fact issue had 
been raised on the conspiracy issue required that judgment 
be entered in petitioners' favor on those claims as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and concluded that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. In re 
Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d, at 260-303. These 
evidentiary rulings are not before us. Matsushita Electric 
3 The district court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' Antidumping Act claims. Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (ED 
Pa. 1980). This ruling was appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in 
a separate opinion issued the same day as the opinion concerning the rest of 
respondents' claims. In re Japanese Electric Products, 723 F. 2d 319 
(CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See S. Ct. Rule 21.l(a). We therefore de-
cline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
• As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
6 t..l..l- - 7k 0-~"f~ 
,{..,e_ /l,t r_z--1•...,.-i..,,....~"1.( • 
/. .. 
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Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio CJ., 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985) 
(limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, the court found he District Court's sum-
mary judgment decision improper lbased on the newly en-
larged record 7 The court acknowledged that "there are legal 
limitations on the inferences that may be drawn from cir-
cumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found that 
"the legal problem . . . is different" when "there is direct evi-
dence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court found, 
"there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of concert of 
action and circumstantial evidence having some tendency to 
suggest that other kinds of CQJ.leel't of action may have oc-
curred." Id., at 304-305. Thus~ the ·court reasoned, cases 
concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. 
Turning to the evidence, the court found that a factfinder 
reasonably could draw the following conclusions from the 
record: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc-
ers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because of significant barriers to 
entry imposed by the Japanese government. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order 
to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
("MITI"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs ex-
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ties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer in order to avoid various customs regulations as well 
as action under the antidumping laws, and the latter to 
cover up petitioners' violations of the check price 
agreements. 
Based on these permissible inferences, 5 the Court of Appeals 
concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy 
to depress prices in the American market in order to drive 
out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by 
excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court 
apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible, or 
more so, to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior 
was independent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con-
cluded that this case did not present the sovereign compul-
5 In addition to these permissible inferences, the court noted that there 
was expert opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were 
at prices which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on 
sales." 723 F. 2d, at 311. The court did not identify any direct evidence 
of below-cost pricing; nor did it place particular reliance on this aspect of 
the expert opinion evidence. See n. 16 infra. 
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sion issue, since the check price agreements were being used 
as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy" and not as an 
independent basis for finding antitrust liability; further, the 
court found it unclear whether in fact the check prices were 
mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstanding a 
statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. 
We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court 
of Appeals properly analyzed petitioners' summary judgment 
motion, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held liable under 
the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part compelled by a for-
eign sovereign. 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985). We now reverse on 
the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages from peti-
tioners based on petitioners' supposed cartelization of the 
Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not 
regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' econo-
mies. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 
148 F. 2d 416,443 (CA21945) (L. Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. 
Turner, Antitrust Law ~236d (1978). 6 Nor can respondents 
recover damages for any conspiracy on petitioners' part to 
charge higher than competitive prices in the American mar-
ket. Such conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); 
6 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. , 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japa-
nese market could not, by itself, have caused that effect. Respondents' 
theory of recovery thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting con-
spiracy in this country. 
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United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 
(1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil], but it could not injure re-
spondents: as petitioners' competitors, respondents stand to 
gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price ,iIYcon-
sumer electronics products. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the 
same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to 
impose nonprice restraints that have the effect of either rais-
ing market price or limiting output. Once again, such re-
strictions, though harmful to competition, actually benefit 
competitors by making supracompetitive pricing more attrac-
tive. Thus, neither petitioners' alleged supracompetitive 
pricing in Japan, nor the five-company rule that limited dis-
tribution in this country, nor the check prices insofar as they 
operated to fix minimum prices in this country, can by them-
selves give respondents a cognizable claim against petitioners 
for antitrust damages. The Court of Appeals therefore 
erred to the extent that it found that evidence of these al-
leged conspiracies was "direct evidence" of a conspiracy that 
injured respondents. See 723 F. 2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of a different conspir-
acy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the Ameri-
can market by means of pricing below the market level. 7 
7 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is either meaningless or mistaken. However one decides to 
describe the contours of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one 
conspiracy or several-respondents must show that the conspiracy some-
how caused them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide relief. 
Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U. S. 519, 538-540 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
supra; see also Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se 
Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1309 (1984). That showing depends in turn on a 
showing that petitioners conspired to price predatorily in the American 
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The thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used 
their o!!_gqpoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a 
concerted campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive 
respondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out 
of business. Once successful, according to respondents, pe-
titioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair compe-
tition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
Respondents' allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to en-
gage in predatory pricing,8 if proved, T)i"j~lffl"!m+v would be a 
market, since the other conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot 
have caused such an injury. 
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to 
price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten-
tial entrants from coming in. E. g., Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 740 F. 2d 980, 1002-1007 
(CADC 1984). In such cases, "predatory pricing" means pricing below 
some appropriate measure of cost. E . g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983); see Utah Pie Co. v. 
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698, 701, 702, n. 14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this 
debate here: unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act section 1 
case, and therefore the per se rule against horizontal combinations to raise 
or depress prices applies. For purposes of our decision in this case, it is 
enough to note that respondents cannot have suffered an antitrust injury 
unless petitioners conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant mar-
kets by (i) pricing below the level nece~ry to sell their product , or (ii) 
ricin below some a ropriate measur( eost. n agreement with ne1 ;ner 
f these features w ul e1 er ea on ents in the same ositio~ ---...--. 
~~~11 benefit res onde~~sing markcl prices. 
Respondents therefore may not comp ain ofconspiracies that, for example, 
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s 
per se violation of section 1 of t~Sherman Act. Such a con- S 
spiracy is a horizontal combina ion whose purpose is !g d~ 
tort the market price of;( good or servic~izontal con-
spiracies to raise or low/r prices are per se illegal. Arizona 
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 348-351 
(1982); Madison Oil, supra, at 221-223. The predatory pric-
ing conspiracy respondents allege here appears to fall within 
that proscription. The issue in this case is whether respond-
ents adduced sufficient evidence in support of that theory to 
survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the 
principles that govern the summary judgment determination. 
III 
In order to survive petitioners' motion for summary judg-
ment, 9 respondents must establish that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether petitioners entered into 
an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cog-
nizable injury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e); 1° First National 
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 
We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, supra. As a 
practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost pricing is 
sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational businesses would 
not enter into conspiracies such as this one. Cf. Easterbrook, The Limits 
of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
9 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 F. 2d 181 
(CADC 1985), cert. granted, - U.S.-, No. 85-198 (Nov. 4, 1985). 
That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
10 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. Ifhe does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him. 
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(1968). This proposition has two components. First, re-
spondents must show more than a conspiracy in violation of 
the antitrust laws; they must show an injury to them result-
ing from the illegal conduct. Respondents charge petition-
ers with a whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. 
Ante, at--. Save for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize 
the American market through predatory pricing, these al-
leged conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suf-
fer an "antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, supra, 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually 
tended to benefit respondents. Ante, at--. Therefore, 
unless, in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies 
raises a genuine fact issue concerning the existence of a fWed-r 
a~ conspirac~ that evidence cannot defeat peti-
tioners' summary judgment motion. , ? 
Second, the issue of fact must be ''genuine." Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 56(c,e). When-as hereLthe moving party has car-(. 
ried its burden under Rule56(c), its opponent must do more J 
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts? as one o he RUJ:E!'s draftsmen no e , a 
as a s 1g oubt can be developed as to racticall all 
~ thin s huma ' ar , Specia ro lems in Drafting an n-
terpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 
504 (1950). See also DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 
F. 2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 
943 (1949); l0A Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 2727 (1983). Cf. Sartor v. Arkansas 
Natural Gas Crop., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In the lan-
guage of the Rule, the non-moving party must come forward 
with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). Where 
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
factfinder to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genu-
ine issue for trial." Cities Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that, when certain 
facts render a necessary element of respondents' claim im-
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plausible, respondents must come forward with stronger evi-
dence to establish the existence of that element than would 
be necessary if the element were not implausible. Cities 
Service is instructive. The issue in that case was whether 
the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff was enough 
to support an inference that the defendant had willingly 
joined an illegal boycott. The economic context strongly 
suggested that the defendant had no motive to join the al-
leged conspiracy. 391 U. S., at 278-279. The Court ac-
knowledged that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal 
might well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id. , at 
277. But the defendant's refusal to deal had to be evaluated 
in context. Given the lack of any rational motive to join the 
alleged boycott, the refusal to deal could not by itself support 
a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a section 
1 case such as this one. Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984), we held that con-
duct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal 
conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of 
antitrust conspiracy. Id., at 1470-1471. See also Cities 
Service , supra, at 280. A plaintiff seeking damages for a vi-
olation of section 1 must, in order to survive motions for sum-
mary judgment or a directed verdict, come forward with evi-
dence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged 
conspirators acted independently. 104 S. Ct., at 1471. Re-
spondents in this case, in other words, must show that the 
inference of conspiracy is as plausible as the inference of per-
missible independent conduct. Cities Service, supra, at 280; 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 434, 446 (CA3 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978). See also Venzie Corp. v. 
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United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 2d 1309, 
1314-1315 (CA3 1975). 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case, because the alleged conspiracy is one that is economi-
cally irrational and practically infeasible. The irrationality 
of the alleged scheme, according to petitioners, is strong sup-
port for the notion that the allegedly illegal conduct was in 
fact nothing more than competitive price-cutting. Conse-
quently, they argue, the Court of Appeals' decision deters 
not illegal conspiracy but legitimate price competition. This 
argument requires us to consider the nature of the alleged 
conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementation. 
IV 
A 
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature spe ative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive lev: requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free comp ition would 
offer them. The foregone profits may be vi ed as an in-
ves menx, For the investment to be ratio 1 th~ ons ir- _ 
ators must ~ - - ~, in the form o monopoly prof-
its, more than the losses.,..p.~ -a1w--aeef'tlted 
~ - As then-Professor Bork, discussing predatory 
CJ pr1c1~g by a single firm, explained: 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
I 
w 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
size of the losses. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation makes clear, 
---
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the success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the 
short-run losses are definite, but the long-run gain depends 
on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is _ _ A ~ 
not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, jf monopoly GA--'"_. 
pricing bree s quick entry by new competitors eager to share 
in the ~cess profits. The success of any predatory scheme 
depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough 
both to recoup the predators' losses and to harvest some ad-
ditional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for mo-
nopoly will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a sig-
nificant period of time, "the predator must make a 
substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off." 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is 
a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. 
See, e.g., R. Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, 
supra, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 699; Easterbrook, Predatory 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 
(1981); Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing-An Empirical 
Study, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Pred-
atory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, 1 J. L. 
& Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 
J. L. & Econ. 289, 292-294 (1980). See also Northeastern 
Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 
F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) ("[N]owhere in the recent outpouring 
of literature on the subject do commentators suggest that 
[predatory] pricing is either common or likely to increase"), 
cert. denied, 455 U. S. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply to predatory pricing by a single 
firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respondents al-
lege that a large number of firms have conspired to charge 
below-market prices in order to stifle competition. Such a 
conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to carry out than an 
analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The con-
spirators in such a scheme must allocate the losses to be sus-
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tained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also allo-
cate any eventual gains from its success. Precisely because 
success is speculative and depends on a willingness to endure 
short-term loss, all the conspirators have a strong incentive 
to cheat, letting their partners suffer the losses necessary to 
drive out the competition while sharing in any gains if the 
conspiracy succeeds. The necessary allocation is therefore 
difficult at best. Yet if conspirators cheat to any substantial 
extent, the conspiracy must fail, . because its success depends 
on depressing the market price for all buyers of CEPs. If 
there are too few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy 
demand, the would-be victims of the conspiracy can continue 
to sell at the "real" market price, and the conspirators' losses 
accomplish little. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are unlikely as a 
general proposition, they are especially so where, as here, 
the prospects of attaining monopoly power seem so slight. 
In order to recoup any losses occasioned by their alleged 
below-market pricing, petitioners must obtain enough mar-
ket power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspirac 
..,-Jed1Y--.be.J™I.--El~rat.1-0f1, petitioners appear to be far from 
achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail mar-
ket in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Ze-
nith, not by any of the petitioners. App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 
2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together ap-
proximate 40% of sales of both black-and-white and color 
television sets, did not decline appreciably during the 1970's. 
Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose rapidly during this 
period, from one-fifth or less of the relevant markets to close 
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to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316.11 Neither the District Court nor 
the Court of Appeals found, however, that petitioners' share 
presently allows them to charge monopoly prices; to the con-
trary, respondents contend that the conspiracy is ongoing-
that petitioners are still artificially depressing the market 
price in order to drive Zenith out of the market. The data in 
the record strongly suggests that that goal is yet distant. 12 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ehds in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
11 During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing 
television sets declined from 19 to 13. App. to Pet., Vol. V, at 1961a. 
According to respondents, these departures from the market were due to 
petitioners' concerted price-cutting. See Brief for Respondents 54-55. 
12 Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook_,fffers the following sensible assessment: 
The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen y1 ars or 
more at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than 
cost in order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct 
cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the 
Japanese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could 
not recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high 
prices for the indefinite future . (The losses are like investments, which 
must be recoverd with compound interest.) If the defendants should try 
to raise prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There 
are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer 
and audio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent 
United States firms, from other foreign firms, (Korea and many other 
nations make TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to re-
coup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among them-
selves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty 
years, far longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. 
None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each 
firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The preda-
tion-recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with 
the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost 
in the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition. Easter-
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a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
with interest. Thus, the longer the time needed to eliminate 
the competition, the longer the time needed to recoup the 
conspirators' losses. Maintaining supracompetitive prices in 
turn depends on the continued cooperation of the conspir-
ators, on the inability of other would-be competitors to enter 
the market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators' ability 
to escape antitrust liability for their minimum price-fixing 
cartel. 18 Each of these factors weighs more heavily as the 
time needed to recoup losses grows. If the losses have been 
substantial-as would likely be necessary in order to drive 
out the competition 14-petitioners would have to sustain their 
cartel for decades simply to break even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the investment will pay off. At most, / 
the size of petitioners' Japanese profits might be relevant to 
show that, were the alleged conspiracy otherwise plausible, 
and were the opportunity for successful predation present, 
petitioners might enter into the alleged conspiracy. \ The ex- ~ 
istence of supracompetitive profits in Japan does not ~
ifhow overcome the obstacles to success that are otherwise 
present in a scheme such as this one. 15 
18 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re-
coup their losses, but they can recoup their losses only by engaging in some 
form of price-fixing after they have succeeded in driving competitors from 
the market. Such price-fixing would, of course, be an independent viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Madison Oil, sv:pra. 
14 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its 
objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
16 The same is true of any excess capacity that petitioners may have pos-
sessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds domestic demand 
~11) 
f-~ 
4 /HI J/w.h,.,:A4 
? 
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duct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 1470-1471. "[W]e must be concerned 
lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particu-
lar type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag-
ing legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp., 
supra, at 234. 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, uniquely one-sided in cases such as 
this one. As we earlier explained, ante, at --, predatory 
pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in order 
eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the gains 
depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more 
likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities tend 
to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: unlike 
most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, failed 
predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspirators. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26 
(1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a single firm, ~ 
successful conspiracies to price predatorily can be ~ Jafict 
punished once they succeed, since they require some kind of 
minimum price-fixing agreement in order to reap the benefits t<-~ 
of their predation. Thus, there is little reason to~ 
n-: 
1 
_ grantin summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 
~ ~,...,.,..,- cons~iracy i ambiguous, courts will ~h ich0mes fu ~ 
~ ~ V ~ . 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of thj factor~ 
-
1 
L~I .,... hich render the alleged redato ricin cons irac hi hly · ~f 
r;i,v- implausible, and call into question the notion that ra-
tional businessmen would engage in the behavior with which 
petitioners are charged. Cities Service, supra, at 279. It 
found.,that concern inapplicable here because respondents 
came forward with direct evidence of somE;.lfilnds of concerted 
action. 723 F. 2d, at 304-305. This conclusion was error. 
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. B 
j.v~nMonsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
pt ~ factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences seem 
~ implausible, lest they deter pro-competitive conduct. 
rt\ Monsanto, 104 S. Ct., at 1470. Respondents, petitioners' 
~ - om etitors, seek to hold petitioners liable for damages 
..e.L. cause Y, pe.titioRers' pl'iec etttti9g. Moreover, they seek to 
~. J. ~~ establish this conspiracy indirectly, through evidence of ~-n 
1 
-, ~ other combinations (such as the check-price agreements and 
.,f-o .:- £ ' the five-company rule) whose natural tendency is o raise 
..a--1 ~ price, and through evidence of rebates and other price-cut-
..., 1.-v .A---"' ting activities that respondents clai give rise to an inference 
1· ~M of a combination to suppress prices. 16 But cutting price in 
,_,.-,,- order to increase business · he essence of competition,tper-
~ 1 haps the most desirable a tivity ... that can take place in a 
1 . • . · concentrated industry where prices typically exceed costs." 
~ ~ Barry rignt Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 
" 235 (CAl 1983)] Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as 
1.-r -· - · · this one are especially costly, because they chill the very con-
does tend to establish a need to sell products abroad. It does not, how-
ever, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than necessary to obtain 
sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing to lose money in 
the United States market without some reasonable prospect of recouping 
their investment. 
18 Respondents also rely on an expert study that suggested that petition-
ers have sold their products at substantial losses. The relevant st d is 
not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of a mathematical con-
struction that rests on assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District 
Court analyzed those assumptions in some detail and found them both im-
plausible and inconsistent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-1363 (ED Pa. 
1980). Although the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's find-
ing that the expert report was inadmissible, the Court of Appeals did not 
disturb the District Court's analysis of the factors that substantially under-
mine the probative value of that evidence. We find the District Court's 
analysis persuasive also. ·ae-wm1 aR¥-pre-
. ondents' expert opinion evid~e. 
? · 
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Evidence tending to show that a necessa element of a plain-
tiff's claim is extremely unlikely ·1 always be relevant to 
whether a "genuine issue for trial" exists withm the meaning 
of Rule 56(v Respondents may yet be entitled to survive 
summary judgment: it may be tH t there i sufficient evi 
dence of an ipegal a eement to pric below arke levels to 
overcome the strong ntextual evide~ that uch an agree 
ment uld be irratio al. B~ if st;>, ! he evidence of illegal 
agreement must be su stantial, and it must be evaluated in 
light of the strong disincentives to engage in a conspiracy of 
the kind respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals found inapplicable the 
principle that highly ambiguous conduct-conduct that is as 
consistent with permissible competition as with illegal con-
spiracy-does not, without more, support an inference of con-
spiracy. This too was error. The principle of Monsanto ap-
plies fully to evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, of 
other combinations whose evident purpose is either to raise 
prices or to impose territorial restraints that ordinarily facili-
tate raising prices. Such combinations are not themselves 
-~-"im· r-P.et evidence of a conspiracy to price predatorily; the limi-
tations on inference drawing that derive from our decisions in 
Cities Service and Monsanto therefore apply with full force. 
The same limitations apply to evidence of fundamentally com-
petitive conduct, such as pricing "to get the sale," or wide-
spread use of rebates and other price discounts as means of 
undercutting the check prices. 17 This kind of activity sug-
gests nothing so much as a determination to compete directly 
with more established firms. See Great Atlantic & Pacific 
11 Respondents point to evidence of exchanges _of pricing information 
among petitioners, and contend that such evidence tends to lend strong 
support to~ their theory of antitrust conspiracy. The difficulty with 
this argument is that exchanges of information, without more, do not tend 
to show any combination to price predatorily. To the contrary, such e~ ~ 
changes~w:e consistent~ with competition ~ rted action to 
raise prices. Great American & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80 
(1979); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 336-337 (1968). 
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Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80 (1979); United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 457 (1978). It is 
precisely this kind of conduct one might expect from foreign 
firms seeking to break into a market dominated by American 
companies. It does not, by itself, support the inference that 
petitioners were lowering prices to monopolize the relevant 
market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' showing 
in the context of the whole record, but leave that task to the 
Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases as factually 
complex as this one is best limited to articulation of the gov-
erning legal principles; those who have lived longer with the 
case than have we, and who have developed greater familiar-
ity with its mammoth record, are better able to apply those 
principles to the facts of the case. We therefore hold that 
the Court of Appeals did not correctly apply Rule 56(e) and 
the principles of our cases to petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment, and we remand for further consideration in light of 
this opinion. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion issue that both petitioner and the 
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The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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No. 83-2004 
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APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1986) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than 
three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products() 
/ 
723 F. 2d 238 (CA3"!983); @'enit?fRaawCorp.v . Matsushi@ 
'))) Electriclndus ria . 513 F. Supp. 
1
1100 (ED Pa. ' 1981). 
Two respected istrict udges each have authored a number 
of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an 
entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court that 
is said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respec-
tive decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated 
and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that com-
prise the record on appeal. Since we review only the stand-
ard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and 
not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we 
fJ 
-r ~ ~ .P 'f .. ; J;_,,:Jt\.. ) 
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find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What 
follows is a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese corpora-
tions that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic prod-
ucts" ~EPs8>---for the most part, television sets. Re-
s_pondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio Corporation 
(YZenithO) and _ National Union Electric Corporation 
<°NUEO). Zenith is an American firm that manufactures 
and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to 
Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that manufac-
tured and sold television sets until 1970, when it withdrew 
from the market after sustaining substantial losses. Zenith 
and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, 1 claiming that petition-
ers had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the 
American CEP market. According to respondents, the gist 
of this conspiracy was a " cheme to raise, fix and maintain 
artificially high prices for television receivers sold by [peti-
tioners] in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain 
low prices for television receivers exported to and sold in the 
United States.' n re Ja aneseE ectronic roducts supra;> 
at 25~ (quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memoran-
dum). These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that pro-
duced substantial losses for petitioners. cZenith Ra io orp. 
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial o. 513 F. Supp. (lI.QQ:) 
1125 a. 1981 The conspiracy allegedly began as early 
as 1953, and according to respondents was in full operation by 
sometime in the late 1960's. Respondents claimed that vari-
ous portions of this scheme violated§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson 
Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
1 NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 
1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two cases were con-
solidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. 
SEE STYLl 
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After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded 
to trial. After these statements were filed, the District 
Court entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
the evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. lZE},ith adio sura.J At bottom, the court 
found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that could 
be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the Japanese 
and American markets, and from the effects of that conduct 
on petitioners' American competitors. 513 F . Supp., at 
1125~1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category 
and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy 
was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the evidence 
suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not in-
jure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that bore directly on 
the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more 
plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to 
compete in the American market and not to monopolize it. 
Summary judgment therefore was granted on respondents' 
claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff 
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. ~- Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 11~5 (ED Pa.' 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zen'ith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. '1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. / 
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Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 claims, which alleged 
that petitioners had combined to monopolize the American 
CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from the § 1 
claims, the court dismissed them also. Finally, the court 
found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the 
same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Since 
the court had found no genuine issue of fact as to the conspir-
acy, it entered judgment in petitioners' favor on those claims 
as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. n re:> 
Gfapanese E ectronic Producff;)723 F. 2d, at 260..:303. These 
evidentiary rulings are not before us. See(M_atsushita Ele'c;) 
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio orp~ 47! U. S. --
(1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the 
court found that the District Court's summary judgme;it de-
cision was improper. The court acknowledged that "there 
8 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 
1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. ' 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the 
Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning respondents' other claims. In re Japanese Electric 
Products, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 i983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See~ Rule 21:1(a). We therefore de-
cline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
• As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
SH STYLE 
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are legal limitations (@) the ipf erences ~ may be drawn ~ /-wtuc1v / 
from circumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found 
) I I 
that "the legal problem ... is 9ifferent" when "there is direct 
evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court con-
cluded, 1'there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of con-
cert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tend-
ency to s~ggest that other kinds of concert of action may have 
occurred. ' Id., at 304..!305. Thus, the court reasoned, 
cases concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at /305. 
Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a 
factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc-
ers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because the Japanese government 
imposed significant barriers to entry. 'Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order 
'· to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant c~pacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan'~Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
~IT1.J-J, petitioners fixed minimum pricesjor CEPs ex-
ported to the American market. Id., at 310. The par-
ties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
S[[ SlYll 
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each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 
1
311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer to avoid various customs regulations as well as ac-
tion under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
Based on these permissible inferences, 5 the Court of Appeals 
concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy 
to depress prices in the American market in order to drive 
out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by 
excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court 
apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to 
conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was inde-
pendent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con-
cluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign 
compulsion, because the check price agreements were being 
used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy'' and not as 
an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The 
court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact 
were mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstand-
ing a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 
1
315. 
6 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert 
opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at ?,rices 
which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales. ' 723 
F . 2d, at'311. The codrt did not identify any direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing; nor did it place particularly heavy reliance on this aspect of the ex-
pert evidence. See n@ 19"infra. 
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We granted certiorari to determine (i)-whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the 
District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held lia-
ble under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part com- .J.. / 
pelled by a foreign sovereign. 47p U. S. - (1985). We 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely 
on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive con-
ditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Alumi-
, I ' 
num Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416,443 (CA21945) (L. 
Hand, J.); 1 P. Ar~eda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ,236d 
(1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for any con-
spiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive 
prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed 
violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U. S. 1392 (1927); United States v. Socon -Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U. S. 1150, 223 (1940) hereinafter Madison Oil 
but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners' competi-
tors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise 
the market price in CEPs. Cf. Brunsu;ick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat,A429 U. S. '477, 488~489 (1977). Finally, for the 
5 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
/ .I. ~ ~ "\ Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) (' A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restr~n the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries'\ The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japa-
nese market could not, by itself, have caused that effect. Respondents' 
theory of recovery thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting con-
spiracy in this country. 
83-2004-0PINION 
8 MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 
same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to 
impose nonprice restraints that have the effect of either rais-
ing market price or limiting output. Such restrictions, 
though harmful to competition, actually benefit competitors 
by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, 
neither petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in 
Japan, nor the five-company rule that limited distribution in 
this country, nor the check prices insofar as they established 
minimum prices in this country, can by themselves give re-
spondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust 
damages. The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the ex-
tent that it founq evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be 
"direct evidence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. 
See 723 F. 2d, at 304~305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy 
that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market by means of pricing below the market level. 7 The 
thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their 
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a con-
certed campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive re-
spondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of 
business. Once successful, according to respondents, peti-
1 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours 
of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one conspiracy or several-
respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for 
which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors 
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 538-"540 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, ~ lso Note, Antitrust 
Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1 309 
(19~). That showing depends in turn on proof that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily in the American market, since the other conduct in-
volved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have caused such an injury. 
SHSTYLl 
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tioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair compe-
tition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
Respondents' allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to en-
gage in predatory pricing, 8 if proved, 9 would be a per se vi-
olation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Such a conspiracy is a hor-
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to SU STYll 
price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a MANllAL 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices § /, ~ &, 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten- ----:,j--
tial entrants from coming in. E . g. , Southern Pacific Communic~tions 01' 
31
.J.. 331.. Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,~ 40 F. 2d 980, 1002-100'7 ~3'8 U.S.ApP.0,C.. 3o9j 3 "' t 
(~ 1984), cert. denied, ,t- U. S. --(1985). In such cases, "preda-
tory pricing" means pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. 
E . g. , Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F . 2d'227, 232~235 
(CAl 1.983); see Utah Pie Co . .f. Continental Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 
698, 701, 702J'll./14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this de-
bate here: unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act ~ 1 
case, and therefore the per se rule against horizontal combinations to raise 
or depress prices applies. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note 
that respondents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners 
conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing 
below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some 
appropriate measure of cost. An agreement without these features would 
either leave respondents in the same position as would market forces or 
would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices. Respond-
ents therefore may not complain of conspiracies that, for example, set max-
imum prices above market levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. 
9 We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & 'Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 697, 709.:'.718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in§ 2 cases). 
As a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational busi-
S[( sTnE 
MAMII.Al ~ 
§ J., I //J. 
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izontal combination whose purpose is to-distort the market 
price of goods or services. Horizontal conspiracies to raise / 
or lower prices are per se illegal., Ariz~ v. Ajlaricopa .d:[!;) . j 
County Medical Society, 457U. S. 332, 348-351 (1982); ~ .;i(J'(!."1:=U~QJ..G,.f 
~ Oil, ~ at 221.1223. The predatory pricing conspir-
acy alleged here appears to fall within that proscription. 
The issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents ad-
duced sufficient evidence in support of that theory to survive 
summary judgment. We therefore examine the principles 
that govern the summary judgment determination. 
III 
To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 re-
spondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal 
conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable in-
jury. Fed. Rf) Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of Ar-
izona ~- Cities Service Co,., 391 U. S. 253, 288...:289 (1968). 
This showing has two components. First, respondents must 
show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust 
laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the 
illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a 
whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 
J..! , ) nesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this one. See@i)part /lf//f t-ll'*u> IVtDAo 1 
10 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
~1 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue pf material fact. See Adickes ..f. S. H . Kress & 
Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 15~ (1970). Cf. Celotex C'o® v. Catrettf?;56 F. 2d·181 
(~ 1985), cert. granted, --/'r U. S. --(No. 85-19&1(Nov. 4} 1985). 
That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
11 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
11 When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affida\Tlts or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. Ifhe does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him./\ 
stf snn 
IANU~~ ~ ( 
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Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the 
American market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
conspiracies could ,not have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brun1wick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, @_1£ra~ 429 U. S., at t:189, because they actually tended 
to bene respondents. Supra, at --. Therefore, unless, 
in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a 
genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary 
judgment motion. / 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. Re Civ. .:;~ 
Proc. 56(c); (e). When-as here-the moving party has car-
ried its burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do more 
SU STYLf 
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the materi'l facts. Se~ D9!::7:'ca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 
176 F . 2d 421, 423 (C~ (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 
U. S. '943 (19~~); l0A Wright, iller, &AKane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure lVl §'2727 (UJ83); Clark, Special 
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Prq.cedural Codes and 
/
iLIIAN~ 11.jf}./1>1. § 3, f> 
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504..::505 (1950). 1 Cf. §artor v. 
Arkansas Natural Gas q,ffp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In 
the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come 
forward with "~pecific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. %>Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). =Mlt.-
See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of / 
~ed. Ri9Civ. Proc. 56(e),.._(purpose of summary judgment is to f, l 8 v.s. c. App.,; P· "';i" 
"pierce the pleadings and to assess the prooyn order to see t--- . ' 
whether there is a genuine need for trial"). Where the ·,sH STYLE 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact §M~~~L ~ 
to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial.'( Cities Service, supra, at 289. · 
It follows from these settled principles that when certain 
facts render a necessary element of respondents' claim im-
plausible, respondents must come forward with stronger evi-
1.2 See n@ 10Asupra. 
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dence to establish the existence of that element than would 
otherwise be necessary. Cities Service is instructive. The 
issue in that case was whether proof of the defendant's re-
fusal to deal with the plaintiff supported an inference that the 
defendant had willingly joined an illegal boycott. Economic 
factors strongly suggested that the defendant had no motive 
to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 U. S., at 278..:279. The 
Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal 
to deal might well have sufficed to create a triable issue. 
Id., at 
1
277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in 
context. Since the defendant lacked any rational motive to 
join the alleged boycott, its refusal to deal could not by itself 
support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at '280. 
Respondents correctly note that )'[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . 
must be viewed in \he light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 1654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case. 
Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spay-Rite Service Corp., -fT-
U. S. -fr- (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 
Id. , at--. See also Cities Service, supra, at 1280. To sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict, a plaintiff se~king damages for a violation of § 1 ;nust 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. ,t- U. S., at 
--ft-· Respondents in this case, in other words, must show 
that the inference of -conspiracy is as plausible as the inf er-
ence of permissible independent conduct. Cities Service, 
supra, at'280; Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 434, 446 
(CA3 "1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. "1086 (1978). See also 
Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 
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Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case, because the alleged conspiracy is one that is economi-
cally irrational and practically infeasible. The irrationality 
of the alleged scheme, according to petitioners, strongly sug-
gests that the challenged conduct was in fact nothing more 
than competitive price-cutting. Consequently, they argue, 
the Court of Appeals' decision deters not illegal conspiracy 
but legitimate price competition. This argument requires us 
to consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the prac-
tical obstacles to its implementation. 
IV 
A 
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free competition would 
offer them. The foregone profits are equivalent to an invest-
ment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the 
conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recover-
ing, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the 
losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing preda-
tory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
/\Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
siz~ of the lossesi\ R./ Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. @ & 
Econ. 289, 295~297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the 
success of such schemes is inherently.uncertain: the short-run 
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neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough 
simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may 
breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional 
gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly 
will materializevand that it can be sustained for a significant 
period of time, '~tJie predator must make a substantial)nvest-
ment with no assurance that it will pay off. ,r Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is a consensus 
among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are 
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e.g., ® 
Bork, supra, at 149.:155; Areeda & Turner, ~ 88 Harv. 
L. Rev.~ 699{) Easterbrook re a ory ra e es n 
oun erstra e es 8 U. hi. L. Rev. 263 (1981)· Koller, The 
Myth of Predatory Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust 
' ' / 4)& Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Pric~ Cuttjng: 
The Standard Oil N. J. Case 1 J. . & Econ. 137 (1958); 
McGee, redato Priem evis1 e , . . & Econ. 9 
292-294 (I~ See also Northeastern Telephorie ,Co. v. 
A~eric,an Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 
1981) ("[N]owhere in the recent outpouring of literature on 
the subject do commentators suggest thap [predatory] pricing 
is either common or likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 
I' / u. s. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply to predatory pricing by a single 
firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respondents al-
lege that a large number of firms have conspired to charge 
below-market prices in order to stifle competition. Such a 
conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an 
analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The con-
spirators must allocate the losses to be sustained during the 
conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any gains to be 
realized from its success. Precisely because success is spec-
83-2004-OPINION 
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ulative and depends on a willingness to- endure short-term 
loss, each conspirator has a strong incentive to cheat, letting 
its partners suffer the losses necessary to destroy the compe-
tition while sharing in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. 
The necessary allocation is therefore difficult to accomplish. 
Yet if conspirators cheat to any substantial extent, the con-
spiracy must fail, because its success depends on depressing 
the market price for all buyers of CEPs. If there are too 
few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy demand, the 
would-be victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the 
"real" market price, and the conspirators suffer losses to lit-
tle purpose. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally un-
likely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the 
prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In 
order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough 
market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, @ pra) 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is al-
leged to have commenced, 13 petitioners appear to be far from 
achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail mar-
ket in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Ze-
nith, not by any of the petitioners. A . to Pet. Vol. 6, at 
2575a~2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together ap-
proximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably during 
the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose rapidly 
during this period, from onE_!-fifth or )ess of the relevant mar-
kets to close to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316. 14 Neither the Dis-
/J(/ SH STYlt 
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18 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 
1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Com-
plaint 1152; Zenith Complaint 1139. 
• During \he same pe,fod, the nwnber of American firms manufaeturffig t {/Pf', t; &:ufr fi"'-
television sets declined from 19 to 13. @PP· to Pet., Vol. V, at) 1961a.' - f+f),<Ul.l;:u,i;t:. Mu 'h., 
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trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, that pe-
titioners' share presently allows them to charge monopoly 
prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the conspir-
acy is ongoing-that petitioners are still artificially depress-
ing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of the mar-
ket. The data in the record strongly suggests that that goal 
is yet far distant. 15 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
This decline continued a trend that began at least by 1960, when petition-
ers' sales in the United States market were negligible. Ibid. See Zenith 
Complaint 111135, 37. 
16 Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review arti-
cle, offers the following sensible assessment: 
c:'..'The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or 
more at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than 
cost in order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct 
cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the 
Japanese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could 
not recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high 
prices for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which 
must be recovered with compound inter~st.) If the defendants should try 
to raise prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There 
are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer 
and audio firms shows. The competition would com~ from resurgent 
United States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other na-
tions make TV sets), and from defendants themsel:ves. In order to re-
coup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among them-
selves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty 
years, far longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. 
None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each 
firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The preda-
tion-recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with 
the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost,... 
in the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition." 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texe L. Rev. i, 26..'.'27 (1984)D 
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a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued 
over the course of two decades, the conspirators will likely 
require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining 
supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued co-
operation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-
be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their 
minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs 
more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If 
the losses have been substantial-as would likely be neces-
sary in order to drive out the competition 17-petitioners 
would most likely have to sustain their cartel for decades sim-
ply to break even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the investment will pay off. At most, 
the size of petitioners' Japanese profits might be relevant to 
show that, were the alleged conspiracy otherwise plausible, 
and were the opportunity for ·successful predation present, 
petitioners might enter into the alleged conspiracy. The ex-
istence of supracompetitive profits in Japan does not over-
come the obstacles to success that are otherwise present in 
18 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re-
coup their losses, but they can recoup their losses only by engaging in some 
form of price-fixing after they have succeeded in driving competitors from 
the market. Such price-fixing would, of course, be an independent viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. rl[aa,ison Oi~ supra'"";)--
11 The predators' losses must actually increase as t e conspiracy nears its 
objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
,. cL J;laµA) V ~ 
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this scheme. 18 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
pro-competitive conduct. Monsanto, -A:- U. S., at --. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petition-
ers liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut 
prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy in-
directly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the 
check-price agreements and the five-company rule) whose 
natural tendency is to raise price, and through evidence of re-
bates and other price-cutting activities that respondents 
argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. 19 But 
cutting price in order to increase business of ten is the very 
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases 
18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that peti-
tioners may have possessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds 
domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell products abroad. 
It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than nec-
essary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing 
to lose money in the United States market without some reasonable pros-
pect of recouping their investment. 
19 Respondents also rely on an expert study suggesting that petitioners 
have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. 
The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of 
expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on 
assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those 
assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsist-
ent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 505 F. Supp.~ 1356-'l.363 (ED Pa. 198@ Although the 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's finding that the expert re-
port was inadmissible, the court did not disturb the District Court's analy-
sis of the factors that substantially undermine the probative value of that 
evidence. See},:23 F. 2d(@277..'.'28Zo We find the District Court's analy-
sis persuasive. Accordingly, in our view the expert opinion evidence of 
below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the eco-
nomic factors, discussed in jart IVc;i A, supra, that suggest that such con-
duct is irrational. 
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such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 470-147 . ''[W]e must be concerned 
lest a rule or precedent t at authorizes a search for a particu-
lar type of undesirable pricing be~avior end up by discoura~-
ing legitimate price competition.' Barry Wright Corp. v. 
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 
1
227, 234 (CA1'1983). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such 
as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at --, preda-
tory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in 
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the 
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes 
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities 
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: 
unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspir- ;; ,.A,/ 
ators. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Te~ L. - ,.,.,... 
Rev. ' 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a sin-
gle firm, successful conspiracies to price predatorily can be 
identified and punished once they succeed, since they require 
some kind of minimum price-fixing agreement in order to 
reap the benefits of predation. Thus, there is little reason to 
be concerned that by granting summary judgment in cases 
where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or ambigu-
ous, courts will encourage such conspiracies. 
V 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the factors 
that render the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy highly 
implausible, and that suggest that rational businessmen 
would not en age in the conduct charged to petitioners. Cit-
ies Service, supra, at 279. The court found these factors in-
applicable here because respondents came forward with di-
rect evidence of some kinds of concerted action. 723 F. 2d, 
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I at 304-305. This conclusion was error. · Evidence suggest-
ing that a necessary element of a claim is extremely unlikely 
always '}'ill be relevant in deciding whether a '~genuine issue 
for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Any evi-
dence of illegal agreement must therefore be evaluated in 
light of the strong disincentives to engage in a conspiracy of 
the kind respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals did not apply the princi-
ple that highly ambiguous conduct-conduct that is as con-
sistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspir-
acy-does not, without more, support an inference of 
conspiracy. 20 This too was error. The principle of 
Monsanto applies fully to evidence, whether direct or cir-
cumstantial, of other combinations whose apparent purpose 
is either to raise prices or to impose territorial restraints that 
ordinarily facilitate raising prices. Such combinations are 
not themselves direct evidence of a conspiracy to price preda-
torily; the limitations on inference drawing that derive from 
our decisions in Cities Service and Monsanto therefore apply 
with full force. 21 The same limitations apply to evidence of 
20 Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., -ft- U. S. + (1984), was announced three months after the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in this case, and therefore was not available to the Court of Appeals. 
Nevertheless, the principle we applied in Monsanto was established in the 
Court of Appeals' own Circuit. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 
434 (CA311977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978); Venzie Corp. v~ United 
• , I. 
States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 2d 1309 (CA3 1975). See also Ed-
ward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. {. Texaco, Inc.., 637 F. 2d 105, 111 (CA3 
19§0), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 911 (1981) (quoted in Monsanto, supra, at <SP /\ 
21 There is an additional reason for finding that the principle developed in 
Monsanto applies here. Monsanto rests on the notion that courts must be 
wary of permitting weak conspiracy cases to go to the jury, lest pro-com-
petitive conduct be deterred. -A- U. S., at -. That concern is of 
course strongest when the record on summary judgment consists solely of 
ambiguous evidence-evidence that is as consistent with competition as 
with conspiracy. Id., at-. But it does not apply only in such situa-
tions. To the contrary, the basic principle applies whenever a plaintiff in 
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fundamentally competitive conduct, such as pricing "to get 
the sale," or widespread use of rebates and other price dis-
counts as means of undercutting the check prices. 22 This 
kind of activity suggests nothing so much as a determination 
to compete directly with more established firms. See Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 169, 810 (1979). 
It is precisely the kind of conduct one might expect from for-
eign firms seeking to break into a market dominated by 
American companies. It does not, by itself, support the in-
ference that petitioners were lowering prices to monopolize 
the relevant market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' showing 
in the context of the whole record, but leave that task to the 
Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases as factually 
complex as this one is best limited to articulation of the gov-
erning legal principles; those who have lived longer with the 
case than we have, and who have developed greater familiar-
an antitrust conspiracy case seeks to prove conspiracy in whole or in part 
through ambiguous evidence. Plaintiffs may not, simply because they ad-
duce a single item tending to show conspiracy directly, transform an other-
wise wholly inadequate record into one that automatically withstands a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
There is no precise formula that courts can apply in cases where the evi-
dence is only partly ambiguous. Some evidence may reinforce other evi-
dence, so that otherwise implausible inferences become plausible. And
1 
£ I 
even ambiguous evidence has probative value. Id., at ~n. 8. But in ,. 
determining whether a plaintiff has raised a triable issue of conspiracy, a 
court must bear in mind Monsanto's central proposition: an antitrust de-
fendant should not be required ~ o undergo a trial for treble damages 
because of conduct that is as consistent with competition as with illegal 
conspiracy. 
22 Respondents point to evidence of exchanges of pricing information 
among petitioners, and contend that such evidence supports their theory of 
antitrust conspiracy. The difficulty with this argument is that exchanges 
of information, without more, do not tend to show any combination to price 
predatorily. To the contrary, such exchanges may be consistent with 
competition or with concerted action to raise wices. Great f[rneficc§)& 
Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, f~ (1979); United States v. Con-
tainer Corpd393 U. S. 333, 336,:337 (196/. 
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ity with its enormous record, are better -able to apply those 
principles to the facts of the case. We therefore hold that 
the Court of Appeals did not correctly apply Rule 56(e) and 
the principles of our cases to petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment, and we remand for further consideration in light of 
this opinion. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and 
the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented 
here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., et al. v. ZENITH RADIO 
CORPORATION, et al. 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the 
standard district courts must apply when deciding whether 
to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this massive case is a 
daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of 
the District Court is more than three times as long. In 
re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (CA3 1983); 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 
513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Two respected district 
judges each have authored a number of opinions in this 
case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume 
of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the parties have 
filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court that is said 
to contain the distilled essence of the evidence on which 
2. 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals based their 
respective decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many able opinions 
have already stated and restated, or summarize the mass of 
documents that comprise the official record on appeal. We 
review only the standard applied by the Court of Appeals 
in deciding this case, and not the weight the Court of 
Appeals assigned to particular pieces of evidence. We 
therefore find it unnecessary to state the facts in great 
detail. What follows is a summary of this case's long 
history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese 
corporations that manufacture and/or sell "consumer 
electronic products" ( 11 CEPs 11 )--for the most part, 
television receivers and finished television sets. 
Respondents, 
Corporation 
plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio 
("Zenith") and National Union Electric 
Corporation ("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm that 
manufactures and sells television sets. NUE is the 
corporate successor to Emerson Radio Company, an American 
firm that manufactured and sold television sets until 
3. 
1970, when it withdrew from the market after sustaining 
substantial losses. Zeni th and NUE brought this case in 
1973, claiming that petitioners had illegally conspired to 
drive American firms from the American CEP market. 
According to respondents, the gist of this conspiracy was 
a "scheme to raise, fix and maintain artificially high 
prices for television receivers sold by [petitioners] in 
Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low 
prices for television receivers exported to and sold in 
the United States." In re Japanese Electronic Products, 
723 F.2d 238, 250 (CA3 1983) (quoting respondents' 
Preliminary Pretrial Memorandum). These "low prices" were 
allegedly at levels that produced substantial losses for 
petitioners. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
Respondents claimed that various portions of this scheme 
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, section 2(a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, section 73 of the Wilson 
Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
After several years of detailed discovery, 1 
petitioners filed motions for summary judgment on all 
claims against them. The District Court directed the 
parties to file, with preclusive effect, a "Final Pretrial 
4. 
Statement" containing all the documentary evidence that 
would be offered if the case proceeded to trial. After 
these statements were filed, the District Court 
entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' 
summary judgment motions. In an opinion spanning 217 
pages, the court found that the admissible evidence did 
not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
existence of the alleged conspiracy. Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. , 513 F. Supp. 1100 
(E.D. Pa. 1981). At bottom, the court found, respondents' 
claims rested on the inferences that could be drawn from 
petitioners' parallel conduct in the Japanese and Americ~n 
markets, and from the effects of that conduct on 
petitioners' American competitors. Id., at 1125-1127. 
After reviewing the evidence both by category and in toto, 
the court found that any inference of conspiracy simply 
was unreasonable, because ( i) some portions of the 
evidence suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that 
did not injure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that 
5. 
bore directly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy in 
no way rebutted the obvious inference that petitioners 
were cutting prices to compete in the American market and 
not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore was 
granted on respondents' Sherman Act section 1 and Wilson 
'l'ariff Act claims. Because the Sherman Act section 2 
claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to 
monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally 
indistinguishable from the section 1 claims, they were 
dismissed as well. Finally, the court found that the 
Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the same supposed 
conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Thus, the finding 
that no genuine fact issue had been raised on the 
conspiracy issue required that judgment be entered in 
petitioners' favor on those claims as we11. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed. 4 The court began by examining the District 
Court's evidentiary rulings, and concluded that much of 
the evidence excluded by the District Court was in fact 
admissible. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d, 
at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. 
6. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
105 s.ct. 1863 (1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, the court found the District Court's 
summary judgment decision improper based on the newly 
enlarged record. The court acknowledged that "there are 
legal limitations on the inferences that may be drawn from 
circumstantial evidence," 723 F.2d, at 304, but it found 
that "the legal problem • . • is different" when "there is 
direct evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the 
court found, "there is both direct evidence of certain 
kinds of concert of action and circumstantial evidence 
having some tendency to suggest that other kinds of 
concert of action may have occurred." Id., at 304-305. 
Thus, the court reasoned, cases concerning the limitations 
on inferring conspiracy from ambiguous evidence were not 
disposi tive. Id., at 305. Turning to the evidence, the 
court found that a factf inder reasonably could draw the 
following conclusions from the record: 
A I i3L[)llL ~U D,t 71a11v 
~ 1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of 
producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
... 
7. 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because of significant barriers to 
entry imposed by the Japanese government. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs 
than their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order to 
make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs 
of the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation 
with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
("MIT!"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs 
exported to the American market. Id., at 310. The 
parties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and 
to the agreements that require them as the "check pr ice 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products 
in the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by 
a variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
8. 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MIT!, the former in 
order to avoid various customs regulations as well as 
action under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
t)\' t>LO'.-IL Q\)0'1£ 
Based on these permissible inferences, 5 the Court of 
Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find 
a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese 
market. The court apparently did not consider whether it 
was as plausible, or more so, to conclude that 
petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent and 
not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address 
petitioners' claim that they could not be held liable 
under the antitrust laws for conduct that was compelled by 
a foreign sovereign. The claim, in essence, was that 
because MIT! required petitioners to enter into the check 
price agreements, liability could not be premised on those 
agreements. The court concluded that this case did not 
present the sovereign compulsion issue, since the check 
9. 
pr ice agreements were being used as "evidence of a low 
export price conspiracy" and not as an independent basis 
for finding antitrust liability; further, the court found 
it unclear whether in fact the check prices were mandated 
by the Japanese government, notwithstanding a statement to 
that effect by MIT! itself. Id., at 315. 
We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the 
Court of Appeals properly analyzed petitioners' summary 
judgment motion, and (ii) whether petitioners could be 
held liable under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in 
part compelled by a foreign sovereign. 105 s.ct. 1863 
(1985). We now reverse on the first issue, but do not 
reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is 
not. Respondents cannot recover anti trust damages from 
petitioners based on petitioners' supposed car telization 
of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do 
not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' 
economies. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 
148 F.2d 416, 443 (CA2 1945) (L. Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & 
o. Turner, Antitrust Law ,1236d (1978). 6 Nor can 
10. 
respondents recover aamages for any conspiracy on 
petitioners' part to charge higher than competitive prices 
in the American market. Such conduct would indeed violate 
the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 
273 u.s. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 u.s. 150, 223 (1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil], 
but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners' 
competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy 
to raise the market price in consumer electronics 
products. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 
u.s. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, 
respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose 
nonprice restraints that have the effect of either raising 
market price or limiting output. Once again, such 
restrictions, though harmful to competition, actually 
benefit competitors by making supracompetitive pricing 
more attractive. Thus, neither petitioners' alleged 
supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the five-company 
rule that limited distribution in this country, nor the 
check prices insofar as they operated to fix minimum 
prices in this country, can by themselves give respondents 
a cognizable claim 
damages. The Court 
against petitioners for antitrust 
of Appeals therefore erred to the 
,, ' 
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extent that it found that evidence of these alleged 
conspiracies was "direct evidence" of a conspiracy that 
injured respondents. See 723 F.2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed 
conspiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of 
antitrust damages, are circumstantial evidence of a 
different conspiracy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to 
nonopolize the American market by means of pr icing below 
the market level. 7 The thrust of respondents' argument is 
that petitioners used their oligopoly profits from the 
Japanese market to fund a concerted campaign to pr ice 
predatorily and thereby drive respondents and other 
American manufacturers of CEPs out of business. Once 
successful, according to respondents, petitioners would 
cartelize the American CEP market, restricting output and 
raising prices above the level that fair competition would 
produce. The resulting monopoly profits, respondents 
contend, would more than compensate petitioners for the 
losses they incurred through years of pricing below market 
level. 
Respondents• allegation of a horizontal conspiracy 
to engage in predatory pricing, 8 if proved, presumably 
would be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
12. 
Act. Such a conspiracy is a horizontal combination whose 
purpose is to distort the market price of a good or 
service. Horizontal conspiracies to raise or lower prices 
are per se illegal. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society, 457 U.S. 332, 348-351 (1982); Madison Oil, supra, 
at 221-223. The predatory pricing conspiracy respondents 
allege here appears to fall within that proscription. The 
issue in this case is whether respondents adduced 
sufficient evidence in support of that theory to survive 
summary judgment. We therefore examine the principles 
that govern the summary judgment determination. 
Ill 
In order to survive petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment, 9 respondents must establish that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners 
entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents 
to suffer a cognizable injury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
56(e) ; 1° First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service 
Co • , 3 91 U • S • 2 5 3 , 2 8 8- 2 8 9 ( 19 6 8 ) • This proposition has 
two components. First, respondents must show more than a 
conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws; they must 
show an injury to them resulting from the illegal conduct. 
13. 
Respondents charge petitioners with a whole host of 
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Ante, at Save 
for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer 
an "antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, supra, 429 u.s., at 489, because they actually tended 
to benefit respondents. Ante, at Therefore, unless, 
in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises 
a genuine fact issue concerning the existence of a 
predatory pricing conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat 
petitioners' summary judgment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. 
R. Civ. Proc. 56(c,e). When--as here--the moving party 
has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must 
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the mat~rial facts: as one of the Rule's 
draftsmen noted, "at least a slight doubt can be developed 
as to practically all things human." Clark, Special 
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and 
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504 (1950). See also DeLuca 
v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. 
Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 u.s. 943 (1949): l0A Wright, 
14. 
Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 
§2727 (1983). Cf. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Crop., 
321 u.s. 620, 627 (1944). In the language of the Rule, 
the non-moving party must 
facts showing that there is 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) 
record taken as a whole 
come forward with "specific 
a genuine issue for trial." 
(emphasis added). Where the 
could not lead a rational 
f actf ind er to find for the non-moving party, there is no 
"genuine issue for trial." Cities Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that, when 
certain facts render a necessary element of respondents' 
claim implausible, respondents must come forward with 
stronger evidence to establish the existence of that 
element than would be necessary if the element were not 
implausible. Cities Service is instructive. The issue in 
that case was whether the defendant's refusal to deal with 
the plaintiff was enough to support an inference that the 
defendant had willingly joined an illegal boycott. The 
economic context strongly suggested that the defendant had 
no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 U.S., at 
278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the 
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed to 
create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the defendant's 
15. 
refusal to deal had to be evaluated in context. Given the 
lack of any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, 
the refusal to deal could not by itself support a finding 
of antitrust liability. 19_., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that 11 [o) n summary 
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying 
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 369 u.s. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits 
the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous 
evidence in a section 1 case such as this one. Thus, in 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 s.ct. 1464 
(1984), we held that conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 
not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust 
conspiracy. Id., at 1470-1471. See also Cities Service, 
supra, at 280. A plaintiff seeking damages for a 
violation of section 1 must, in order to survive motions 
for summary judgment or a directed verdict, come forward 
with evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. 104 s.ct., 
at 1471. Respondents in this case, in other words, must 
show that the inference of conspiracy is as plausible as 
16. 
the inference of permissible independent conduct. Cities 
Service, supra, at 280; Bogos ian v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 561 
F.2d 434, 446 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1086 
(1978). See also Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral 
Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314-1315 (CA3 1975). 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case, because the alleged conspiracy is one that 
is economically irrational and practically infeasible. 
The irrationality of the alleged scheme, according to 
petitioners, is strong supper t for the notion that the 
allegedly illegal conduct was in fact nothing more than 
competitive price-cutting. Consequently, they argue, the 
Court of Appeals' decision deters not illegal conspiracy 
but legitimate price competition. This argument requires 
us to consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and 
the practical obstacles to its implementation. 
IV 
A 
A predatory pr icing conspiracy is by nature 
speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive 
level requires the conspirators to forego profits that 
free competition would offer them. The foregone profits 
17. 
may be viewed as an investment. For the investment to be 
rational, the conspirators must be able to recover, in the 
form of monopoly profits, more than the amount of the 
losses plus any accrued interest. As then-Professor Bork, 
discussing predatory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes 
that the predator as well as his victims will 
incur losses during the fighting, but such a 
theory supposes it may be a rational calculation 
for the predator to view the losses as an 
investment in future monopoly profits (where 
rivals are to be killed) or in future 
undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be 
disciplined) • The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the 
present size of the losses. R. Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation makes 
clear, the success of such schemes is inherently 
uncertain: the short-run losses are definite, but the 
long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the 
competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve 
monopoly power, if monopoly pricing breeds quick entry by 
new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The 
success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining 
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the 
predators' losses and to harvest some additional gain. 
18. 
Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a 
significant period of time, "the predator must make a 
substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay 
off." Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). 
For this reason, there is a consensus among commentators 
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful. See, e.g., R. Bork, supra, at 
149-155: Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 699: 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 
48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981): Koller, The Myth of 
Predatory Pr icing--An Empirical Study, 4 Anti trust L. & 
Econ. Rev. 105 (1971): McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The 
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958); 
McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 
292-294 (1980). See also Northeastern Telephone Co. v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (CA2 
1981) (" [ N] owhere in the recent outpouring of literature 
on the subject do commentators suggest that [predatory] 
pricing is either common or likely to increase"), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). 
19. 
These observations apply to predatory pricing by a 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, 
respondents allege that a large number of firms have 
conspired to charge below-market prices in order to stifle 
competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
difficult to carry out than an analogous plan undertaken 
by a single predator. The conspirators in such a scheme 
must allocate the losses to be sustained during the 
conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any 
eventual gains from its success. Precisely because 
success is speculative and depends on a willingness to 
endure short-term loss, all the conspirators have a strong 
incentive to cheat, letting their partners suffer the 
losses necessary to drive out the competition while 
sharing in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The 
necessary allocation is therefore difficult at best. Yet 
if conspirators cheat to any substantial extent, the 
conspiracy must fail, because its success depends on 
depressing the market pr ice for all buyers of CEPs. If 
there are too few goods at the artificially low price to 
satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the conspiracy can 
continue to sell at the "real" market price, and the 
conspirators' losses accomplish little. 
20. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are 
unlikely as a general proposition, they are especially so 
where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power 
seem so slight. In order to recoup any losses occasioned 
by their alleged below-market pr icing, petitioners must 
obtain enough market power to set higher than competitive 
prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to 
earn in excess profits what they earlier gave up in below-
cost pr ices. See Northeastern Telephone Co. v. Arner ican 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 
supra, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their 
conspiracy allegedly began operation, petitioners appear 
to be far from achieving this goal: the two largest shares 
of the retail market in television sets are held by RCA 
and respondent Zeni th, not by any of the petitioners. 
App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those 
shares, which together approximate 40% of sales of both 
black-and-white and color television sets, did not decline 
appreciably during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' 
collective share rose rapidly during th is period, f rorn 
one-fifth or less of the relevant markets to close to 50%. 
723 F.2d, at 316. 11 Neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals found, however, that petitioners' share 
/ 
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presently allows them to charge monopoly pr ices; to the 
contrary, respondents contend that the conspiracy is 
ongoing--that petitioners are still artificially 
depressing the market price in order to drive Zenith out 
of the market. The data in the record strongly suggests 
that that goal is yet distant. 12 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its 
ends in the two decades of its asserted operation is 
strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact 
exist. Since the losses in such a conspiracy accrue 
before the gains, they must be "repaid" with interest. 
Thus, the longer the time needed to eliminate the 
competition, the longer the time needed to recoup the 
conspirators' losses. Maintaining supracompetitive prices 
in turn depends on the continued cooperation of the 
conspirators, on the inability of other would..:.be 
competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape anti trust liability 
for their minimum price-fixing carte1. 13 Each of these 
factors weighs more heavily as the time needed to recoup 
losses grows. If the losses have been substantial--as 
would likely be necessary in order to drive out the 
22. 
competitionl4--petitioners would have to sustain their 
cartel for decades simply to break even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have 
obtained supracompeti tive profits in the Japanese market 
change this calculation. Whether or not petitioners have 
the means to sustain substantial losses in this country 
over a long period of time, they have no motive to sustain 
such losses absent some strong likelihood that the 
investment will pay off. At most, the size of 
petitioners• Japanese profits might be relevant to show 
that, were the alleged conspiracy otherwise plausible, and 
were the opportunity for successful predation present, 
petitioners might enter into the alleged conspiracy. The 
existence of supracompeti ti ve profits in Japan does not 
somehow overcome the obstacles to success that are 
otherwise present in a scheme such as this one. 15 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not 




seem implausible, lest they deter 
conduct. Monsanto, 104 
petitioners' competitors, 








petitioners liable for damages caused by petitioners' 
pr ice cutting. Moreover, they seek to establish this 
conspiracy indirectly, through evidence of other 
combinations (such as the check-pr ice agreements and the 
five-company rule) whose natural tendency is to raise 
pr ice, and through evidence of rebates and other pr ice-
cutting activities that respondents claim give rise to an 
inference of a combination to suppress prices. 16 But 
cutting price in order to increase business is the essence 
of competition, "perhaps the most desirable activity •.• 
that can take place in a concentrated industry where 
prices typically exceed costs." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235 (CAl 1983). Thus, 
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are 
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect. See Monsanto, 
supra, at 14 70-14 71. "[W] e must be concerned lest a rule 
or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular 
type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by 
discouraging legitimate price competition." Barry Wright 
Corp., supra, at 234. 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced 
against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified 
24. 
and punished. That balance is, however, uniquely one-
sided in cases such as this one. As we earlier explained, 
ante, at __ , predatory pricing schemes require 
conspirators to suffer losses in order eventually to 
realize their illegal gains: moreover, the gains depend on 
a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely 
to fail than to succeed. These economic realities tend to 
make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: unlike 
most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the 
conspirators. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory 
pricing by a single firm, successful conspiracies to price 
predatorily can be caught and punished once they succeed, 
since they require some kind of minimum price-fixing 
agreement in order to reap the benefits of their 
predation. Thus, there is little reason to fear that by 
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 




The Court of Appeals did not take account of these 
factors, which render the alleged predatory pricing 
conspiracy highly implausible, and thereby call into 
question the notion that rational businessmen would engage 
in the behavior with which petitioners are charged. 
Cities Service, supra, at 279. It found that concern 
inapplicable here because respondents came forward with 
direct evidence of some kinds of concerted action. 723 
F. 2d, at 304-305. This conclusion was error. Evidence 
tending to show that a necessary element of a plaintiff's 
claim is extremely unlikely will always be relevant to 
whether a "genuine issue for trial II exists within the 
meaning of Rule 56(e). Respondents may yet be entitled to 
survive summary judgment: it may be that there is 
sufficient evidence of an illegal agreement to price below 
market levels to overcome the strong contextual evidence 
that such an agreement would be irrational. But if so, 
the evidence of illegal agreement must be substantial, and 
it must be evaluated in light of the strong disincentives 
to engage in a conspiracy of the kind respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals found 
inapplicable the principle that highly ambiguous conduct--
conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition 
26. 
as with illegal conspiracy--does not, without more, 
support an inference of conspiracy. This too was error. 
The principle of Monsanto applies fully to evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, of other combinations 
whose evident purpose is either to raise prices or to 
impose territorial restraints that ordinarily facilitate 
raising prices. Such combinations are not themselves 
direct evidence of a conspiracy to price predatorily; the 
limitations on inference drawing that derive from our 
decisions in Ci ties Service and Monsanto therefore apply 
with full force. The same limitations apply to evidence 
of fundamentally competitive conduct, such as pricing "to 
get the sale," or widespread use of rebates and other 
price discounts as means of undercutting the check 
prices. 17 This kind of activity suggests nothing so much 
as a determination to compete directly with more 
established firms. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 
V. FTC, 4 4 0 U.S. 6 9, 8 0 
States Gypsum Co., 438 
precisely this kind of 
(1979); United States v. United 
U.S. 422, 457 (1978). It is 
conduct one might expect from 
foreign firms seeking to break into a market dominated by 
American companies. It does not, by itself, support the 
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inference that petitioners were lowering pr ices to 
monopolize the relevant market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' 
showing in the context of the whole record, but leave that 
task to the Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases 
as factually complex as this one is best limited to 
articulation of the governing legal principles; those who 
have lived longer with the case than have we, and who have 
developed greater familiarity with its mammoth record, are 
better able to apply those principles to the facts of the 
case. We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals did not 
correctly apply Rule 56(e) and the principles of our cases 
to petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and we remand 
for further consideration in light of this opinion. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the 
sovereign compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' 
argument on that issue is that MITI, an agency of the 
Government of Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum 
prices for export to the United States, and that 
petitioners are therefore immune from antitrust liability 
for any scheme of which those minimum prices were an 
28. 
integral part. As we discussed in part II, supra, 
respondents could not have suffered a cognizable injury 
from any action that raised pr ices in the American CEP 
market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion issue that both petitioner and 
the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not 
presented here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
1ouring this period, some petitioners unsuccessfully 
challenged both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, 
the latter on the ground that the court lacked power to 
impose antitrust liability for conduct that took place 
almost wholly in Japan. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(personal jurisdiction); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.o. Pa. 
1980). 
2The inadmissible evidence included various government 
records and reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.o. Pa. 
1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), and a large portion of the expert testimony that 
respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
3The district court ruled separately that petitioners 
were entitled to summary judgment on respondents' 
Antidumping Act claims. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 
1980). This ruling was appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning the rest of respondents' claims. In re, 
Japanese Electric Products, 723 F.2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' 
Antidumping Act decision along with its decision on the 
rest of this mammoth case. The Antidumping Act claims 
were not, however, mentioned in the questions presented in 
the petition for certiorari, and they have not been 
independently argued by the parties. See s. Ct. Rule 
21.l(a). We therefore decline the invitation to review 
the Court of Appeals' decision on those claims. 
4As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are 
the 21 defendants who remain in the case. 
5 rn addition to these per miss ible inferences, the court 
noted that there was expert opinion evidence that 
petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices which 
produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on 
sales." 723 F.2d, at 311. The court did not identify any 
direct evidence of below-cost pricing; nor did it place 
particular reliance on this aspect of the expert opinion 
evidence. See note 16 infra. 
6The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, 
but only when the conduct has an effect on American 
commerce. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp., 370 u.s. 690, 704 (1962) ("A conspiracy to 
monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of 
the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman 
Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs 
in foreign countries"). The effect on which respondents 
rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. Petitioners' alleged 
cartelization of the Japanese market could not, by itself, 
have caused that effect. Respondents' theory of recovery 
thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting 
conspiracy in this country. 
7Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-
company rule, and the price-fixing in Japan are all part 
of one large conspiracy that includes monopolization of 
the American market through predatory pricing. The , 
argument is either meaningless or mistaken. However orie 
decides to describe the contours of the asserted 
conspiracy--whether there is one conspiracy or several--
respondents must show that the conspiracy somehow caused 
them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide 
relief. Associated General Contractors v. California 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 u.s. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, supra; see also 
Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se 
Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309 (1984). That showing depends 
in turn on a showing that petitioners conspired to price 
predatorily in the American market, since the other 
conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have 
caused such an injury. 
8Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted 
conspiracy as one to price "predatorily." This term has 
been used chiefly in cases in which a single firm, having 
a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or 
perhaps to deter potential entrants from corning in. E.g., 
Southern Pacific Communications co. v. American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1002-1007 (CADC 1984). In 
such cases, "predatory pricing" means pricing below some 
appropriate measure of cost. E.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. 
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983): see 
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698, 
701, 702 n. 14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases 
and in the law reviews, about what "cost" is relevant in 
such cases. we need not resolve this debate here: unlike 
the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act section 1 
case, and therefore the per se rule against horizontal 
combinations to raise or depress prices applies. For 
purposes of our decision in this case, it is enough to 
note that respondents cannot have suffered an anti trust 
injury unless petitioners conspired to drive respondents 
out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level 
necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below 
some appropriate measure cost. An agreement with neither 
of these features would either leave respondents in the 
same position as would the market or actually benefit 
respondents by raising market prices. Respondents 
therefore may not complain of conspiracies that, for 
example, set maximum prices above market levels, or thgt , 
set minimum prices at any level. · 
We do not consider whether recovery should ever be 
available on a theory such as respondents' when the 
pricing in question is above some measure of incremental 
cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, supra. As a 
practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of 
below-cost pr icing is sufficient to overcome the strong 
inference that rational businesses would not enter into 
conspiracies such as this one. Cf. Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
9Respondents argued before the district court that 
petitioners had failed to carry their initial burden under 
Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. See Adickes v. s. H. Kress & Co. , 39 8 
U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 
F.2d 181 (CADC 1985), cert. granted, u.s. , No. 85-
198 (Nov. 4, 1985). That issu-e-was resolved in 
petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
lORule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
11our ing the same period, the number of Arner ican f irrns 
manufacturing television sets declined from 19 to 13. 
App. to Pet., Vol. V, at 1961a. According to respondents, 
these departures from the market were due to petitioners' 
concerted price-cutting. See Brief for Respondents 54-55. 
12Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into 
the relevant market is especially difficult, yet without 
barriers to entry it would presumably be irnposs ible to 
maintain supracornpetitive prices for an extended time. , 
Judge Easterbrook offers the following sensibie 
assessment: 
The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the 
last fifteen years or more at least ten Japanese 
manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in order 
to drive United States firms out of business. Such 
conduct cannot possibly produce profits by harming 
competition, however. If the Japanese firms drive some 
United States firms out of business, they could not 
recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by 
very high pr ices for the indefinite future. ( The losses 
are like investments, which must be recoverd with compound 
interest.) If the defendants should try to raise pr ices 
to such a level, they would attract new competition. 
·"'"' 
There are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the 
proliferation of computer and audio firms shows. The 
competition would come from resurgent United States firms, 
from other foreign firms, (Korea and many other nations 
make TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order 
to recoup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress 
competition among themselves. On plaintiffs' theory, the 
cartel would need to last at least thirty years, far 
longer than any in history, even when cartels were not 
illegal. None should be sanguine about the prospects of 
such a cartel, given each firm's incentive to shave price 
and expand its share of sales. The predation-recoupment 
story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with 
the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did 
not sell below cost in the first place. They were just 
engaged in hard competition. Easterbrook, The Limits of 
Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
13The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if 
petitioners can recoup their losses, but they can recoup 
their losses only by engaging in some form of price-fixing 
after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the 
market. Such price-fixing would, of course, be an 
independent violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Madison Oil, supra. 
14The predators' losses must actually increase as the 
conspiracy nears its objective: the greater the predators' , 
market share, the more products the predators sell; but 
since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in 
market share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
15The same is true of any excess capacity that 
petitioners may have possessed. The existence of plant 
capacity that exceeds domestic demand does tend to 
establish a need to sell products abroad. It does not, 
however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than 
necessary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why 
petitioners would be willing to lose money in the United 
States market without some reasonable prospect of 
recouping their investment. 
16Respondents also rely on an expert study that suggested 
that petitioners have sold their products at substantial 
losses. The relevant study is not based on actual cost 
data; rather, it consists of a mathematical construction 
that rests on assumptions about petitioners' costs. The 
District Court analyzed those assumptions in some detail 
and found them both implausible and inconsistent with 
record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-1363 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). Although the Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court's finding that the expert report was 
inadmissible, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the 
District Court's analysis of the factors that 
substantially undermine the probative value of that 
evidence. We find the District Court's analysis 
persuasive also. We need not, however, determine with any 
precision the weight to be accorded to respondents' expert 
opinion evidence. 
17Respondents point to evidence of exchanges of pricing 
information among petitioners, and contend that such 
evidence tends to lend strong support to the their theory 
of antitrust conspiracy. The difficulty with this 
argument is that exchanges of information, without more, 
do not tend to show any combination to price predatorily. 
To the contrary, such exchanges are consistent both with 
competition and with concerted action to raise prices. 
Great American & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 80 
(1979); United States v. Container Corp., 393 u.s. 333, , 
336-337 (1968). . 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than 
three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 
723 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 1981). 
Two respected district judges each have authored a number 
of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an 
entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a forty-volume appendix in this Court that 
is said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respec-
tive decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated 
and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that com-
prise the record on appeal. Since we review only the stand-
·ard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and 
not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we 
' / ., 
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find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What 
follows is a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese corpora-
tions that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic prod-
ucts" ("CEPs"}-for the most part, television sets. Re-
spondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio Corporation 
("Zenith") and National Union Electric Corporation 
("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm that manufactures 
and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to 
Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that manufac-
tured and sold television sets until 1970, when it withdrew 
from the market after sustaining substantial losses. Zenith 
and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, 1 claiming that petition-
ers had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the 
American CEP market. According to respondents, the gist 
of this conspiracy was a "scheme to raise, fix and maintain 
artificially high prices for television recewrs sold by [peti-
tioners] in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and~aintain 
low prices for television receivers exported to and sold in the 
United States." In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra, 
at 250 (quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memoran-
dum). These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that pro-
duced substantial losses for petitioners. Zenith-Radio Corp. 
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 
1125 (ED Pa. 1981). The conspiracy allegedly began as early 
as 1953, and according to respondents was in full operation by 
sometime in the late 1960's. Respondents claimed that vari-
ous portions of this scheme violated§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson 
Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
1 NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 
1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two cases were con-
solidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. 
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After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded 
to trial. After these statements were filed, the District 
Court entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
the evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. Zenith Radio, supra. At bottom, the. court 
found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that could 
be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct iri the Japanese 
and American markets, and from the effects of that conduct 
on petitioners' American competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 
1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category 
and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy 
was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the evidence 
suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not in-
jure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that bore directly on 
the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more 
plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to 
compete in the American market and not to monopolize it. 
Summary judgment therefore was granted on respondents' 
claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff 
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp . v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co ., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F . Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1980). 
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Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 claims, which alleged 
that petitioners had combined to monopolize the American 
CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from the § 1 
claims, the court dismissed them also. Finally, the court 
found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the 
same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Since 
the court had found no genuine issue of fact as to the conspir-
acy, it entered judgment in petitioners' 'favor on those claims 
as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. In re 
Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d, at 260-303. These 
evidentiary rulings are not before us.· See Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 470 U. S. --
(1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the 
court found that the District Court's summary judgment de-
cision was improper. The court acknowledged that "there 
8 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 
1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the 
Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning respondents' other claims. In re Japanese Electric 
Products, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See S. Ct. Rule 21.l(a). We therefore de-
cline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
'As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
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are legal limitations on the inferences that may be drawn 
from circumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found 
that "the legal problem ... is different" when "there i · ect 
evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court con-
cluded, "there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of con-
cert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tend-
ency to suggest that Qthey kinds of concert of action may have 
occurred." Id., at ffi54-3O5. Thus, the court reasorn -
cases concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy frc 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 30 
Tcrning to the evidence, the court determined that 
factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterize 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc 
ers meeting regularly' and exchanging information 01 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created th( 
o ortunity for a stable combination to raise both price~ 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combmation because the Japanese gove~ment 
imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order 
to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan's Minlstryof nternational Trade and Industry 
("MITI"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs ex-
ported to the American market. Id., at 310. The par-
ties refer to these pr1ces as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
\ ' 
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each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. -
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at '311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer to avoid various customs regulations as well as ac-
tion under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
Based on thesie..pet'BW:BBil* inferencej:""the Court of Appeals 
concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy 
to depress prices in the American market in order to drive 
out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by 
excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court 
apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to 
conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was inde-
pendent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con- ; 
eluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign 
compulsion, because the check price agreements were being 
used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy'' and not as ( 
an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The 
court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact 
were mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstand- l 
ing a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. 
6 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert 
opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices 
which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales." 723 
F. 2d, at 311. The court did not identify any direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing; nor did it place particularly heavy reliance on this aspect of the ex-
pert evidence. See note 19 infra. 
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We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the 
District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held lia-
ble under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part com-
pelled by a foreign sovereign. 470 U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely 
on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive con-
ditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Alumi-
rJ,Um Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (CA21945) (L. 
Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 1236d 
(1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for any con-
spiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive 
prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed 
violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil], 
but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners' competi-
tors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise 
the market price in CEPs. Cf. Brunsu.rick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the 
6 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the J apa-
nese market could not, by itself, have caused that effect. Respondents' 
theory of recovery thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting con-
spiracy in this country. 
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same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to 
impose nonprice restraints that have the effect of either rais-
ing market price or limiting output. Such restrictions, 
though harmful to competition, actually benefit competitors 
by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, 
neither petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in 
Japan, nor the five-company rule that limited distribution in 
this country, nor the check prices insofar as they established 
minimum prices in this country, can by themselves give re-
spondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust 
damages. The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the ex- r 
tent that it found evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be 
"direct evi2-ence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. 
See723 F .-2d, at 304-305. 7 " 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy 
that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market by means of pricing below the market . .level. 7 The 
thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their-
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a con-
certed campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive re-
spondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of 
business. Once successful, according to respondents, peti-
7 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours 
of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one conspiracy or several-
respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for 
which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors 
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswi.ck Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, supra; see also Note, Antitrust 
Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1309 
(1984). That showing depends in turn on proof that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily in the American market, since the other conduct in-
volved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have caused such an injury. 
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tioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair compe-
tition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
Respondents' allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to en-
gage in predatory pricing,8 if proved,9 would be a per se vi-
olation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Such a conspiracy is a hor-
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to 
price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten-
tial entrants from coming in. E.g., Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. v. American Tele-phone & Telegraph Co., 740 F. 2d 980, 1002-1007 
(CADC 1984), cert. denied, -- U. S. --(1985). In such cases, "preda-
tory pricing" means pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. 
E. g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232-235 
(CAl 1983); see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 
698, 701, 702 n. 14 (1967). 
· There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this de-
bate here: unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act section 1 
case, and therefore the per se rule against horizontal combinations to raise 
or depress prices applies. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note 
that respondents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners 
conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing 
below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some 
appropriate measure of cost. An agreement without these {eatures would 
either leave respondents in the same position as would market forces or 
would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices. Respond-
ents therefore may not complain of conspiracies that, for example, set max-
imum prices above market levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. 
9 We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 697, 709-718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in§ 2 cases). 
As a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational busi-
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izontal combination whose purpose is to distort the market 
price of goods or services. Horizontal conspiracies to raise 
or lower prices are per se illegal. Arizona v. Maric<Ypa 
County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 348-351 (1982); Mad-
ison Oil, supra, at 221-223. The predatory pricing conspir-
acy alleged here appears to fall within that proscription. 
The issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents ad-
duced sufficient evidence in support of that theory to survive 
summary judgment. We therefore examine the principles 
that govern the summary judgment determination. 
III 
To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 re-
spondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of ma-
. terial fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal 
conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable in-
jury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of Ar-
izona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 (1968). 
This showing has two components. First, respondents must 
show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust 
laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the 
illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a 
whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 
nesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this one. See infra, part 
IV, A. 
10 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 F. 2d 181 
(CADC 1985), cert. granted, - U.S.-, No. 85-198 (Nov. 4, 1985). 
That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
u Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. Ifhe does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him. 
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Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the 
American market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-
Mat, supra, 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually tended 
to benefit respondents. Supra, at--. Therefore, unless, 
in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a 
genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary 
judgment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 56(c), (e). When-as here-the moving party has car-
ried its burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do more 
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Re.fining Co., 
176 F. 2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 
U. S. 943 (1949); lOA Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2727 (1983); Clark, Special 
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and 
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. Sartor v. 
Arkansas Natural Gas Crop., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In 
the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come 
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (purpose of summary judgment is to 
"pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 
whether there is a genuine need for trial"). Where the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 
to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial." Cities Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that when certain 
facts render a necessary element of respondents' claim im-
plausible, respondents must come forward with stronger evi-
12 See note 10 supra. 
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dence to establish the existence of that element than would 
otherwise be necessary. Cities Service is instructive. The 
issue in that case was whether proof of the defendant's re-
fusal to deal with the plaintiff supported an inference that the 
defendant had willingly joined an illegal boycott. Economic 
factors strongly suggested that the defendant had no motive 
to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 U. S., at 278-279. The 
Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal 
to deal might well have sufficed to create a triable issue. 
Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in 
context. Since the defendant lacked any rational motive to 
join the alleged boycott, its refusal to deal could not by itself 
support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a§ 1 case. 
Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. S'f)ray-Rite Service Corp., --
U. S. -- (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy ·does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 
Id., at--. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. -- U. S., at 
--. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show 
that the inference of conspiracy is as plausible as the inf er-
ence of permissible independent conduct. Cities Service, 
supra, at 280; Bogosian v. Gitlf Oil Corp ., 561 F. 2d 434, 446 
(CA3 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978). See also 
Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 
2d 1309, 1314-1315 (CA3 1975). 
• < . 
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Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case, because the alleged conspiracy is one that is economi-
cally irrational and practically infeasible. The irrationality 
of the alleged scheme, according to petitioners, strongly sug-
gests that the challenged conduct was in fact nothing more 
than competitive price-cutting. Consequently, they argue, 
the Court of Appeals' decision deters not illegal conspiracy 
but legitimate price competition. This argument requires us 
to consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the prac-
tical obstacles to its implementation. 
IV 
A 
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free competition would 
offer them. The foregone profits Ml@ •"ILJ,ll<.n~ an invest-
ment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the 
conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recover-
ing, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the 
losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing preda-
tory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
size of the losses. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the 
success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run 
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neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough 
simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may 
breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional 
gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly 
will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant 
period of time, "the predator must make a substantial invest-
ment with no assurance that it will pay off." Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is a consensus 
among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are 
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e. g., R. 
Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 699; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981); Koller, The 
Myth of Predatory Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust 
L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: 
The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, 1 J. L. & Econ. 137 (1958); 
McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & Econ. 289, 
292-294 (1980). See also Northeastern Telephone Co. v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 
1981) ("[N]owhere in the recent outpouring of literature on 
the subject do commentators suggest that [predatory] pricing 
is either common or likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 
u. s. 943 (1982). '4,-.. ....,.. 
These observations apply" to predatory pricing by a single 
firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respondents al-
lege that a large number of firms have conspired"-to charge 
below-market prices in order to stifle competition. Such a 
conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an 
analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The con-
spirators must allocate the losses to be sustained during the 
conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any gains to be 
realized from its success. Precisely because success is spec-
~ A.. )tc ,......t 
t,-f ~ •• .., ,,....,_,_ 
83-2004-0PINJON 
MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 15 
~ ulative and depends on a willingness to endure Mellt ~et-m 
~ ' each conspirator has a strong incentive to ~ at, letting 
its partners suffer the losses necessary to destroy the compe-
tition while sharing in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. 
The necessary allocation is therefore difficult to accomplish. 
Yet if conspirators cheat to any substantial extent, the con-
spiracy must fail, because its success depends on depressing 
the market price for all buyers of CEPs. If there are too 
few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy demand, the 
would-be victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the 
"real" market price, and the conspirators suffer losses to lit-
tle purpose. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally un-
likely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the 
prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In 
order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough 
market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is al-
leged to have commenced, 13 petitioners appear to be far from 
achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail mar-
ket in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Ze-
nith, not by any of the petitioners. App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 
2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together ap-
proximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably during 
the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose rapidly 
during this period, from one-fifth or less of the relevant mar-
kets to close to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316. 14 Neither the Dis-
13 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 
1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Com-
plaint 1[52; Zenith Complaint ,r 39. 
14 During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing 
television sets declined from 19 to 13. App. to Pet., Vol. V, at 1961a. 
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trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, that pe-
titioners' share presently allows them to charge monopoly 
prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the conspir-
acy is ongoing-that petitioners are still artificially depress-
ing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of the mar-
ket. The data in the record strongly suggests that that goal 
is yet far distant. 15 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
This decline continued a trend that began at least by 1960, when petition-
ers' sales in the United States market were negligible. Ibid. See Zenith 
Complaint ,i,i 35, 37. 
15 Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review arti-
cle, offers the following sensible assessment: 
"The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or 
more at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than 
cost in order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct 
cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the 
Japanese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could 
not recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high 
prices for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which 
must be recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try 
to raise prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There 
are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer 
and audio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent 
United States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other na-
tions make TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to re-
coup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among them-
selves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty 
years, far longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. 
None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each 
firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The preda-
tion-recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with 
the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost 
in the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition." 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
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a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued 
over the course of two decades, the conspirator~~.\QU lt~tSQC '4"• W "-.;4.~L 
require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining 
supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued co-
operation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-
be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their 
minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs 
more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If 
the losses have been substantial-as would likely be neces-
sary in order to drive out the competition 11-petitioners 
would most likely have to sustain their cartel for di@ftdts sim- ~ ~ 
ply to break even. A 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, ·they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihoo~ tJMt • iR•, ~11cR~ w!U 'Pft' fJff. [Ft most, 
the size of petitioners' Japanese pro~ s might be relevant to ~ 
show that, were the alleged conspiracy otherwise plausible, A 
and were the opportunity for successful predation present, 
petitioners might enter into the alleged conspiracy. The ex-
istence of supracompetitive profits in Japan does not over- Y~ , 
16 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re- 1 
coup their losses. In light of the large number of firms involved here, pe-
titioners can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price-fixing 
after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. Such 
price-fixing would, of course, be an independent violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Madison Oil, supra. 
17 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its 
.!' objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
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come the obstacles to success that are otherwise present i0 ~ 
this scheme. 18 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
pro-competitive conduct. Monsanto, -- U.S., at--. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petition-
ers liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut 
prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy in-
directly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the 
check-price. agreements and the five-company rul~ whose 
natural tendency is to raise price, and through evidence of re-
bates and other price-cutting activities that respondents 
argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. 19 But 
cutting price in order to increase business of ten is the very 
18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that peti-
tioners may have possessed. The existence of ylant capacitY. that exceeds 
domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell pro~ cts abroad. 
It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than nec-
ssary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing 
to mone~ the United States market without some reasonable pros-
pect of QilMII ~~ iMh i:.llfesLntei!t. > .r 
19 Respondents also rely on an expe~ tudy suggesting that petitioners 
have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. 
The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of 
expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on 
assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those 
assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsist-
ent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-1363 (ED Pa. 1980). Althougl}Jhe 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's finding that the expe~ re-
port was inadmissible, the court did not disturb the District Court's analy-
sis of the factors that substantially undermine the probative value of that 
evidence. See 723 F. 2d, at 277-282. We find the District Court's analy-
sis persuasive. Accordingly, in our view· the expert opinion evidence of 
below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the eco-
nomic factors, discussed in part IV, A, su-pra, that suggest that such con-
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essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases 
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 1470-1471. "[W]e must be concerned 
lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particu-
lar type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag-
ing legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp. v. 
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CAl 1983). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such 
as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at --, preda-
tory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in 
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the 
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes 
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities 
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: 
unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspir-
ators. Easterbrook, The Limits of· Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a sin-
gle firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involving 
a large number of firms can be identified and punished once 
they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing agree-
ment would be necessary in order to reap the benefits of pre-
dation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned that by 
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 
conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage 
such conspiracies. 
V 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the factors 
that render the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy highly 
implausible, and that suggest that rational businessmen 
would not engage in the conduct charged to petitioners. Cit-
ies Service, supra, at 279. The court found these factors in-
applicable here because respondents came forward with di-
~? 
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rect evidence of some kinds of concerted action. 723 F. 2d, 
at 304-305. This conclusion was error. Evidence suggest-
ing that a necessary element of a claim is extremely unlikely 
always will be relevant in deciding whether a "genuine issue 
for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Any evi-
dence of illegal agreement must therefore be evaluated in 
light of the strong disincentives to engage in a conspiracy of 
the kind respondents allege. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals did not apply the princi-
ple that highly ambiguous conduct-conduct that is as con-
sistent with p.ermissible competition as with illegal conspir-
acy-does not, without more, support an inference of 
conspiracy. 20 This too was error. The principle of 
Monsanto applies fully to evidence, whether direct or cir-
cumstantial, of other combinations whose apparent purpose 
is either to raiseprices ~to impose territorial restraints that 
ordinarily facilitate raising prices. Such combinations are 
not themselves direct evidence of a conspiracy to price preda-
torily; the limitations on inference drawing that derive from 
our decisions in Cities Service and Monsanto therefore apply 
with full force. 21 The same limitations apply to evidence of 
"'Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., -- U. S. 
-- (1984), was announced three months after the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in this case, and therefore was not available to the Court of Appeals. 
Nevertheless, the principle we applied in Monsanto was established in the 
Court of Appeals' own Circuit. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 
434 (CA31977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978); Venzie Corp. v. United 
States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 2d 1309 (CA3 1975). See also Ed-
ward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F . 2d 105, 111 (CA3 
1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 911 (1981) (quoted in Monsanto, supra, at 
-). 
21 There is an additional reason for finding that the principle developed in 
Monsanto applies here. Monsanto rests on the notion that courts must be 
wary of permitting weak conspiracy cases to go to the jury, lest pro-com-
petitive conduct be deterred. -- U. S., at--. That concern is of 
course strongest when the record on summary judgment consists solely of 
ambiguous evidenc~vidence that is as consistent with competition as 
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fundamentally competitive conduct, such as pricing "to get 
the sale," or widespread use of rebates and other price dis-
counts as means of undercutting the check prices. 22 This 
kind of activity suggests nothing so much as a determination 
to compete directly with more established firms. See Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80 (1979). 
It is precisely the kind of conduct one might expect from for-
eign firms seeking to break into a market dominated by 
American companies. It does not, by itself, support the in-
ference that petitioners were lowering prices to monopolize 
the relevant market. 
We do not review the sufficiency of respondents' showing 
in the context of the whole record, but leave that task to the 
Court of Appeals on remand. Our role in cases as factually 
complex as this one is best limited to articulation of the gov-
erning legal principles; those who have lived longer with the 
tions. To the contrary, the basic principle applies whenever a plaintiff in 
an antitrust conspiracy case seeks to prove conspiracy in whole or in part 
through ambiguous evidence. Plaintiffs may not, simply because they ad-
duce a single item tending to show conspiracy directly, transform an other-
wise wholly inadequate record into one that automatically withstands a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
There is no precise formula that courts can apply in cases where the evi-
dence is only partly ambiguous. Some evidence may reinforce other evi-
dence, so that otherwise implausible inferences become plausible. And 
even ambiguous evidence has probative value. Id., at -- n. 8. But in 
determining whether a plaintiff has raised a triable issue of conspiracy, a 
court must bear in mind Monsanto's central proposition: an antitrust de-
fendant should not be required to undergo a trial for treble damages be-
cause of conduct that is as consistent with competition as with illegal 
conspiracy. 
22 Respondents point to evidence of exchanges of pricing information 
among petitioners, and contend that such evidence supports their theory of 
antitrust conspiracy. The difficulty with this argument is that exchanges 
of information, without more, do not tend to show any combination to price 
predatorily. To the contrary, such exchanges may be consistent with 
competition or with concerted action to raise prices. Great American & 
Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80 (1979); United States v. Con-
tainer Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 336-337 (1968). 
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case than we have, and who have developed greater familiar-
ity with its enormous record, are better able to apply those 
principles to the facts of the case. We therefore hold that 
the Court of Appeals did not correctly apply Rule 56(e) and 
the principles of our cases to petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment, and we remand for further consideration in light of 
this opinion. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and 
the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented 
here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than 
three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products, 
723 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 1981). 
Two respected district judges each have authored a number 
of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an 
entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the 
parties have filed a forty-volume appendµc in this Court that 
is said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respec-
tive decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated 
and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that com-
prise the record on appeal. Since we review only the stand-
ard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and 
not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we 
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find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What 
follows is a summary of this case's long history. 
A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 Japanese corpora-
tions that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic prod-
ucts" ("CEPs")-for the most part, television sets. Re-
spondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio Corporation 
("Zenith") and National Union Electric Corporation 
("NUE"). Zenith is an American firm that manufactures 
and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to 
Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that manufac-
tured and sold television sets until 1970, when it withdrew 
from the market after sustaining substantial losses. Zenith 
and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, 1 claiming that petition-
ers had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the 
American CEP market. According to respondents, the gist 
of this conspiracy was a "scheme to raise, fix and maintain 
artificially high prices for television receivers sold by [peti-
tioners] in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain 
low prices for television receivers exported to and sold in the 
United States." In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra, 
at 250 ( quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memoran-
dum). These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that pro-
duced substantial losses for petitioners. Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 
1125 (ED Pa. 1981). The conspiracy allegedly began as early 
as 1953, and according to respondents was in full operation by 
sometime in the late 1960's. Respondents claimed that vari-
ous portions of this scheme violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson 
Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
1 NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 
1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two cases were con-
solidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. 
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After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded 
to trial. After these statements were filed, the District 
Court entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
the evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. Zenith Radio, supra. At bottom, the court 
found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that could 
be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the Japanese 
and American markets, and from the effects of that conduct 
on petitioners' American competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 
1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category 
and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy 
was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the evidence 
suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not in-
jure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that __ bore directly on 
the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more 
plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to 
compete in the American market and not to monopolize it. 
Summary judgment therefore was granted on respondents' 
claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff 
1 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. · Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1980). 
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Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 claims, which alleged 
that petitioners had combined to monopolize the American 
CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from the § 1 
claims, the court dismissed them also. Finally, the court 
found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the 
same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Since 
the court had found no genuine issue of fact as to the conspir-
acy, it entered judgment in petitioners' favor on those claims 
as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.' 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. In re 
Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F. 2d, at 260-303. These 
evidentiary rulings are not before us. See Matsushita E lec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 470 U. S. --
(1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the 
court found that the District Court's summary judgment de-
cision was improper. The court acknowledged that "there 
8 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 
1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Jru!,ustrial Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the 
Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning respondents' other claims. In re Japanese Electric 
Products, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See S. Ct. Rule 21.l(a). We therefore de-
cline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
• As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
83-2004-0PINION 
MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 5 
are legal limitations on the inferences that may be drawn 
from circumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found 
that "the legal problem . . . is different" when "there is direct 
evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court con-
cluded, "there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of con-
cert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tend-
ency to suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have 
occurred." Id., at 304-305. Thus, the court reasoned, 
cases concerning the limitations on inf erring conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. 
Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a 
factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc-
ers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because the Japanese government 
imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full ~~pacity in order 
to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
("MITI"), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs ex-
ported to the American market. Id., at 310. The par-
ties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
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each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer to avoid various customs regulations as well as ac-
tion under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
Based on inferences from the foregoing conclusions, 5 the 
Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could 
find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese mar-
ket. The court apparently did not consider whether it was 
as plausible to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behav-
ior was independent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con-
cluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign 
compulsion, because the check price agreements were being 
used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy'' and not as 
an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The 
court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact 
were mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstand-
ing a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. 
5 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert 
opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices 
which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales." 723 
F. 2d, at 311. The co did not ident~ direct evide~ fbelow-cost 
pricing; no did it place particularly heavy reliance on this aspect of the ei=-
pert evid . See note 19 infra. 
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We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the 
District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held lia-
ble under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part com-
pelled by a foreign sovereign. 470 U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely 
on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive con-
ditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Alumi-
num Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (CA2 1945) (L. 
Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ,r236d 
(1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for any con-
spiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive 
prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed 
violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940) [hereinafter Madison Oil], 
but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners' competi-
tors, respondents stand to gain from any copspiracy to raise 
the market price in CEPs. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-0-Mat, 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the 
5 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japa-
nese market could not, by itself, have caused that effect. Respondents' 
theory of recovery thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting con-
spiracy in this country. 
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same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to 
impose nonprice restraints that have the effect of either rais-
ing market price or limiting output. Such restrictions, 
though harmful to competition, actually benefit competitors 
by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, 
neither petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in 
Japan, nor the five-company rule that limited distribution in 
this country, nor the check prices insofar as they established 
minimum prices in this country, can by themselves give re-
spondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust 
damages. The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the ex-
tent that it found evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be 
"direct evidence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. 
See 723 F. 2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy 
that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market by means of pricing below the market level. 7 The 
thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their 
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a con-
certed campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive re-
spondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of 
business. Once successful, according to r~~pondents, peti-
7 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours 
of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one conspiracy or several-
respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for 
which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors 
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswu:k Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, supra; see also Note, Antitrust 
Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1309 
(1984). That showing depends in turn on proof that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily in the American market, since the other conduct in-
volved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have caused such an injury. 
83-2004-0PINION 
MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 9 
tioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair compe-
tition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
The Court of Appeals found that respondents' allegation of 
a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, 8 if 
proved, 9 would be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. 723 F. 2d, at 306. Petitioners did not appeal from that 
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to 
price ''predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten-
tial entrants from coming in. E.g., Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 740 F. 2d 980, 1002-1007 
(CADC 1984), cert. denied, --U. S. -- (1985). In such cases, ''preda-
tory pricing" means pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. 
E. g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232-235 
(CAl 1983); see Ut,ah Pie Co. v. Continent,al Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 
698, 701, 702 n. 14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this de- I 
bate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act sec-
tion 1 case. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note that respond-
ents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petiUoners conspired to 
drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level 
necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate 
measure of cost. An agreement without these features would either leave 
respondents in the same position as would market forces or would actually 
benefit respondents by raising market prices. Respondents therefore 
may not complain of conspiracies that, for example, set maximum prices 
above market levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. 
'We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 697, 709-718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in§ 2 cases). 
As a practical matter, it may be that only direct- evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational busi-
:. 
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conclusion. The issue in this case thus becomes whether re-
spondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their the-
ory to survive summary judgment. We therefore examine 
the principles that govern the summary judgment 
determination. 
III 
To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 re-
spondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal 
conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable in-
jury. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of Ar-
izona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 (1968). 
This showing has two components. First, respondents must 
show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust 
laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the 
illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a 
whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 
--. Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the 
American market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, supra, 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually tended 
nesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this o-ne. See infra, part 
IV, A. 
10 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 756 F. 2d 181 
(CADC 1985), cert. granted, - U.S.-, No. 85-198 (Nov. 4, 1985). 
That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not before us. 
11 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him. 
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to benefit respondents. Supra, at--. Therefore, unless, 
in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a 
genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary 
judgment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 56(c), (e). When-as here-the moving party has car-
ried its burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do more 
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 
176 F. 2d 421, 423 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 
U. S. 943 (1949); lOA Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2727 (1983); Clark, Special 
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and 
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. Sartor v. 
Arkansas Natural Gas Cr<Yp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In 
the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come 
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (purpose of summary judgment is to 
"pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 
whether there is a genuine need for trial"). Where the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rati_<;mal trier of fact . 
to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial." Cities Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual 
context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the claim 
is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents 
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support 
their claim than would otherwise be necessary. Cities Serv-
ice is instructive. The issue in that case was whether proof 
of the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an illegal 
12 See note 10 supra. 
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boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that the de-
fendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 
U. S., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isola-
tion, the defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed 
to create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal 
had to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defend-
ant lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, and 
since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant's 
independent interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself 
support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case. 
Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., --
U. S. -- (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 
Id., at--. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently:· -- U. S., at 
--. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show ~ · Y 
that the inference of conspiracy is as plausible as the infer- / (\ 
ence of permissible independent conduct. Cities Service, 
supra, at 280; Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F. 2d 434, 446 
(CA3 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978). See also 
Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F. 
2d 1309, 1314-1315 (CA3 1975). 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case. According to petitioners, the alleged conspiracy is one 
that is economically irrational and practically infeasible. 
Consequently, petitioners contend, they h~d no motive to en-
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gage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, 
they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner re-
spondents allege. Petitioners argue that, in light of the ab-
sence of any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of 
the evidence of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could 
find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged 
actually existed. This argument requires us to consider the 




A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free competition would 
off er them. The foregone profits may be considered an in-
vestment in the future. For the investment to be rational, 
the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of;recov-
ering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the 
losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing preda-
tory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
size of the losses. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J . L. & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the 
success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run 
loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough 
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simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may 
breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional 
gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly 
will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant 
period of time, "the predator must make a substantial invest-
ment with no assurance that it will pay off." Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is a consensus 
among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are 
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e.g., R. 
Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 699; Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1981); Koller, The 
Myth of Predatory Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust 
L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: 
The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, 1 J. L. & Econ. 137 (1958); 
McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & Econ. 289, 
292-294 (1980). See also Norlheastern Telephone Co. v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 
1981) ("[N]owhere in the recent outpouring of literature on 
the subject do commentators suggest that [predatory] pricing 
is either common or likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 
u. s. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply even to predatory pricing by a \ 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respond-
ents allege that a large number of firms have conspired over a 
period of many years to charge below-market prices in order 
to stifle competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a 
single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to 
be sustained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also 
allocate any gains to be realized from its success. Precisely 
because success is speculative and depends on a willingness 
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to endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has \ 
a strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the 
losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in 
any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary alloca-
tion is therefore difficult to accomplish. Yet if conspirators 
cheat to any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, be-
cause its success depends on depressing the market price for 
all buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the artifi-
cially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the 
conspiracy can continue to sell at the "real" market price, and 
the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally un-
likely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the 
prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In 
order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough 
market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, supra, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is al-
leged to have commenced, 13 petitioners appear to be far from 
achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail mar-
ket in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Ze-
nith, not by any of the petitioners. App. to Pet. Vol. 6, at 
2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together ap-
proximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably during 
the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose rapidly 
during this period, from one-fifth or less of the relevant mar-
kets to close to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316. 14 Neither the Dis-
11 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 
1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Com-
plaint ,r 52; Zenith Complaint ,r 39. 
"During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing 
television sets declined from 19 to 13. App. to Pet., Vol. V, at 1961a. 
This decline continued a trend that began at least by 1960, when petition-
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trict Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, that pe-
titioners' share presently allows them to charge monopoly 
prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the conspir-
acy is ongoing-that petitioners are still artificially depress-
ing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of the mar-
ket. The data in the record strongly suggests that that goal 
is yet far distant. 15 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
ers' sales in the United States market were negligible. Ibid. See Zenith 
Complaint 111135, 37. 
11 Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review arti-
cle, offers the following sensible assessment: 
"The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or 
more at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than 
cost in order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct 
cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the 
Japanese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could 
not recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high 
prices for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which 
must be recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try 
to raise prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There 
are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer 
and audio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent 
United States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other na-
tions make TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to re-
coup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among them-
selves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty 
years, far longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. 
None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each 
firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The preda-
tion-recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with 
the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost 
in the first place. They were just engaged · in hard competition." 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984). 
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with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued 
over the course of two decades, the conspirators could well 
require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining 
supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued co-
operation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-
be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their 
minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs 
more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If 
the losses have been substantial-as would likely be neces-
sary in order to drive out the competition 17-petitioners 
would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years simply 
to break even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy in this country 
will eventually pay off. The courts below found no evidence 
of any such success, and-as indicated above-the facts actu-
ally are to the contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the peti-
tioners, continue to hold the largest share of the American 
retail market in color television sets. The record before us 
does not establish the amount of petitioners' profits in Japan. 
More important, there is nothing to suggest any relationship 
between petitioners' profits in Japan and the amount peti-
11 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re-
coup their losses. In light of the large number of firms involved here, pe-
titioners can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price-fixing 
after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. Such 
price-fixing would, of course, be an independent violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Madison Oil, supra. 
11 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its 
objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
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tioners could expect to gain from a conspiracy to monopolize 
the American market. In the absence of any such evidence, 
the possible existence of supracompetitive profits in Japan 
simply cannot overcome the economic obstacles to the ulti-
mate success of this alleged predatory conspiracy. 18 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
pro-competitive conduct. Monsanto , -- U.S., at--. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petition-
ers liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut 
prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy in-
directly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the 
check-price agreements and the five-company rule) whose 
natural tendency is to raise price, and through evidence of re-
bates and other price-cutting activities that respondents 
argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. 19 But 
18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that peti-
tioners may have possessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds 
domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell products abroad. 
It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than nec-
essary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing 
to lose money in the United States market without some reasonable pros-
pect of recouping their investment. 
' 
19 Respondents also rely on an expert study suggesting that petitioners 
have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. 
The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of 
expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on 
assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those 
assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsist-
ent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1356-1363 (ED Pa. 1980). Although the 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's finding that the expert re-
port was inadmissible, the court did not disturb the District Court's analy-
sis of the factors that substantially undermine the probative value of that 
evidence. See 723 F. 2d, at 277-282. We find the District Court's analy-
sis persuasive. Accordingly, in our view the expert opinion evidence of 
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cutting price in order to increase business of ten is the very 
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases 
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 1470-1471. "[W]e must be concerned 
lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particu-
lar type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag-
ing legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp. v. 
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CAl 1983). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such 
as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at --, preda-
tory pricing schemes require eonspirators to suffer losses in 
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the 
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes 
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities 
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: 
unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspir-
ators. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a sin-
gle firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involving 
a large number of firms can be identified an.d punished once 
they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing agree-
ment would be necessary in order to reap the benefits of pre-
dation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned that by 
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 
conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage 
such conspiracies. 
V 
As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners had no 
motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the con-
below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the eco-
nomic factors, discussed in part IV, A, supra, that suggest that such con-
duct is irrational. 
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trary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had 
every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they 
are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses 
for petitioners with no corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Serv-
ice, supra, at 279. The Court of Appeals did not take ac-
count of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the 
alleged predatory pricing conspiracy. It focused instead on 
whether there was "direct evidence of concert of action." 
723 F. 2d, at 304. The Court of Appeals erred in two re-
spects: (i) the "direct evidence" on which the court relied had 
little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing con-
spiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a 
plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. 
The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was evi-
dence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing con-
spiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices 
in Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents' 
claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not 
tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. Evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum prices 
(through the "check price" agreements) for the American 
market actually works in petitioners' favor, because it sug-
gests that petitioners were seeking to place a floor under 
prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of distribu-
tors of their products in the American market-the so-called 
"Five Company Rule." That practice may have facilitated a 
horizontal territorial allocation, see United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), but its natural effect 
would be to raise market prices rather than reduce them. 20 
., The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the Five Company Rule 
might tend to insulate petitioners from competition with each other. 723 
F. 2d, at 306. But this effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price preda-
torily. Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if they al-
ready are pricing below the level at which they could sell their goods. The 
far more plausible inference from a customer allocation agreement such as 
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Evidence that tends to support any of these collateral con-
spiracies thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market prices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to 
engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a 
"genuine issue for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 
56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible con-
clusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if pe-
titioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if 
their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible ex-
planations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of 
conspiracy. See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, 
the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels 
that succeeded in taking business away from respondents, 
and (ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' abil-
ity to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from go-
ing even lower). This conduct suggests either that petition-
ers behaved competitively, or that petitioners conspired to 
raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agree-
ment among 21 companies to price below market levels. 
Moreover, the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct is 
said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls for 
petitioners to destroy companies larger and better estab-
lished than themselves, a goal that remains far distant more 
than two decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had 
they succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest that they could recover the losses 
they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in light 
the Five Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise prices, 
by limiting their ability to take sales away from each other. Respond-
ents-petitioners' competitors-suffer no harm from a conspiracy to raise 
prices. Supra, at 7. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five 
Company Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the ''rule" per-
mitted petitioners to sell to their American subsidiaries, and did not limit 
the number of distributors to which the subsidiaries could resell. Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp., at 1190. 
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of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither pe-
titioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese 
market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribu-
tion in the American market, suffice to create a "genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).21 
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider 
whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambigu-
ous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of 
any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must "tend[] to 
exclude the possibility" that petitioners underpriced respond-
ents to compete for business rather than to implement an eco-
nomically senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 
--. In the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine 
issue for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and 
11 We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to con-
spire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspir-
acy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 
- (1984), establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible 
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support 
even an inference of conspiracy. Id., at -. See supra, at 12. 
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the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented 
here. · 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 








February 5, 1986 / /1 ~ 
13-200 ~ ~~ ~ Matsushita, No. 8~ 
Proposed chan9,,>,s in response to Justice Rehnquist's 
- % 
Justice Rehnquist's clerk has seen all these 
proposed changes, and liked them all. He emphasized, 
however, that he is not certain he's on the same 
wavelength as his boss on this case, so I'm afraid we're 
shooting in the dark on this one. 
If these changes aren't sufficient, and if the 
majority in this case is thus fragmented, I think you 
should consider withdrawing your opinion. A plurality , 
cpinion in a case such as this one would be of no value at 
all to litigants. Moreover, it would place CA3 in an 
impossible position on remand. If all the other Justices 
stick with their Conference votes, the Court would be 
split 4-4 on whether CA3 properly applied summary judgment 
predatory 
against price-fixing. ------------~ CA3 would thus be in the strange 
2. 
position of having each element of its decision affirmed, 
while the decision as a whole would be reversed. Since 
your opinion contemplates further proceedings, CA3 would 
have to decide how to respond to that odd combination. 
That sort of confusion reflects badly on the Court . 
.Fbr this reason, I think that if neither your opinion nor 
the dissent (nor Justice Rehnquist if he wishes to try) 
can get a majority, the Court should DIG the case. The 
Conference came very close to doing just that (5-4, with 
all the dissenters voting to DIG), and I suspect it would 
have been unanimous if the Justices had known that no 
opinion would get a majority. 
I wasn't sure whether to make this point in a draft 
letter to Justice Rehnquist or not. It isn't a good idea 
to appear petulant; on the other hand, if Justice , 
Rehnquist understands that your opinion is really the only 
realistic alternative to DIGing the case, he may be more 
inclined to concur in the opinion as well as the judgment. 
Also, I think that if you don't change your own vote to 
DIG, someone else in the majority well might: the Court 
has probably had more than its fill of this case, and the 
thought of another round of haggling, with the almost 
certain result of a divided majority, may lead to a 
3. 
consensus that the case should simply be got ten rid of. 
It might be well to plant that thought with Justice 
Rehnquist. 
My proposed changes follow. The first suggested 
/ change is meant to raise expressly the possibility that 
~ ? e Court might reconsider the legality of maximum price-
-(fY\,, ~ fixing. That would presumably make it possible for 




that the Court should in fact overrule Maricopa County. 
The rest of the proposed changes--including the complete 
rewrite of part v--are intended to clarify the opinion's 
summary judgment analysis, in the hope that clarification 
might lead Justice Rehnquist to conclude that there is 
nothing disagreeable here after all. 
~ -~ For the paragraph carrying over from page 9 to 
kr ~-I-~ ~ .1 LJ,,-1-AJd--t, age 10, substitute the following: 
Au-4i/ff~~a4) 
·-.-./ I  ~ • 
We may presume that a conspiracy to pr ice 
~ , 
LH 7 --/ predatorily violates §1 of the Sherman Act. w--, ·, --t~~tt,hv'( Such a conspiracy is functionally no different than a conspiracy 
~~ 
~~'~ 




to fix maximum prices1 This Court has held that 
horizontal conspiracies to fix maximum prices are illegal 
per se. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 
u.s. 332, 348-351 (1982); Kiefer-Stewart Co. E. 
Inc., 340 u.s. 211, 213 (1951). 
maximum price-fixing benefit consumers, 
without to competition. See Arizona 
362-364 
us to revisit these cases here, and un.t,.,i...1-...o\terr.uled they 
are binding authority. Applied to this case, the Court's 
decisions require the conclusion that the alleged 
oonspiracy, if proved, is a per se violation of the 
antitru~ 
~ he issue in this case thus becomes whether 
respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of 
their theory to survive summary judgment. We therefore 
examine the principles that govern the summary judgment 
determination. 
-
2. For the paragraph carrying over from page 11 to 
page 12, substitute the following: --
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents' claim 




must come forward with.A~ 
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be 
necessary. Ci ties Service is instructive. The issue in 
that case was whether proof of the defendant's refusal to 
deal with the plaintiff supported an inference that the 
defendant ~ i1.lingly"- joined an illegal boycott. 
Economic factors strongly suggested that the defendant had 
no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 
278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the , 
defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed to 
create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to 
real had to be evaluated in~ nf,,:-:{:••t{nce the defendant 
~ 
lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, 
and since its refusal to deal was consistent with the 
defendant's independent interest, the refusal to deal 
could not by itself support a finding of antitrust 






3. For the first paragraph on page 13, substitute 
the following: 
~titioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged 
conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and 
practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners 
contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged 
predatory pr icing conspiracy; indeed, they had a strong 
noti ve not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. 
Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any 
apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence 
~~ 
of conspiracy, no ~ ,ten-al trier of fact I"\ could find that 
the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually 
existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature , 
of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to 
its implementation. 
4. For part V (pages 19-21), substitute the 
following: 
As ou~___sj.~scussion 
~ ~ Iif/iilt V & J 
had no motive to enter 
I\ 
in part 1~½ shows, petitioners 
into the alleged conspiracy. To 
7. 
the contrary, as presumably ration 1 businesses, 
petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the 
conduct with which they are charged, for is likely effect 
IDuld be to generate losses 
en r res pond in g gains • , Cf • C=1=-· t=i =e=s----'==-=--=-==..., .,...a.~ 
The absence of a k motive does not ~~~~~~~ 
~-1;ww,-l.~l::r6.,...,""'2~~ 
respondents' theory is incorrecr e~ that 
conspired to price predatorily, even though petitioners 
such a conspiracy 
~4-~ 
~Lt.I~~ ~~ 
would have been !18-flSt!!lt!!l!!S . ~ But l..a,.c.k of 
A ~ 
I\ motive does bear on the range of permissible inferences 




defendant has no motive to conspire, and if s.i. conduct is 
consistent with ~ ndepen~ ~ then his conduct 
~ " I\ 
eet-Rnot give rise to an inference of conspiracy. See id., 
I\ 
at 278-280. Thus, if petitioners' conduct over the course, 
~c·~~ 
of the past two decades is explainable on grouncfs other 
. " 
than illegal conspiracy, the absence of any plausible 
rrotive to conspire means that a , ra:tj{merl trier of fact 
could not find a conspiracy in this case. 
The Court of Appeals did not apply this principle, 
apparently because respondents came forward with 
unambiguous evidence of some kinds of concerted action. 
723 F.2d, at 304-305. This was error. Evidence that 
8. 
petitioners combined to raise prices, or to impose 
territorial restraints that ordinarily facilitate raising 
prices, does not constitute unambiguous evidence of a 
conspiracy to price predatorily. The same is true of 
evidence of fundamentally competitive conduct, such as 
pr icing "to get the sale," or widespread use of rebates 
and other pr ice discounts as means of undercutting the 
check prices.-22- This kind of activity suggests nothing 
so much as a determination to compete directly with more 
established firms. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 
v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 80 (1979). It is precisely the kind 
of conduct one might expect from foreign firms seeking to 
break into a market dominated by American companies. Such 
evidence does not, in the absence of any plausible motive 
to conspire, support the inference that petitioners were , 
lowering prices to monopolize the relevant market. 
On remand, the Court of Appeals should consider 
whether there is unambiguous evidence that would permit a 
finder of fact to find that petitioners conspired to price 
predatorily despite the absence of any apparent motive to 
do so. The evidence must "tend[) to exclude the 
J,,t;r,,• ~ ~ '"""' ~- *"• "4<.,_,,,. 
possibility" that petitioners cut prices- to compete rather 
than to implement an unlawful conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 
9. 
u.s., at • Absent such evidence, there is no "genuine 
issue for trial II under Rule 56 ( e) , and petitioners are 
entitled to have summary judgment reinstated. 
5. Delete notes 20 and 21 (pages 20-21). 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: February 5, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
DRAFT LETTER TO JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
( ~~/J~) 
like. 
The following letter is probably longer than you'd 
If you're looking for places to cut, the last two 
paragraphs of #1 ("I wish to emphasize ••• ") and #3 ("I 
hope the changes ••• ") could go without causing any real 
problems. That would cut the letter down by about 60%. 
'!he point made in #3 is one we should perhaps discuss; if 




along those lines to Justice Rehnquist 
I have now had an opportunity to review your 
January 31 letter carefully, and I am hopeful that we can 
find common ground in this case. Your letter makes two 
~ e points; I'll address these in turn. 
2. 
1. You express concern about my lack of clarity 
concerning the nature of CA3 's error in this case, and 
also about the creation of "vaguely described higher 
burdens of proof." The criticism is well taken. There 
are several places in which the opinion is less than 
precise about just what CA3 did wrong, and what it should 
do on remand. Attached are a series of suggested changes; ---------
ru.mbers 2 through 5 are designed to clarify my position. 
~ /,1. •• J.. 
I w•.J...S.Jl..-J:.Q....-e.JrR-JJ-Ril~~ ...... ..i;;~=--:t. do not mean to create 
different 
claims. 
burdens of proof for differen} subptantive 
!} IAA,, µ.- A'- ,..,.{,. 
To the contrary, TD¥ int.e~tioft w~s~simply to apply 
Cities Service and Monsanto in a straightforward way. In 
Ci ties Service, the Court affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment when (i) the defendant had no motive to join the 
alleged conspiracy, and (ii) the plaintiff adduced only, 
weak and ambiguous evidence to support his allegations. 
In Monsanto, we found, in the context of a dealer 
termination case, that an anti trust plaintiff must come 
forward with evidence that tends to exclude the 
possibility of independent conduct in order to survive a 
motion for a directed verdict. It seems to me that either 
one of those decisions is sufficient to require reversal 
in this case. Respondents (and CA3) rely on highly 
3. 
ambiguous evidence--evidence of other, essentially 
irrelevant combinations, or of ordinary price-cutting. 
They claim that this evidence permits a trier of fact to 
find a conspiracy that petitioners had absolutely no 
motive to join. 
~ y irrational. 
In my view, such a finding would be 
As a result, there is no genuine 
issue for trial under Rule 56. 
~ ~~.e. t:-bat /Mt first two drafts did not m%.? 
this point sufficiently clearly. 1 hope that ~~ges 
rectify that problem in a way that would 
permit you to join. If not, 1 would be happy to consider 
any alternative language you might suggest. 
2. You also argue that the real problem in this 
case lies in the misapplication of the ~r ~ e rule. I , 
c:;-"" heartil~ agree that the conduct at issue here should be 
analyzed under the Rule of Reason, and that under a proper 
analysis respondents' claims should be barred because of 
insufficient evidence of an ability to recoup. As you 
~ 
9e-Q.m t o.-aG-knGWlQd~e, '\ however, Maricopa County stands in 
the way of such an approach. Also, the issue hasn't been 
raised, briefed or argued in this case, and I don't 
believe it was mentioned at Conference. Under these 
4. 
circumstances, I feel bound to apply the governing law, 
and I doubt that a Court would agree to a different 
approach. 
In order to make it 
redrafted the paragraph 
:per se rule. The 
:i;ossibility that the 
Cbunty in some later case, 
r you to join, I have 
that discusses the 
explicitly raises the 
reconsider Maricopa 
without 




case is illegal I hope you to tn< 
join even if you write separately to urge that the per se 
rule be reexamined. 
3. i hope the changes i•ve sugges~~'/4..~L, 
possible for you to J01n. A fractured ity would , 
• L+c., ~~-~/.-,.-a-t..c,.. +~ 
re-t'l-&erA. this A~ e-f 'IQ.liY 1-ite-le \•slue to litigants. It 
would also place CA3 in an untenable position. If all the 
other Justices hold to their Conference votes, the Court 
would divide 4-4 on whether CA3 properly applied summary 
judgment analysis, while dividing 4-1 (with 4 reserving 
the question) on whether a predatory pr icing conspiracy 
falls within the per se rule against price-fixing. CA3 
would thus be in the strange position of having each 
5. 
element of its decision affirmed, while the decision as a 
whole would be reversed. Since both my opinion and the 
dissent will contemplate further proceedings, CA3 would 
have to decide how to respond to that odd combination. It 
may be that the best response to this situation is to DIG 
the case if no one opinion can get a Court. 
I'll welcome any further suggestions or comments. 




This is merely to confirm our conversation as to 
Bill Rehnquist's possible defection in this case. 
I am sending him some suggested changes that are 
clarifying in nature that I hope he will accept. My opinion 
is written in full conformity with Bill's vote at Confer-
ence. He also expressly said he agreed with you and me. 
If Bill should decide to write separately, a possi-
bility he has mentioned, the Court would end up 4-4-1 - a 
most ungatisfactory result, and one that would afford no 
guidance to CA3 or have any precedential effect. 
Your join at this time could be influential with 
Bill, and we need him. 




TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: February 8, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Revised changes in response to Justice Rehnquist's 
letter 
You need not look at #2 and #3--you've already 
given them your OK. They're in here just to preserve the 
order. 
1. For the paragraph carrying over from page 9 to 





of Appeals found that respondents' 
horizontal conspiracy to engage in 
would be a per se 
723 F.2d, at 306. 
predatory pricing,-8- if proved,-9-
violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. 
Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The 
issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents 
adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to 
survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the 
principles that govern the summary judgment determination • 
2. 
2. For the paragraph carrying over from page 11 to 
page 12, substitute the following: 
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents' claim 
implausible--if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense--respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary. C~i_t_i_e;...;;s:;..__s-"e;...;;r'-v'-1;;;;;..· c~e is instructive. 
The issue in that case was whether proof of the 
defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an 
illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that 
the defendant had no motive to join the alleged 
conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged 
that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal might 
well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id. , at 
277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its 
factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational 
motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal 
to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent 
interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself support 
a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
3. 
3. For the first paragraph on page 13, substitute 
the following: 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged 
conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and 
practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners 
contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged 
predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, they had a strong 
motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. 
Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any 
apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence 
of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that 
the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually 
existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature 
of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to 
its implementation. 




As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners 
had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To 
the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, 
petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the 
conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect 
would be to generate losses for petitioners with no 
corresponding gains. Cf. Ci ties Service, supra, at 279. 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the absence 
of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory 
pricing conspiracy, because it found that there was 
"direct evidence of concert of action." 723 F.2d, at 304. 
The Court of Appeals erred. The evidence on which 
the court relied was ciree~ evidence of other 
combinations, not of a predatory pricing conspiracy. 
Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in 
Japan prov ides little, if any, support for respondents' 
claims: a conspiracy, to inc.rease profits in one market . '1, 
- /'~ .J...,. .. .,.~"'4, .-.. t:=:r+ /e-lA..'f ,w, 6"'K.ot. - va.. ,,,,,_+ '-' : au+~ 
dees. n&t .tRRC'J. a conspiracy to sustain losses in 11. 
A . . fl 
,._Mfflth~r. Evidence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum 
prices (through the "check price" agreements) for the 
American market actually works in petitioners' favor, 
~k A-&4-.c.< 
because it suggests that petitioners were seeking /\to a-ise ,; 
prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of 
. ,. 
e,a-
Q.1,1. .. j .'-.~ ,t...J.w,U.k,,~J. w.(, ~;I co(_ 5. 
-- n,.,.,,,. ,,,_ .. "'tA,...t. ............ ~I, r.··~ ~ 
~ . 7 .,._.,, ,,,,_..~...,"1 H • •• - ft 
~ ~.c.. n...,;,,..,~.-(. 4jd ,I.,,"""" ' 
evidence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of 
distributors of their products in the American market--the 
so-called "Five Company Rule." That practice may have 
facilitated a horizontal territorial allocation, see 






natural effect ,~ to raise ~ market 
}1,.~ i t / 
reduce/\ i-t. -20- Evidence that Q~re-et-47 0 
tends to support any of these collateral conspiracies thus 
says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market pr ices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible 
motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant 
to whether a "genuine issue for trial" exists within the 
meaning of Rule 56 ( e) • Lack of motive bears on the range 
of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from 
r-:-,k~ ../...:--~ 
ambiguous evidence: if A tho "--defendant ha.s no rational 
economic motive to conspire, and if 1 ~ conduct i-s-
r<--W"l,, -~ ~ 1-w-,.wv:..L Vk-~f lo "~t1t'tl .JJ rA 
consistent withA;i..e.s 'ncite~na~ nteres then ,ii;s'l\conduct ,, . 
does not give rise 
Ci ties Service, supra, 
to an inference of conspiracy. See 
at 278-280. (!ere, the conduct in 
\ question consists largely of price-cutti~, and 




~ -~ ' J'T"'r.;r.--1-
~t ;uk /.t-V";;t.~r~ 
such as the Five 
~~ 
I 
Company Rule and the check price 
agreements. Pr ice-cutting is of course fully consistent 
with petitioners' inde~endent interests, while the other 
draw from this defies economic reality: 
petitioners are said 
conspiracy to drive from 
leading manufacturers of 
respondents have shown no basi 
lg_s.se.s-s.uch. a._plan would entail. 
joined a decades-long 
American market all the 
sets P d 'ft 
~ of recovering the 
The conduct cited by the 
~ 
Court of Appeals, and relied on by respondents, \arguabll / 
may be consistent with the alleged conspiracy (as it i U 
~onsistent with other, more plausible explanations), bu 
lt falls far short of relevant direct evidence in light of 
the strong disincentives to engage in the 
~pricing conspiracy at issue here.-21-1 
~ I\ :;; 
71 0n remand, the Court of Appeals is 
~ ....... ·~ 




sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find 
that petitioners conspired to pr ice predator ily for two 
decades ctespi te the absence of any app-a,ent motive to do 
so :/ The evidence must "tend[] to exclude the possibility" 
7. 
that petitioners underpriced respondents for the rational 
purpose of competing for business, rather than to 
implement an unlawful and economically hazardous 
conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 u.s., at In the absence 
of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue for trial" 
under Rule 56 (e), and petitioners are entitled to have 
summary judgment reinstated. 
5. For notes 20 and 21, substitute the following: 
-20-The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the 
Five Company Rule might tend to insulate petitioners from 
competition with each other. 723 F.2d, at 306. This 
effect is irre1ev;n 0 to a conspiracy to price predatorily .,.....,...Q ,,,, FAl , 
~~ f e:i tioners have' ~; incentive to underpr ice each 
other ~ th ~ - @r'. already A pricing below the level at 
,b I\ 
which they could sell their goods. The far more plausible 
inference from a customer allocation agreement such as the 
Five Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to 
raise prices, by limiting their ability to take sales away 
from each other. Respondents--petitioners' competitors--
/?~"b 
t Cf1 1-L 
/ suffer no harm from a conspiracy to raise prices. 




-21-We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a 
plausible reason to conspire, highly ambiguous conduct 
would suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. 
Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
establishes that conduct that is as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 
not, without more, support an inference of conspiracy. 







February 10, 1986 
Proposed Changes in Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Following are a number of changes prompted by your 
letter of January 31. 
1. For the paragraph carrying over from page 9 to 
page 10, substitute the following: 
The Court of Appeals found that respondents' 
allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in 
predatory pr icing ,-8- if proved ,-9- would be a per se 
violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. 723 F.2d, at 306. 
Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The 
issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents 
adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to 
survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the 
principles that govern the summary judgment determination. 
2. For the paragraph carrying over from page 11 to 
page 12, substitute the following: 
2. 
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents' claim 
implausible--if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense--respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary. Ci ties Service is instructive. 
The issue in that case was whether proof of the 
defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an 
illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that 
the defendant had no motive to join the alleged 
conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged 
that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal might 
well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id. , at 
277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its 
factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational 
motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal 
to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent 
interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself support 
a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
3. For the first paragraph on page 13, substitute 
the following: 
3. 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged 
conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and 
practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners 
contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged 
predatory pr icing conspiracy; indeed, they had a strong 
motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. 
Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any 
apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence 
of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that 
the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually 
existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature 
of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to 
its implementation. 
4. For part V (pages 19-21), substitute the' 
following: 
As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners 
had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To 
the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, 
petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the 
conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect 
would be to generate losses for petitioners with no 
4. 
corresponding gains. Cf. Ci ties Service, supra, at 279. 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the absence 
of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory 
pr icing conspiracy. It focused instead on whether there 
was "direct evidence of concert of action." 723 F.2d, at 
304. The Court of Appeals erred in two respects: (i) the 
"direct evidence" on which the court relied had little, if 
any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing 
conspiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the 
absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory 
pricing. 
The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was 
evidence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise 
prices in Japan provides little, if any, support for 
respondents' claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in' 
one market does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain 
losses in another. Evidence that petitioners agreed to 
fix minimum pr ices (through the "check pr ice" agreements) 
for the American market actually works in petitioners' 
favor, because it suggests that petitioners were seeking 
to place a floor under prices rather than to lower them. 
The same is true of evidence that petitioners agreed to 
5. 
limit the number of distributors of their products in the 
American market--the so-called "Five Company Rule." That 
practice may have facilitated a horizontal territorial 
allocation, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 
405 u.s. 596 (1972), but its natural effect would be to 
raise market prices rather than reduce them.-20- Evidence 
that tends to support any of these collateral conspiracies 
thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market pr ices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible 
motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant 
to whether a "genuine issue for trial" exists within the 
meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range 
of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from 
ambiguous evidence: 
economic motive to 
if petitioners 
conspire, and if 
had no rational 
their conduct is 
consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the 
conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. 
See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, the conduct 
in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that 
succeeded in taking business away from respondents, and 
(ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' 
, 
6. 
ability to compete with each other (and thus kept pr ices 
from going even lower). This conduct suggests either that 
petitioners behaved competitively, or that petitioners 
conspired to raise pr ices. Neither possibility is 
consistent with an agreement among 21 companies to pr ice 
below market levels. Moreover, the predatory pricing 
scheme that this conduct 
makes no practical sense: 
destroy companies larger 
is said to prove is one that 
it calls for petitioners to 
and better established than 
themselves, a goal that remains far distant more than two 
decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had they 
succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that they could recover the losses 
they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in 
light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, 
neither petitioners' pricing practices, nor their conduci 
in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting 
prices and distribution in the American market, suffice to 
create a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
56 (e) .-21-
0n remand, the Court of Appeals is free to 
consider whether there is other evidence that is 
sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find 
7. 
that petitioners conspired to pr ice predator ily for two 
decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do 
so. The evidence must "tend[] to exclude the possibility" 
that petitioners underpr iced respondents to compete for 
business rather than to implement an economically 
senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 u.s., at In 
the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
5. For notes 20 and 21, substitute the following: 
-20-The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the 
Five Company Rule might tend to insulate petitioners from 
competition with each other. 723 F.2d, at 306. But this 
effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price predatorily. 
Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if 
they already are pr icing below the level at which they 
could sell their goods. The far more plausible inference 
from a customer allocation agreement such as the Five 
Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise 
prices, by limiting their ability to take sales away from 
each other. Respondents--petitioners' competitors--suffer 
no harm from a conspiracy to raise prices. Supra, at 7. 
8. 
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five Company 
Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the 
"rule" permitted petitioners to sell to their American 
subsidiaries, and did not limit the number of distributors 
to which the subsidiaries could resell. Zeni th Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F.Supp., 
at 1190. 
-21-We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a 
plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could 
suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our 
decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
establishes that conduct that is as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 
not, without more, support even an inference of 
conspiracy. 465 u.s., at See supra, at 12. ~ 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: February 10, 1986 
RE: Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Revised changes in response to Justice Rehnquist's 
letter 
Note changes in (i) the paragraph carrying over 
from page 5 to page 6, and (ii) note 20--pages 7-8. 
1. For the paragraph carrying over from page 9 to 
page 10, substitute the following: 
The Court ti>'f- f/ ppeals found that respondents' 
allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in 
predatory pricing,-8- if proved,-9- would be a per se 
violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. 7 2 3 F. 2d, at 3 0 6 ., 
Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The 
issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents 
adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to 
survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the 
principles that govern the summary judgment determination. 
2. 
2. For the paragraph carrying over from page 11 to 
page 12, substitute the following: 
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents' claim 
implausible--if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense--respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary.C ~~i~t~i~e~s~~S~e~r~v:.....=..ic~e is instructive. 
The issue in that case was whether proof of the 
defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an 
illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that 
the defendant had no motive to join the alleged 
conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged 
that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal might 
well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id., at' 
277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its 
factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational 
motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal 
to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent 
interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself supp9rt 
a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
3. 
3. For the first paragraph on page 13, substitute 
the following: 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged 
conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and 
practically infeasible. 
contend, they had no motive 
predatory pr icing conspiracy; 
Consequently, petitioners 
to engage in the alleged 
indeed, they had a strong 
motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. 
Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any 
apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence 
of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that 
the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually 
existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature 
of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to 
its implementation. 






would be to 
to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To 
as presumably rational businesses, 
every incentive not to engage in the 
they are charged, for its likely effect 
losses for petitioners with no 
corresponding gains. Cities Service, supra, at 279. 
The Court ot # ppeals not take account of the absence 
of a plausible motive toe into the alleged predatory 
pr icing conspirac~ b.6-caua1.e 
~I ~4-H,_w., 4"J,4. ~~ 
t /1 fe~RQ t+i-a-t. there was 
C> ~ 
"direct evidence of concert 9-f 723 F.2d, at 304. 
The Court of Appeals erre. The "direct evidence" 
on which the court relied was evidence of other 
combinations, not of a predatory pricing conspiracy. 
Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in 
Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents' 
claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market' 
does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in 
another. Evidence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum 
prices (through the "check price" agreements) for the 
American market actually works in petitioners' favor, 
because it suggests that petitioners were seeking to place 





is true of evidence that petitioners agreed to limit the 
number of distributors of their products in the Arner ican 
market--the so-called II Five Company Rule. 11 That practice 
may have facilitated a horizontal territorial allocation, 
see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 u.s. 596 
. (1972), but its natural effect would be to raise market 
prices rather than reduce them.-20- Evidence that tends 
to support any of these collateral conspiracies thus says 
little, if anything, about the existence of a conspiracy 
to charge below-market prices in the American market over 
a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible 
motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant 
to whether a "genuine issue for trial" exists. within the 
meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range 
of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from 
ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational' 
economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is 
.A.-
consistent with other, explanations, the 
conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. 
See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, the conduct 
in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that 
succeeded in taking business away from respondents, and 
6. 
(ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' 
ability to compete with each other (and thus kept pr ices 
from going even lower). This conduct suggests either that 




to raise prices. Neither possibility is 
a..... ~r ~ .a., ~
with I'\  to pr ice t1elow marf<et levels. 
the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct 
is said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it 
calls for petitioners to destroy companies larger and 
better established than themselves, a goal that remains 
far distant more than two decades after the conspiracy's 
birth. Even had they . succeeded in obtaining their 
monopoly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
they could recover the losses they would need to sustain 
along the way. In sum, in light of the absence of any 
rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners' pricing 
practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese market, noi 
their agreements respecting prices and distribution in the 
American market, suffice to create a "genuine issue for 
trial." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56 (e) .-21-
0n remand, the Court of Appeals is free to 
consider whether there is other evidence that is 
sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find 
i-•. 
- 7. 
that petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two 
decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do 
so. The evidence must "tend[] to exclude the possibility" 
that petitioners underpr iced respondents to compete for 
business rather than to implement an economically 
senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 u.s., at In 
the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
5. For notes 20 and 21, substitute the following: 
-20-The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the 
Five Company Rule might tend to insulate petitioners from 
competition with each other. 723 F.2d, at 306. But this 
effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price predatorily. 
Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if 
they already are pr icing below the level at which they 
could sell their goods. The far more plausible inference 
from a customer allocation agreement such as the Five 
Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise 
prices, by limiting their ability to take sales away from 
8. 
each other. Respondents--petitioners' competitors--suffer 
no harm from a conspiracy to raise pr ices. Supra, at 7. 
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five Company 
Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the 
"rule" permitted petitioners to sell to their American 
subsidiaries, and did not limit the number of distributors 
to which the subsidiaries could resell. Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F.Supp., 
at 1190. 
-21-We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a 
plausible reason 
c.. 
x ould suffice to 
to conspire, h ~ ambiguous conduct 
create a triable issue of conspiracy. 
Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
t~ 
establishes that conduct that is as consistent with 
.t\ 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does' 
4!!.~ ......... 
not, without more, support "\ an inference of conspiracy. 
465 u.s., at See supra, at 12. 
LFP/ss 
February 10, 1986 
Proposed Changes in Matsushita, No. 83-2004 
Following are a number of changes prompted by your 
letter of January 31. 
1. For the paragraph carrying over from page 9 to 
page 10, substitute the following: 
The Court of Appeals found that respondents' 
allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in 
predatory pr icing ,-8- if proved ,-9- would be a per se 
violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. 723 F.2d, at 306. 
Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The 
issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents 
adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to 
survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the 
principles that govern the summary judgment determination. 
2. For the paragraph carrying over from page 11 to 
page 12, substitute the following: 
' 
It follows from these settled principles that if 
the factual context renders respondents' claim 
implausible--if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense--respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary. Ci ties Service is instructive. --------
The issue in that case was whether proof of the 
defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an 
illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that 
the defendant had no motive to join the alleged 
conspiracy. 391 u.s., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged 
that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal might 
well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id., at 
277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its 
factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational 
motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal 
to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent 
interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself support 
a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
3. For the first paragraph on page 13, substitute 
the following: 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully 
to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged 
conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and 
practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners 
contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged 
predatory pr icing conspiracy: indeed, they had a strong 
motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. 
Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any 
apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence 
of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that 
the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually 
existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature 
of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to 
its implementation. 
4. For part V (pages 19-21), substitute the 
following: 
As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners 
had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To 
the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, 
petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the 
conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect 
would be to generate losses for petitioners with no 
corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Service, supra, at 279. 
The Court of Appeals did not take account of the absence 
of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory 
pr icing conspiracy. It focused instead on whether there 
was "direct evidence of concert of action." 723 F.2d, at 
3 04. The Court of Appeals er red in two respects: ( i) the 
"direct evidence" on which the court relied had little, if 
any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing 
conspiracy: and (ii) the court failed to consider the 
absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory 
pricing. 
The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was 
evidence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing 
conspiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise 
prices in Japan provides little, if any, support for 
respondents' claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in 
one market does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain 
losses in another. Evidence that petitioners agreed to 
fix minimum prices (through the "check price" agreements) 
for the American market actually works in petitioners' 
favor, because it suggests that petitioners were seeking 
to place a floor under prices rather than to lower them. 
The same is true of evidence that petitioners agreed to 
'. 
limit the number of distributors of their products in the 
American market--the so-called "Five Company Rule." That 
practice may have facilitated a horizontal territorial 
allocation, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 
405 u. S. 596 ( 1972) , but its natural effect would be to 
raise market prices rather than reduce them.-20- Evidence 
that tends to support any of these collateral conspiracies 
thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market pr ices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible 
motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant 
to whether a "genuine issue for trial II exists within the 
meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range 
of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from 
ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational 
economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is 
consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the 
conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. 
See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, the conduct 
in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that 
succeeded in taking business away from respondents, and 
(ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' 
ability to compete with each other (and thus kept pr ices 
from going even lower). This conduct suggests either that 
petitioners behaved competitively, or that petitioners 
conspired to raise prices. Neither possibility is 
consistent with an agreement among 21 companies to pr ice 
below market levels. Moreover, the predatory pricing 
scheme that this conduct is said to prove is one that 
makes no practical sense: it calls for petitioners to 
destroy companies larger and better established than 
themselves, a goal that remains far distant more than two 
decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had they 
succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that they could recover the losses 
they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in 
light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, 
neither petitioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct 
in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting 
prices and distribution in the American market, suffice to 
create a "genuine issue for trial. 11 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
56(e).-21-
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to 
consider whether there is other evidence that is 
sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find 
that petitioners conspired to pr ice predator ily for two 
decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do 
so. The evidence must "tend[] to exclude the possibility" 
that petitioners underpr iced respondents to compete for 
business rather than to implement an economically 
senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 u.s., at In 
the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue 
for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
5. For notes 20 and 21, substitute the following: 
-20-The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the 
Five Company Rule might tend to insulate petitioners from 
competition with each other. 723 F.2d, at 306. But this 
effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price predatorily. 
Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if 
they already are pr icing below the level at which the_Y , 
could sell their goods. The far more plausible inference 
from a customer allocation agreement such as the Five 
Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise 
prices, by limiting their ability to take sales away from 
each other. Respondents--petitioners' competitors--suffer 
no harm from a conspiracy to raise pr ices. Supra, at 7. 
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five Company 
Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the 
"rule" permitted petitioners to sell to their American 
subsidiaries, and did not limit the number of distributors 
to which the subsidiaries could resell. Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F.Supp., 
at 1190. 
-21-We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a 
plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could 
suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our 
decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
establishes that conduct that is as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does 
not, without more, support even an inference of 
conspiracy. 465 u.s., at See supra, at 12. 
t, 
I, 
., ... .,,. ________ _ 
2. 
The respondents allege a Predatory pricing con-
spi.racy among 21 companies that exi.sted for two decades! 
For the reasons stated primarily in Section IV-A of my opin-
ion, and as recognized by every commentator, this tvpe of 
conspiracy even by a single company for a relatively brief 
period of time rarely exists, and is extremely difficult to 
prove. In a word, I think the DC was 100% right n dismiss-
ing this case on summary judgment, and would have b- en riqht 
even if it found all of the "additional evidence" admissi-
ble. 
* * * 
I am more conc~rned about this case than I usually 
am when an oninion I have worked on with great care is not 
accepted by four oth~r Juc:iti.ce1:1. I assume that it i.s un-
likely you wilJ join anvthi.ng Ryron may write. My Confer-
ence notes i.nc: icate that you agreed w~ th the ('l1:ief .Justice 
and me and di.sagreed with Byron. My qu~ss is that Byron 
will find t~ere fq pnnuah ~~4~enc~ to foreclose summary 
judgment for Petjtione,,:-~. Of r:ourr,t:?, mv opinion doe:; not 
rule out th~ posr;ibility of: CA3 finn'ng sufflc ent evi.dence 
on remand. r do not kr,ow w ether Byron w J.J talk about 
Mari.con.'il, RPii r.eiterat that t:he ;,,J l~qec' conspiracy is a E!il:_ 
~ violr\tfon. 
If you do not ioin Bvron or roe, ~e wi l have a 
fractured votP (4-4-1) in t~in m3jor antitrust case, an~ CA3 
on remand would have little or no guidance. I suopose, in 
such a sjtuation, we ~ou1d nrG t~ 0 case, but this would re-
flect adverselv on thP. rou r-t. La t tf'e rm, I was among those 
who voted to DIG, but at our Conference on November 15 I 
expressed the view that since we had failed to DIG n June, 
it would seem almost irrPsnonsible to :-1 0 ~o after full 
brief ng and oral arcmment. You stated explicitly at Con-
ference that you also would not DIG the case, ana would re-
verse an~ r~mand it. 
It is advantageous to all conc<:>rned if a complex 
antitrust conspir.acy case c.an be resolved fairly on summary 
judgment. Otherwise, a tr~al could last f.or a decade with 
inconclusive results and enormous expense. E.g., IBM and 
AT&T. Charlie Brown, Chairman of AT&T - a Virginian whom I 
have known for manv years - told me that after aome 12 years 
of enormously expensive and inconclusive litigation, AT&T 
decided the fight simply wasn't worth it - particularly i.n 
di.sruption and demands on the time of management. Moreover, 
the threat of lit'gation of n allPqed predatory conspiracy 
could well deter some legitimate price cutting. 
3. 
In sum, we need your vote, and if my suqgested 
changes are not satisfactory, I will certainly consider any 
further thoughts of vours. Sandra ana Thurgood have joined 
me, and the Chief has told me verballv that he intends to 






THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
;§u:prtutt <q:ourt ltf t4t ~~ ;§tldtg 
JJ'M4inghtn, J. (!J:. 2llffe~.;l 
February 10, 1986 




Copies to the Conference 
P.P.S. I may have a thought or two, but I'll defer until the ' 
dust settles. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt Oittltft ttf tlf t ~th j;tatts 
jjas4itt¼lbm. ~. or. 2llffe~$ / 
;, I 
February 11, 1986 ~ 
Re: No. 83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio 
Dear Lewis, 
I have reviewed the proposed changes in your present 
circulation suggested in your letter of February 10th, and 
they go a long way towards accommodating the concern about 
which I earlier wrote to you. I have no desire to fragment 
what is only a five Justice Court in the first place over 
differences which you have gone a long way to reconcile. 
Therefore, if you make the changes proposed in your letter 




.hpt-nttt QJ:ouri of tl{t ~tb i'tatts 
Jla•Jringhm. ~- ~- 2llffe~, 
CHAMl!IERS Of" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
February 12, 1986 
83-2004 Matsushita 
Dear Chief, Thurgood and Sandra: 
Bill Rehnquist, the "fifth vote" we need in this 
case, suggested that my summary judgment analysis could be 
clarified in several respects. When I reviewed my draft, I 
concluded that clarification would be appropriate. Accord-
ingly, I have made a number of changes for this purpose, 
particularly in Part V (pp. 19-22). 
I enclose my 3rd draft on which the changes have 
been marked. Although they involved a good deal of rewrit-
ing, the changes do not alter the substance of my reasoning. 
Indeed, many of the changes can be viewed as stylistic. 
I also have noted (see pp. 9-10) that petitioners 
do not question the view of CA3 that, if proved, the alleged 
conspiracy would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 
It therefore is unnecessary for us to say anything about 
that question. 
I will assume unless I hear to the contrary that 
the changes are agreeable to you, but will not recirculate 
until Friday. 





February 12, 1086 
83-2004 Matsushita 
Dear Chief., Thurgood and Sandra: 
Bill Pehnquist, the "fift1 vote" we need in this 
case, suggested that my sum.~ry judgment analysts could be 
clartfi.ed in several renpects. r11hen I reviewe,rl my draft, I 
conclu~ea that clarlfication woula be anor.opriat~. Accord-
ingly, I have made a num ~r of ~hanges for this purpose, 
parti.cularly in Part v (pp. 1.9-22). 
I enclose mv 3r ,Jraft OP which the changPs have 
been marke~. A .thoug~ they nvolv ~ a goor aeal of rewrit-
ing, the chanqe~ ~o ~ot ~lter the~ hstance of my reasoning. 
Indeed, many of t~e changes can he viewe~ ~R stylistic . 
I also have notea (see pp. 9-10) that petitioners 
do not qu~stion thP view of CA3 that, if proven, t~e alleged 
conspir""CY woulrl be a Pl?t" qp ,,in1r1tion of t11e Sherman Act. 
It th~ri?for~ is unn~c~ss.:tru f'or us t,., c,ay anything about 
that que~ti.on. 
I will assume unJ~sq T hPar to the contrarv that 
the changes are agreeable to you, but will not recirculate 
until Frtday. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~i-mtt ~Mttt 4tf ur~ ~nitt~ .i,mttg 
•aslp:ttgfott. !fl. ~. 2llp'!.;l 
February 18, 1986 
Re: No. 83-2004, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 
For now, I shall await further writings in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 







JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~nprttttt Qj:anrl af tlrt 1fuitth ~taftg 
~ufyi:n:gfon. ,. <!):. 2llffe~, 
February 18, 1986 
Re: 83-2004 - Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerel~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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lfp/ss 02/07/86 Rider A, p. 17 (Matsushita) 
MATl 7 SALLY-POW 
~fJ 
The courts below 4~ ~o evidence of any such success, 
I\ 
and - as indicated above - the facts actually are to the 
contrary: RCA and Zenith have continued to have the 
largest share of the American retail market. The findings 
before us do not reveal the extent of petitioners' 
Japanese profits or whether there is any relationship 
between such profits and what rationally could be expected 
in the way of profits from the alleged conspiracy here. 
ln the absence of any such proof by respondents, the 
~ 
possible existence of supra~ competitive profits in 
" Japan simply cannot overcome the economic obstacles to the 
ultimate success of this alleged predatory conspiracy.
18 
lfp/ss 02/07/86 Rider A, p. 5 (Matsushita) 
MAT5 SALLY-POW 
The inference that respondents seek to draw from this 
conduct defies economic reality: petitioners are said to 
have joined a decades-long conspiracy to drive from the 
American market all the leading manufacturers of 
television sets, and yet respondents have shown no basis 
for hope of recovering the losses such a plan would 
entail. The conduct cited by the CA arguably may be 
consistent with the alleged conspiracy (as it is 
: consistent with other, more plausible explanations), but 
~ 
it falls far short of direct evidence 0-i-the co~spiraGy in 
~ 
light of the strong disincentives to engage in the alleged 
predatory pricing conspiracy at issue here. 
2. 
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to 
consider whether there is other evidence that is 
~ 
sufficientlyl\mbiguous to permit a trier of fact to find 
that petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two 
decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do 
so. The evidence at least must "tend[] to exclude the 
possibility" that petitioners underpriced respondents for 
the rational purpose of competing for business, rather 
than to implement an unlawful and economically hazardous 
conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 u.s., at In the absence 
of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue for trial" ~ 
under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled to have 
summary judgment reinstated. 
lfp/ss 02/08/86 Rider A, p. 17 (Matsushita) 
MAT17 BILLS-POW 
The courts below found no evidence of any such success, 
and--as indicated above--the facts actually are to the 
contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the petitioners, 
continue to hold the largest share of the American retail 
market in color television sets. The record before us 
does not establish the pP~ f!l'e amount of petitioners' 
v,.. j~. 
profits. More important, there is nothing to 
A 
~+;o,.u.r~, 
relationship between e-Re ii ~ RT &.£ profits in 
Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to gain from 
a conspiracy to monopolize the American market. In the 
absence of any such evidence, the possible existence of 
supracompetitive profits in Japan simply cannot overcome 
2. 
' 
the economic obstacles to the ultimate success of this 
alleged predatory conspiracy. 18 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice 







From: Justice White 
r• P 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _ _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-2004 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ZENITH RADIO 
CORPORATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1986] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
It is indeed remarkable that the Court, in the face of the 
long and careful opinion of the Court of Appeals, reaches the 
result it does. The Court of Appeals faithfully followed the 
·relevant precedents, including First National Bank v. Cities 
Service Co., 391 U. S. 253 (1968), and Monsanto v. Spray-
Rite Corp., -- U. S. -- (1984), and it kept firmly in mind 
the principle that proof of a conspiracy should not be frag-
mented, see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 699 (1962). After surveying-the 
massive record, including very significant evidence that the 
District Court erroneously had excluded, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the evidence taken as a whole creates a 
genuine issue of fact whether petitioners engaged in a con-
spiracy in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and 
§ 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. In my view, the Court 
of Appeals' opinion more than adequately supports this 
judgment. 
The Court's opinion today, far from identifying reversible 
error, only muddies the waters. In the first place, the Court 
makes confusing and inconsistent statements about the ap-
propriate standard for granting summary judgment. Sec-
ond, the Court makes a number of assumptions that invade 
the factfinder's province. Third, the Court faults the Third 
83-2004-DISSENT 
2 MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 
Circuit for nonexistent errors and remands the case although 
it is plain that respondents' evidence raises genuine issues of 
material fact. 
I 
The Court's initial discussion of summary judgment stand-
ards appears consistent with settled doctrine. I agree that 
"[ w ]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'gen-
uine issue for trial."' Ante, at 11 (quoting Cities Service, 
supra, at 289). I also agree that "'[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion."' Ante, at 12 (quoting United States v. 
Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962)). But other lan-
guage in the Court's opinion suggests a departure from tradi-
tional summary judgment doctrine. Thus, the Court would 
require respondents to "show that the inference of conspiracy 
is as plausible as the inference of permissible independent 
conduct." Id., at 12 (citing Cities Service, supra, at 280). 
The Court also reads Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp., --
U. S. -- (1984), as holding that "courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible .... " Ante, at 18. This language suggests that a 
judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in 
an antitrust case should decide for himself whether the 
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. This is not a cor-
rect reading of Cities Service and Monsanto. Each of those 
cases simply held that a particular piece of evidence standing 
alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending a case to 
the jury. 1 These holdings in no way undermine the doctrine 
1 The Court adequately summarizes the quite fact-specific holding in Cit-
ies Service. Ante, at 11-12. 
In Monsanto, the Court held that a manufacturer's termination of a 
price-cutting distributor after receiving a complaint from another distribu-
tor is not, standing alone, sufficient to create a jury question. - U. S., 
at -. To understand this holding, it is important to realize that under 
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that all evidence must be construed in the light most favor-
able to the party opposing summary judgment. 
If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion 
for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of deter-
mining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy 
more probable than not, it is overturning settled law. If the 
Court does not intend such a pronouncement, it should re-
frain from using unnecessarily broad and confusing language. 
II 
In defining what respondents must show in order to re-
cover, the Court makes assumptions that invade the 
factfinder's province. The Court states with very little dis-
cussion that respondents can recover under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act only if they prove that "petitioners conspired to 
drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing 
below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing 
below some appropriate measure of cost." Ante, at 9, n. 8. 
This statement is premised on the assumption that "[a]n 
agreement without these foatures would either leave re-
United States v. Colgate & Co ., 250 U. S. 300 (1919), it is permissible for a 
manufacturer to announce retail prices in advance and terminate those who 
fail to comply, but that under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & 
Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911), it is impermissible for the manufacturer 
and its distributors to agree on the price at which the distributors will sell 
the goods. Thus, a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting distribu-
tor after receiving a complaint from another distributor is lawful under 
Colgate, unless the termination is pursuant to a shared understanding be-
tween the manufacturer and its distributors respecting enforcement of a 
resale price maintenance scheme. Monsanto holds that to establish liabil-
ity under Dr. Miles, more is needed than evidence of behavior that is con-
sistent with a distributor's exercise of its prerogatives under Colgate. 
Thus, "[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that 
the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independ-
ently." -- U. S., at --. Monsanto does not hold that if a terminated 
dealer produces some further evidence of conspiracy beyond the bare fact 
of post-complaint termination, the judge hearing a motion for summary 
judgment should balance all the evidence pointing toward conspiracy 
against all the evidence pointing toward independent action. 
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spondents in the same position as would market forces or 
would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices." 
Ibid. In making this assumption, the Court ignores the con-
trary conclusions of respondents' expert DePodwin, whose 
report in very relevant part was erroneously excluded by the 
District Court. 
The DePodwin Report, on which the Court of Appeals re-
lied along with other material, indicates that respondents 
were harmed in two ways that are independent of whether 
petitioners priced their products below "the level necessary 
to sell their products or . . . some appropriate measure of 
cost." Ibid. First, the Report explains that the price-
raising scheme in J apan,A-esulted in lower consumption of pe-
titioners' goods in that country and the exporting of more of 
petitioners' goods to this country than would have occurred 
had prices in Japan been at the competitive level. Increas-
ing exports to this country resulted in depressed prices here, 
which harmed respondents. 2 Second, the DePodwin Report 
indicates that petitioners exchanged confidential proprietary 
information and entered into agreements such as the five-
company rule with the goal of avoiding intra-group compe-
2 The Court dismisses the effect of the cartelization of the Japanese mar-
ket on respondents as follows: 
"The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. . . . The effect on 
which respondents rely is the depressed price for CEPs in the United 
States. Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japanese market could 
not, by itself, have caused that effect. Respondents' theory of recovery 
thus depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting conspiracy in this coun-
try." Ante, at 7, n. 6. 
In light of the quite different conclusions of Dr. DePodwin, see App. Vol 
5, at 1629-1630, there is a disputed factual issue regarding the depressive 
effect of Japanese cartelization on prices in this country. This issue is not 
reducible to the question of whether petitioners sold below cost or the 
"level necessary to sell their products." As to the Court's attempt to ana-
lyze the effect of the alleged Japanese cartelization "by itself," that is pre-
cisely the kind of fragmentation of evidence against which Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 699 (1962), warns. 
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tition in the United States market. The Report explains 
that petitioners' restrictions on intra-group competition 
caused respondents to lose business that they would not have 
lost had petitioners competed with one another. 3 
The DePodwin Report alone creates a genuine factual issue 
regarding the harm to respondents caused by Japanese 
cartelization and by agreements restricting competition 
among petitioners in this country. No doubt the Court pre-
3 The DePodwin Report has this, among other things, to say in sum-
marizing the harm to respondents caused by the five-company rule, ex-
change of production data, price coordination, and other allegedly anti-
competitive practices of petitioners: 
"The impact of Japanese anti-competitive practices on United States 
manufacturers is evident when one considers the nature of competition. 
When a market is fully competitive, firms pit their resources against one 
another in an attempt to secure the business of individual customers. 
However, when firms collude, they violate a basic tenet of competitive be-
havior, i. e., that they act independently. United States firms were con-
fronted with Japanese competitors who collusively were seeking to destroy 
their established customer relationships. Each Japanese company had 
targeted customers which it could service with reasonable assurance that 
its fellow Japanese cartel members could not become involved. But just 
as importantly, each Japanese firm would be assured that what was al-
ready a low price level for Japanese television receivers in the United 
States market would not be further depressed by the actions of its J apa-
nese associates. 
"The result was a phenomenal growth in exports, particularly to the 
United States. Concurrently, Japanese manufacturers, and the defend-
ants in particular, made large investments in new plant and equipment and 
expanded production capacity. It is obvious, therefore, that the effect of 
the Japanese cartel's concerted actions was to generate a larger volume of 
investment in the Japanese television industry than would otherwise have 
been the case. This added capacity both enabled and encouraged the J ap-
anese television industry to penetrate the United States market more 
deeply than they would have had they competed lawfully." App. Vol 5 at 
1628-1629. 
For a more complete statement of DePodwin's explanation of how the 
alleged cartel operated, and the harms it caused respondents, see App. 
Vol. 5, at 1609-1642. This material is summarized in a chart found at App. 
Vol 5, at 1633. 
83-2004-DISSENT 
6 MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 
fers its own economic theorizing to Dr. DePodwin's, but that 
is not a reason to deny the factfinder an opportunity to con-
sider Dr. DePodwin's views on how petitioners' alleged collu-
sion harmed respondents. 4 
The Court, in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory 
conspiracy, also consistently assumes that petitioners valued 
profit-maximization over growth. See ante at 19-20. In 
light of the evidence that petitioners sold their go9ds in this 
country at substantial losses over a long period of time, see 
Part III(B), infra, I believe that this is an assumption that 
should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court. 
III 
In reversing the Third Circuit's judgment, the Court iden-
tifies two alleged errors: "(i) [T]he 'direct evidence on which 
the [Court of Appeals] relied had little, if any, relevance to 
the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, and (ii) the court 
failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage 
in predatory pricing." Ante, at 20. The Court's position is 
without substance. 
• In holding that Parts IV and V of the Report had been improperly ex-
cluded, the Court of Appeals said: 
"The trial court found that DePodwin did not use economic expertise in 
reaching the opinion that the defendants participated in a Japanese televi-
sion cartel. 505 F. Supp. at 1342-46. We have examined the excluded 
portions of Parts IV and V in light of the admitted portions, and we con-
clude that this finding is clearly erroneous. As a result, the court also held 
the opinions to be unhelpful to the factfinder. What the court in effect did 
was to eliminate all parts of the report in which the expert economist, after 
describing the conditions in the respective markets, the opportunities for 
collusion, the evidence pointing to collusion, the terms of certain undis-
puted agreements, and the market behavior, expressed the opinion that 
there was concert of action consistent with plaintiffs' conspiracy theory. 
Considering the complexity of the economic issues involved, it simply can-
not be said that such an opinion would not help the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or determine that face in issue." 723 F. 2d, at 280. 
The Court of Appeals had similar views about Parts VI and VII. 
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A 
The first claim of error is that the Third Circuit treated ev-
idence regarding price-fixing in Japan and the so-called five-
company rule and check prices as "'direct evidence' of a con-
spiracy that injured respondents." Ante, at 8 (citing 723 F. 
2d, at 304-305). The passage from the Third Circuit's opin-
ion in which the Court locates this alleged error makes what I 
consider to be a quite simple and correct observation, 
namely, that this case is distinguishable from traditional 
"conscious parallelism" cases, in that there is direct evidence 
of concert of action among petitioners. 723 F. 2d 238, 
304-305 (CA3 1983). The Third Circuit did not, as the Court 
implies, jump unthinkingly from this observation to the con-
clusion that evidence regarding the five-company rule could 
support a finding of antitrust injury to respondents. 5 The 
Third Circuit twice specifically noted that horizontal agree-
ments allocating customers, though illegal, do not ordinarily 
injure competitors of the agreeing parties. Id., at 306, 
310-311. However, after reviewing evidence of cartel activ-
ity in Japan, collusive establishment of dumping prices in this 
country, and long-term, below-cost sales, the Third Circuit 
held that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the five-
company rule was not a simple price-raising device: 
"[A] factfinder might reasonably infer that the allocation 
of customers in the United States, combined with price-
fixing in Japan, was intended to permit concentration of 
the effects of dumping upon American competitors while 
eliminating competition among the Japanese manufac-
turers in either market." Id., at 311. 
6 I use the Third Circuit's analysis of the five-company rule by way of 
example; the court did an equally careful analysis of the parts the cartel 
activity in Japan and the check prices could have played in an actionable 
conspiracy. See generally 723 F. 2d, at 303-311. 
In discussing the five-company rule, I do not mean to imply any conclu-
sion on the validity of petitioner's sovereign compulsion defense. Since 
the Court does not reach this issue, I see no need of my addressing it. 
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I see nothing erroneous in this reasoning. 
B 
The Court's second charge of error is that the Third Circuit 
was not sufficiently sceptical of respondents' ;illegation that 
petitioners engaged in predatory pricing conspiracy. But 
the Third Circuit is not required to engage in academic dis-
cussions about predation; it is required to decide whether re-
spondents' evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Third Circuit did its job, and remanding the case so that 
it can do the same job again is simply pointless. 
The Third Circuit indicated that it considers respondents' 
evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual issue regarding 
long-term, below-cost sales by petitioners. 723 F. 2d, at 
311. The Court tries to whittle away at this conclusion by 
suggesting that the "expert evidence of below-cost pricing 
has little probative value in comparison with the economic 
factors . . . that suggest that such conduct is irrational." 
Ante, at 18, n. 19. But the question is not whether the 
Court finds respondents' experts persuasive, or prefers the 
District Court's analysis; it is whether, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to respondents, a jury or other 
factfinder could reasonbly conclude that petitioners engaged 
in long-term below-cost sales. I agree with the Third Cir-
cuit that the answer to this question is yes. 
It is misleading for the Court to state that the Court of Ap-
peals "did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the fac-
tors that substantially undermine the probative value of [evi-
dence in the DePodwin Report respecting below-cost sales]." 
Ibid. The Third Circuit held that the exclusion of the por-
tion of the DePodwin Report regarding below-cost pricing 
was erroneous because "the trial court ignored DePodwin's 
uncontradicted affidavit that all data relied on were of the 
type on which experts in his field would reasonably rely." 
723 F. 2d, at 282. In short, the Third Circuit found 
DePodwin's affidavit sufficient to create a genuine factual 
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issue on the correctness of his conclusion that petitioners sold 
below cost over a long period of time. Having made this 
determination, the court saw no need-nor do I-to address 
the District Court's analysis point by point. The District 
Court's criticisms of DePodwin's methods are arguments that 
a factfinder should consider. 
IV 
Because I believe that the Third Circuit was correct in 
holding that respondents have demonstrated the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact, I would affirm the judgment 
below and remand this case for trial. 
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much damage. The 
dissent boils down to two economic propositions, neither 
of which is correct: ( i) the alleged car tel in Japan had 
the effect of depressing pr ices in the American market, 
and (ii) the Five Company rule had the effect of 
increasing the volume of sales by Japanese companies in' 
the American market. The second point is adequately 
answered by note 20, at pages 20-21. I therefore don't 
propose any changes on that account. On the first point, 
I suggest altering note 6, page 7 to read: 
The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our 
borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on 
2. 
American commerce. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & 
carbon Corp., 370 u.s. 690, 704 (1962) ("A conspiracy to 
monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of 
the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman 
Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs 
in foreign countries"). The effect on which respondents 
rely is the artificially depressed level of pr ices for 
CEPs in the United States. 
Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japanese 
market could not have caused that effect over a period of 
some two decades. Once petitioners decided, as 
respondents allege, to reduce output and raise prices in 
the Japanese market, they had the option of either 
producing fewer goods or selling more goods in other 
markets. B:r k-a.£ Tte most plausible conclusion is that 
petitioners chose the latter option because it would be 
more profitable than the former. 1'hat choice does not 
flow from the cartelization of the Japanese market. en 
the contrary, were the Japanese market perfectly 
competitive petitioners would still have to choose whether 
to sell goods overseas, and would still presumably make 
that choice based on their profit expectations. For this 
3. 
reason, respondents' theory of recovery depends on proof 
of the asserted price-cutting conspiracy in this country. 
l suggest only one other change in response to the 
dissent. The dissent criticizes the last sentence of the 
first full paragraph on page 12; l propose changing that 
sentence to read: 
"Respondents in this case, in other words, must show that 
the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the 
competing inferences of independent action or collusive 
action that could not have harmed respondents." 
ln addition to these changes, l have two suggested 
changes based on my own rereading of the opinion. 
1. On page 2, for the first sentence of part A, l'd 
like to substitute the following two sentences: 
that 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 corporations 
manufacture ':J:n€J> sell "consumer electronic 
products" ("CEPs")--fo.r the most part, television sets. 
,• .... , •• 'J. 
4. 
Petitioners include both Japanese manufacturers of CEPs 
and that sell the Japanese-manufactured 
products. 
'!his change is designed to correct a technical error in 
the 
mostly 
Petrs are not all corporations organized 
of Japan; they include trading companies, 
by Japanese parents, that sell the 
Japanese products in this market. 
2. On page 18, I'd like to delete the last full 
sentence on the page, which reads, "'!'he record before us 
does not establish the amount of petitioners' profits in 
Japan." l think that's correct, but given the size of the 
record l can't be absolutely certain. The sentence is 
unnecessary to the substantive point made by the 
paragraph, and earlier in the opinion you have shown that 
the size of Japanese profits is basically irrelevant to 
the conspiracy alleged here. See note 6 (page 7). ln the 
interest of caution, therefore, I'd like to omit the 
sentence. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-2004 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ZENITH RADIO 
CORPORATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1986) 
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN' and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. 
It is indeed remarkable that the Court, in the face of the 
long and careful opinion of the Court of Appeals, reaches the 
result it does. The Court of Appeals faithfully followed the 
relevant precedents, including First National Bank of Ari-
zona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253 (1968), and 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752 
(1984), and it kept firmly in mind the principle that proof of a 
conspiracy should not be fragmented, see Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 699 
(1962). After surveying the massive record, including very 
significant evidence that the District Court erroneously had 
excluded, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence 
taken as a whole creates a genuine issue of fact whether peti-
tioners engaged in a conspiracy in violation of§§ 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act, and § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
In my view, the Court of Appeals' opinion more than ade-
quately supports this judgment. 
The Court's opinion today, far from identifying reversible 
error, only muddies the waters. In the first place , the Court 
makes confusing and inconsistent statements about the ap-
propriate standard for granting summary judgment. Sec-
ond, the Court makes a number of assumptions that invade 
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the factfinder's province. Third, the Court faults the Third 
Circuit for nonexistent errors and remands the case although 
it is plain that respondents' evidence raises genuine issues of 
material fact. · 
I 
The Court's initial discussion of summary judgment stand-
ards appears consistent with settled doctrine. I agree that 
"[ w ]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'gen-
uine issue for trial."' Ante, at 11 (quoting Cities Service, 
supra, at 289). I also agree that "'[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion."' Ante, at 12 (quoting United States v. 
Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962)). But other lan-
guage in the Court's opinion suggests a departure from tradi-
tional summary judgment doctrine. Thus, the Court gives 
the following critique of the Third Circuit's opinion: 
"[T]he Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable 
factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the 
American market in order to drive out American com-
petitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits 
obtained in the Japanese market. The court apparently 
did not consider whether it was as plausible to conclude 
that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent 
and not conspiratorial." Ante, at 6. 
In a similar vein, the Court summarizes Monsanto v. Spray-
Rite Corp., supra, as holding that "courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible .... " Ante, at 18. Such language suggests that 
a judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment 
in an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional sum-
mary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the 
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. Cities Service 
and Monsanto do not stand for any such proposition. Each 
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of those cases simply held that a particular piece of evidence 
standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending 
a case to the jury. 1 These holdings in no way undermine the 
doctrine that all evidence must be construed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion 
for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of deter-
mining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy 
more probable than not, it is overturning settled law. If the 
Court does not intend such a pronouncement, it should re-
frain from using unnecessarily broad and confusing language. 
r 
II 
In defining what respondents must show in order to ·re.:=-
cover, the Court makes assumptions that invade the 
1 The Court adequately summarizes the quite fact-specific holding in Cit-
ies Service. Ante, at 11-12. 
In Monsanto, the Court held that a manufacturer's termination of a 
price-cutting distributor after receiving a complaint from another distribu-
tor is not, standing alone, sufficient to create a jury question. 465 U. S., 
at 763-764. To understand this holding, it is important to realize that 
under United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919), it is permissi-
ble for a manufacturer to announce retail prices in advance and terminate 
those who fail to comply, but that under Dr. Miles Medical Co. Y. John D. 
Park & Sons Co ., 220 U. S. 373 (1911), it is impermissible for the manufac-
turer and its distributors to agree on the price at which the distributors 
will sell the goods. Thus, a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting 
distributor after receiving a complaint from another distributor is lawful 
under Colgate, unless the termination is pursuant to a shared understand-
ing between the manufacturer and its distributors respecting enforcement 
of a resale price maintenance scheme. Monsanto holds that to establish 
liability under Dr. Miles, more is needed than evidence of behavior that is 
consistent with a distributor's exercise of its prerogatives under Colgate. 
Thus, "[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that 
the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independ-
ently." 465 U. S., at 764. Monsanto does not hold that if a terminated 
dealer produces some further evidence of conspiracy beyond the bare fact 
of post-complaint termination, the judge hearing a motion for summary 
judgment should balance all the evidence pointing toward conspiracy 
against all the evidence pointing toward independent action. 
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factfinder's province. The Court states with very little dis-
cussion that respondents can recover under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act only if they prove that "petitioners conspired to 
drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing 
below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing 
below some appropriate measure of cost." Ante, at 9, n. 8. 
This statement is premised on the assumption that "[a]n 
agreement without these features would either leave re-
spondents in the same position as would market forces or 
would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices." 
Ibid. In making this assumption, the Court ignores the con-
trary conclusions of respondents' expert DePodwin, whose 
report in very relevant part was erroneously excluded by the 
District Court. ·. 
The DePodwin Report, on which the Court of Appeals re-
lied along with other material, indicates that respondents 
were harmed in two ways that are independent of whether 
petitioners priced their products below "the level necessary 
to sell their products or . . . some appropriate measure of 
cost." Ibid. First, the Report explains that the price-rais-
ing scheme in Japan resulted in lower consumption of peti-
tioners' goods in that country and the exporting of more of 
petitioners' goods to this country than would have occurred 
had prices in Japan been at the competitive level. Increas-
ing exports to this country resulted in depressed prices here, 
which harmed respondents. 2 Second, the DePodwin Report 
2 Dr. DePodwin summarizes his view of the harm caused by Japanese 
cartelization as follows: 
"When we consider the injuries inflicted on United States producers, we 
must again look at the Japanese television manufacturers' export agree-
ment as part of a generally collusive scheme embracing the Japanese do-
mestic market as well. This scheme increased the supply of television re-
ceivers to the United States market while restricting supply in the 
Japanese market. If the Japanese manufacturers had competed in both 
domestic and export markets, they would have sold more in the domestic 
market and less in the United States. A greater proportion of Japanese 
production capacity would have been devoted to domestic sales. Domestic 
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indicates that petitioners exchanged confidential proprietary 
information and entered into agreements such as the five-
company rule with the goal of avoiding intragroup compe-
tition in the United States market. The Report explains 
that petitioners' restrictions on intragroup competition 
caused respondents to lose business that they would not have 
lost had petitioners competed with one another. 3 
prices would have been lower and export prices would have been higher. 
The size of price differential between domestic and export markets would 
have dimin1shed practically to the vanishing point. Consequently, compe-
tition among Japanese producers in both markets would have resulted in 
reducing exports to the United States and United States prices would have 
risen. In addition, investment by ~ would have in-
creased. As it was, however, the influx of sets at depressea prices cut the 
rates of return on television receiver production facilities in the United 
States to so low a level as to make such investment uneconomic. 
"We can therefore conclude that the American manufacturers of televi-
sion receivers would have made larger sales at higher prices in the absence 
of the Japanese cartel agreements. Thus, the collusive behavior of Japa-
nese television manufacturers resulted in a very severe injury to those 
American television manufacturers, particularly to National Union Elec-
tric Corporation. which produced a preponderance of television sets with 
screen sizes of nineteen inches and lower, especially those in the lower 
range of prices." 5 App. to Brief for Appellants in No. 81-2331 (CA3), 
pp. 1629a-1630a. 
3 The DePod\\in Report has this, among other things, to say in sum-
marizing the harm to respondents caused by the five-company rule, ex-
change of production data, price coordination, and other allegedly anti-
competitiYe practices of petitioners: 
"The impact of Japanese anti-competitive practices on United States 
manufacturers is evident when one considers the nature of competition. 
When a market is fully competitive, firms pit their resources against one 
another in an attempt to secure the business of individual customers. 
However, when firms collude, they violate a basic tenet of competitive be-
havior, i.e., that they act independently. United States firms were con-
fronted with Japanese competitors who collusively were seeking to destroy 
their established customer relationships. Each Japanese company had 
targeted customers which it could service with reasonable assurance that 
its fellow Japanese cartel members would not become involved. But just 
as importantly, each Japanese firm would be assured that what was al-
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The DePodwin Report alone creates a genuine factual issue 
regarding the harm to respondents caused by Japanese 
cartelization and by agreements restricting competition 
among petitioners in this country. No doubt the Court pre-
fers its own economic theorizing to Dr. DePodwin's, but that 
is not a reason to deny the factfinder an opportunity to con-
sider Dr. DePodwin's views on how petitioners' alleged collu-
sion harmed respondents. 4 
The Court, in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory 
conspiracy, also consistently assumes that petitioners valued 
States market would not be further depressed by the actions of its Japa-
nese associates. 
"The result was a phenomenal growth in exports, particularly to the 
United States. Concurrently, Japanese manufacturers, and the defend-
ants in particular, made large investments in new plant and equipment and 
expanded production capacity. It is obvious, therefore , that the effect of 
the Japanese cartel's concerted actions was to generate a larger volume of 
investment in the Japanese television industry than would otherwise have 
been the case. This added capacity both enabled and encouraged the J ap-
anese to penetrate the United States market more deeply than they would 
have had they competed lawfully." 5 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 
81-2331 (CA3) , pp. 1628a- 1629a. 
For a more complete statement of DePodwin's explanation of how the 
alleged cartel operated, and the harms it caused respondents, see 5 id., at 
1609a-1642a. This material is summarized in a chart found at 5 id., at 
1633a. 
' In holding that Parts IV and V of the Report had been improperly ex-
cluded, the Court of Appeals said : 
"The trial court found that DePodwin did not use economic expertise in 
reaching the opinion that the defendants participated in a Japanese televi-
sion cartel. 505 F. Supp. at 1342-46. We have examined the excluded 
portions of Parts IV and V in light of the admitted portions, and we con-
clude that this finding is clearly erroneous. As a result, the court also held 
the opinions to be unhelpful to the factfinder. What the court in effect did 
was to eliminate all parts of the report in which the expert economist, after 
describing the conditions in the respective markets, the opportunities for 
collusion, the evidence pointing to collusion, the terms of certain undis-
puted agreements , and the market behavior, expressed the opinion that 
there was concert of action consistent with plaintiffs' conspiracy theory. 
Considering the complexity of the economic issues involved, it simply can-
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profit-maximization over growth. See, e.g., ante at 20. In 
light of the evidence that petitioners sold their goods in this 
country at substantial losses over a long period of time, see 
Part III-B, infra, I believe that this is an assumption that 
should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court. 
III 
In reversing the Third Circuit's judgment, the Court iden-
tifies two alleged errors: "(i) [T]he 'direct evidence on which 
the [Court of Appeals] relied had little, if any, relevance to 
the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, and (ii) the court 
failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage 
in predatory pricing." Ante, at 20. The Court's position is 
without substance. 
A 
The first claim of error is that the Third Circuit treated ev-
idence regarding price-fixing in Japan and the so-called five-
company rule and check prices as "'direct evidence' of a con-
spiracy that injured respondents." Ante, at 8 (citing In re 
Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 
2d 238, 304-305 (1983)). The passage from the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in which the Court locates this alleged error 
makes what I consider to be a quite simple and correct ob-
servation, namely, that this case is distinguishable from tra-
ditional "conscious parallelism" cases, in that there is direct 
evidence of concert of action among petitioners. Id., at 
304-305. The Third Circuit did not, as the Court implies, 
jump unthinkingly from this observation to the conclusion 
that evidence regarding the five-company rule could support 
not be said that such an opinion would not help the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or determine that fact in issue." In re Japanese Elec-
tronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 2d 238, 280 (1983). 
The Court of Appeals had similar views about Parts VI and VII. 
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a finding of antitrust injury to respondents. 5 The Third Cir-
cuit twice specifically noted that horizontal agreements allo-
cating customers, though illegal, do not ordinarily injure 
competitors of the agreeing parties. Id., at 306, 310-311. 
However, after reviewing evidence of cartel activity in 
Japan, collusive establishment of dumping prices in this coun-
try, and long-term, below-cost sales, the Third Circuit held 
that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the five-com-
pany rule was not a simple price-raising device: 
"[A] factfinder might reasonably infer that the allocation 
of customers in the United States, combined with price-
fixing in Japan, was intended to permit concentration of 
the effects of dumping upon American competitors while 
eliminating competition among the Japanese manufac-
turers in either market." Id., at 311. 
I see nothing erroneous in this reasoning. 
B 
The Court's second charge of error is that the Third Circuit 
was not sufficiently skeptical of respondents' allegation that 
petitioners engaged in predatory pricing conspiracy. But 
the Third Circuit is not required to engage in academic dis-
cussions about predation; it is required to decide whether re-
spondents' evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Third Circuit did its job, and remanding the case so that 
it can do the same job again is simply pointless. 
The Third Circuit indicated that it considers respondents' 
evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual issue regarding 
long-term, below-cost sales by petitioners. Ibid. The 
6 I use the Third Circuit's analysis of the five-company rule by way of 
example; the court did an equally careful analysis of the parts the cartel 
activity in Japan and the check prices could have played in an actionable 
conspiracy. See generally id., at 303-311. 
In discussing the five-company rule, I do not mean to imply any conclu-
sion on the validity of petitioner's sovereign compulsion defense. Since 
the Court does not reach this issue, I see no need of my addressing it. 
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Court tries to whittle away at this conclusion by suggesting 
that the "expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has 
little probative value in comparison with the economic factors 
... that suggest that such conduct is irrational." Ante, at 
19, n. 19. But the question is not whether the Court finds 
respondents' experts persuasive, or prefers the District 
Court's analysis; it is whether, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to respondents, a jury or other 
factfinder could reasonably conclude that petitioners engaged 
in long-term below-cost sales. I agree with the Third Cir-
cuit that the answer to this question is yes. 
It is misleading for the Court to state that the Court of Ap-
peals "did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the fac"=-
tors that substantially undermine the probative value of [evi-
dence in the DePodwin Report respecting below-cost sales]." 
Ibid. The Third Circuit held that the exclusion of the por-
tion of the DePodwin Report regarding below-cost pricing 
was erroneous because "the trial court ignored DePodwin's 
uncontradicted affidavit that all data relied on in his report 
were of the type on which experts in his field would reason-
ably rely." 723 F. 2d, at 282. In short, the Third Circuit 
found DePodwin's affidavit sufficient to create a genuine fac-
tual issue regarding the correctness of his conclusion that pe-
titioners sold below cost over a long period of time. Having 
made this determination, the court saw no need-nor do I-
to address the District Court's analysis point by point. The 
District Court's criticisms of DePodwin's methods are argu-
ments that a factfinder should consider. 
IV 
Because I believe that the Third Circuit was correct in 
holding that respondents have demonstrated the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact, I would affirm the judgment 
below and remand this case for trial. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than 
three times as long. 723 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1983); 513 F. Supp. 
1100 (ED Pa. 1981). Two respected District Judges each 
have authored a number of opinions in this case; the pub-
lished ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal 
Supplement. In addition, the parties have filed a forty-vol-
ume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the essence 
of the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals based their respective decisions. 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated 
and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that com-
prise the record on appeal. Since we review only the stand-
ard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and 
not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we 
find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What 
follows is a summary of this case's long history. 
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A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 corporations that 
manufacture or sell "consumer electronic products" (CEPs)-
for the most part, television sets. Petitioners include both 
Japanese manufacturers of CEPs and American firms, con-
trolled by Japanese parents, that sell the Japanese-manufac-
tured products. Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith 
Radio Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Cor-
poration (NUE). Zenith is an American firm that manufac-
tures and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate succes-
sor to Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that 
manufactured and sold television sets until 1970, when it 
withdrew from the market after sustaining substantial 
losses. Zenith and NUE began this lawsuit in 197 4, 1 claim-
ing that petitioners had illegally conspired to drive American 
firms from the American CEP market. According to re-
spondents, the gist of this conspiracy was a "'scheme to 
raise, fix and maintain artificially high prices for television 
receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same time, 
to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers ex-
ported to and sold in the United States."' 723 F. 2d, at 251 
(quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memorandum). 
These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that produced 
substantial losses for petitioners. 513 F. Supp., at 1125. 
The conspiracy allegedly began as early as 1953, and accord-
ing to respondents was in full operation by sometime in the 
late 1960's. Respondents claimed that various portions of 
this scheme violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, § 2(a) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, and 
the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
1 NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 
1974, in the Eastern District of PennsylYania. The two cases were con-
solidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. 
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The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded 
to trial. After these statements were filed, the District 
Court entertained motions challenging the admissibility of 
the evidence contained in them. In three detailed opinions, 
the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. At bottom, the court found, respondents' claims 
rested on the inferences that could be drawn from petition-
ers' parallel conduct in the Japanese and American markets, 
and from the effects of that conduct on petitioners' American 
competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 1125-1127. After reviewing 
the evidence both by category and in toto, the court found 
that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, because 
(i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners 
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the 
evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting con-
spiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that peti-
tioners were cutting prices to compete in the American mar-
ket and not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore 
was granted on respondents' claims under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 
claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to 
monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally in-
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric lndusfrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. , 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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distinguishable from the § 1 claims, the court dismissed them 
also. Finally, the court found that the Robinson-Patman Act 
claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as the 
Sherman Act claims. Since the court had found no genuine 
issue of fact as to the conspiracy, it entered judgment in peti-
tioners' favor on those claims as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. 723 F. 
2d, at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. 
See 471 U. S. -- (1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the 
court found that the District Court's summary judgment de-
c1s10n was improper. The court acknowledged that "there 
are legal limitations upon the inferences which may be drawn 
from circumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found 
that "the legal problem ... is different" when "there is direct 
evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court con-
3 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 
1916. Z enith Radio Corp . v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the 
Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning respondents ' other claims. In re Japanese Electron ic 
Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See this Court's Rule 21.l(a). We therefore 
decline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
• As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
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eluded, "there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of con-
cert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tend-
ency to suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have 
occurred." Id., at 304-305. Thus, the court reasoned, 
cases concerning the limitations on inf erring conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. 
Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a 
factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc-
ers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because the Japanese government 
imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order 
to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs ex-
ported to the American market. Id., at 310. The par-
ties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
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United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer to avoid various customs regulations as well as ac-
tion under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
Based on inferences from the foregoing conclusions, 5 the 
Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could 
find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese mar-
ket. The court apparently did not consider whether it was 
as plausible to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behav-
ior was independent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to _. address petitioners, 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con-
cluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign 
compulsion, because the check price agreements were being 
used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy" and not as 
an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The 
court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact 
were mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstand-
ing a statement to that effect by MITI itself. / d., at 315. 
We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the 
District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held lia-
ble under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part com-
6 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert 
opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices 
which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales." 723 
F. 2d, at 311. The court did not identify any direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing; nor did it place particularly heavy reliance ,;m this aspect of the ex-
pert eYidence. See n. 19, infra. 
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pelled by a foreign sovereign. 471 U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely 
on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive con-
ditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Alumi-
num Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416,443 (CA21945) (L. 
Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~ 236d 
(1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for any con-
spiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive 
prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed 
violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940), but it could not injure re-
spondents: as petitioners' competitors, respondents stand to 
gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price in CEPs. 
'The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. 
Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japanese market could not ha,·e 
caused that effect over a period of some two decades. Once petitioners 
decided, as respondents allege, to reduce output and raise prices in the 
Japanese market, they had the option of either producing fewer goods or 
selling more goods in other markets. The most plausible conclusion is that 
petitioners chose the latter option because it would be more profitable than 
the former. That choice does not flow from the cartelization of the Japa-
nese market. On the contrary, were the Japanese market perfectly com-
petitive petitioner, would still have to choose whether to sell goods over-
seas, and would still presumably make that choice based on their profit 
expectations. For thi!- reason, respondents' theory of recovery depends 
on proof of the asserted price-cutting conspiracy in this country. 
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Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 
477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respond-
ents cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose nonprice re-
straints that have the effect of either raising market price or 
limiting output. Such restrictions, though harmful to com-
petition, actually benefit competitors by making 
supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, neither pe-
titioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the 
five-company rule that limited distribution in this country, 
nor the check prices insofar as they established minimum 
prices in this country, can by themselves give respondents a 
cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. 
The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it 
found evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be "direct evi-
dence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 723 F. 
2d, at 304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy 
that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market by means of pricing below the market level. j The 
thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their 
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a con-
; Respondents also argue that the check prices , the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours 
of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one conspiracy or several-
respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for 
which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors 
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp . v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 
(1977); supra; see also Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the 
Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J . 1309 (1984). That showing depends in turn 
on proof that petitioners conspired to price predatorily in the American 
market , since the other conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot 
have caused such an injury. 
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certed campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive re-
spondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of 
business. Once successful, according to respondents, peti-
tioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair compe-
tition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
The Court of Appeals found that respondents' allegation of 
a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, 8 if 
proved,9 would be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to 
price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten-
tial entrants from coming in. E.g., Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. ,,. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 238 U. S. App. D.C. 309, 
331-336, 740 F. 2d 980, 1002-1007 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. -
(1985). In such cases, "predatory pricing" means pricing below some ap-
propriate measure of cost. E.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983); see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental 
Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 698, 701, 702, n. 14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is releYant in such cases. We need not resolve this de-
bate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act § 1 
case. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note that respondents have 
not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners conspired to driw re-
spondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level neces-
sary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure 
of cost. An agreement without these features would either leave respond-
ents in the same position as would market forces or would actually benefit 
respondents by raising market prices. Respondents therefore may not 
complain of conspiracies that, for example, set maximum prices above mar-
ket levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. 
9 We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Han 
L. Rev. 697, 709-718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in§ 2 cases). 
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Act. 723 F. 2d, at 306. Petitioners did not appeal from that 
conclusion. The issue in this case thus becomes whether re-
spondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their the-
ory to survive summary judgment. We therefore examine 
the principles that govern the summary judgment 
determination. 
III 
To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 re-
spondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal 
conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable in-
jury. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of 
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S.- 253, 288-289 (1968). 
This showing has two components. First, respondents must 
show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust 
laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the 
illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a 
whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 
7-8. Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the 
American market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
As a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational busi-
nesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this one. See Part IV-A, 
infra. 
10 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
244 U. S. App. D.C. 160, 756 F. 2d 181 (1985), cert. granted, 474 U. S. 
-- (1985). That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not be-
fore us. 
11 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial. Ifhe does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him." 
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conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually tended to bene-
fit respondents. Supra, at 7-8. Therefore, unless, in con-
text, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a genuine 
issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing conspir-
acy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary judg-
ment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 56(c), (e). When-as here-the moving party has 
carried its burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do 
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co., 176 F. 2d 421,423 (CA21949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. 
denied, 338 U. S. 943 (1950); lOA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (1983); Clark, 
Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural 
Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. 
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 
(1944). In the language of the Rule, the non-moving party 
must come forward with "specific facts shov.ring that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) (em-
phasis added). See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 
Amendment of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U.S. C. App., 
p. 626 (purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the plead-
ings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a 
genuine need for trial"). Where the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-mov-
ing party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Cities Serv-
ice, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual 
context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the claim 
is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents 
must come forward v.rith more persuasive evidence to support 
12 See n. 10, supra. 
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their claim than would otherv.ise be necessary. Cities Serv-
ice is instructive. The issue in that case was whether proof 
of the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an illegal 
boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that the de-
fendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 
U. S., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isola-
tion, the defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed 
to create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal 
had to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defend-
ant lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, and 
since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant's 
independent interest, the refusal to deal could not by itselL 
support a finding of antitrust liability. 1 d., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a§ 1 case. 
Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp ., 465 
U. S. 752 (1984), we held that conduct as consistent v.ith per-
missible competition as v.ith illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 
Id., at 764. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. 465 U. S., at 
764. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show \ 
that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the 
competing inferences of independent action or collusive ac-
tion that could not have harmed respondents. See Cities 
Service, supra, at 280. 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case. According to petitioners, the alleged conspiracy is one 
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that is economically irrational and practically infeasible. 
Consequently, petitioners contend, they had no motive to en-
gage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, 
they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner re-
spondents allege. Petitioners argue that, in light of the ab-
sence of any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of 
the evidence of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could 
find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged 
actually existed. This argument requires us to consider the 




A predatory pricing conspiracy is by · nature speculative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free competition would 
off er them. The foregone profits may be considered an in-
vestment in the future. For the investment to be rational, 
the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation ofrecov-
ering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the 
losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing preda-
tory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
"Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting , but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
size of the losses." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the 
success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run 
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loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough 
simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may 
breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional 
gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly 
will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant 
period of time, "[t]he predator must make a substantial in-
vestment with no assurance that it will pay off." 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is 
a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. 
See, e.g., R. Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, 
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699 (1975); 
Easterbrook, supra; Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pric-
ing-An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 
(1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil 
(N. J.) Case, 1 J. L. & Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory 
Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ., at 292-294. See also 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) ("[N]owhere in the 
recent outpouring of literature on the subject do commen-
tators suggest that [predatory] pricing is either common or 
likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply even to predatory pricing by a 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respond-
ents allege that a large number of firms have conspired over a 
period of many years to charge below-market prices in order 
to stifle competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a 
single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to 
be sustained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also 
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allocate any gains to be realized from its success. Precisely 
because success is speculative and depends on a willingness 
to endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has 
a strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the 
losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in 
any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary alloca-
tion is therefore difficult to accomplish. Yet if conspirators 
cheat to any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, be-
cause its success depends on depressing the market price for 
all buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the artifi-
cially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the 
conspiracy can continue to sell at the "real" market price, and 
the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally un-
likely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the 
prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In 
order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough 
market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gaYe up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. Anierican Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 88 Harv. L. Rev., 
at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have 
commenced , 13 petitioners appear to be far from achieving this 
goal: the two largest shares of the retail market in teleYision 
sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by any of 
the petitioners. 6 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 81-2331 
(CA3), pp. 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which to-
gether approximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably 
during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose 
rapidly during this period, from one-fifth or less of the rele-
13 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 
1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Com-
plaint ,: 52; Zenith Complaint ,i 39, 
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vant markets to close to 501:k. 723 F. 2d, at 316. 11 Neither 
the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, 
that petitioners' share presently allows them to charge mo-
nopoly prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the 
conspiracy is ongoing-that petitioners are still artificially 
depressing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of 
the market. The data in the record strongly suggests that 
that goal is yet far distant. 15 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
14 During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing 
television sets declined from 19 to 13. 5 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 
81-2331 (CA3), p. 1961a. This decline continued a trend that began at 
least by 1960, when petitioners' sales in the United States market were 
negligible. Ibid. See Zenith Complaint ,i, 35, 37. 
'~ Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review arti-
cle, offers the follo•Ning sensible assessment: 
"The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or more 
at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in 
order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct cannot 
possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the Japa-
nese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could not 
recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high prices 
for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments , which must be 
recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try to raise 
prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There are no 
barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer and au-
dio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent United 
States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other nations make 
TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to recoup, the Japa-
nese firms would need to suppress competition among themselves. On 
plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty years, far 
longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. None 
should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each firm's 
incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The predation-re-
coupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with the 
more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in 
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the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued 
over the course of two decades, the conspirators could well 
require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining 
supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued co-
operation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-
be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their 
minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs 
more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If 
the losses have been substantial-as would likely be neces-
sary in order to drive out the competition lo-petitioners 
would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years simply 
to break even. · 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy in this country 
·will eventually pay off. The courts below found no evidence 
of any such success, and-as indicated above--the facts actu-
the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition." 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Re\'. 1, 26-27 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
16 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re-
coup their losses. In light of the large number of firms involved here, pe-
titioners can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price-fixing 
after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. Such 
price-fixing would, of course, be an independent violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 
(1940). 
17 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its 
objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
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ally are to the contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the peti-
tioners, continue to hold the largest share of the American . . :-J 
retail market in color television sets. More important, there ( o,-tiSS•09'-
is nothing to suggest any relationship between petitioners' 
profits in Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to 
gain from a conspiracy to monopolize the American market. 
In the absence of any such evidence, the possible existence of 
supracompetitive profits in Japan simply cannot overcome 
the economic obstacles to the ultimate success of this alleged 
predatory conspiracy. 10 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im- -
plausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
pro-competitive conduct. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 762-764. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petition-
ers liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut 
prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy in-
directly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the 
check-price agreements and the five-company rule) whose 
natural tendency is to raise price, and through evidence of re-
bates and other price-cutting activities that respondents 
argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. rn But 
18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that peti-
tioners may haYe possessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds 
domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell products abroad. 
It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than nec-
essary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be ·Nilling 
to lose money in the United States market without some reasonable pros-
pect of recouping their investment. 
19 Respondents also rely on an expert study suggesting that petitioners 
have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. 
The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of 
expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on 
assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those 
assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsist-
ent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
• 
83-200-1-OPINION 
MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. r. ZENITH RADIO 19 
cutting price in order to increase business of ten is the very 
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases 
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 763-764. "[W]e must be concerned lest 
a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular 
type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinne Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CAl 1983). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such 
as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at--, preda-
tory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in 
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the 
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes 
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities 
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: 
unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspir-
ators. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. 
Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a sin-
gle firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involving 
a large number of firms can be identified and punished once 
they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing agree-
ment would be necessary in order to reap the benefits of pre-
dation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned that by 
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of 
dustrial Co., 505 F. Supp., at 1356-1363. Although the Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court's finding that the expert report was inadmissi-
ble, the court did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the factors 
that substantially undermine the probative value of that evidence. See 
723 F. 2d, at 277-282. We find the District Court's analysis persuasiYe. 
Accordingly, in our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing 
has little probative value in comparison \\ith the economic factors, dis-
cussed in Part IV-A, supra, that suggest that such conduct is irrational. 
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conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage 
such conspiracies. 
V 
As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners had no 
motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the con-
trary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had 
every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they 
are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses 
for petitioners with no corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Serv-
ice, 391 U. S., at 279. The Court of Appeals did not take ac-
count of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the 
alleged predatory pricing conspiracy. It focused instead on 
whether there was "direct evidence of concert of action." 
723 F. 2d, at 304. The Court of Appeals erred in two re-
spects: (i) the "direct evidence" on which the court relied had 
little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing con-
spiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a 
plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. 
The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was evi-
dence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing con-
spiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices 
in Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents' 
claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not 
tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. Evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to fix minim.um prices 
(through the "check price" agreements) for the American 
market actually works in petitioners' favor, because it sug-
gests that petitioners were seeking to place a floor under 
prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of distribu-
tors of their products in the American market-the so-called 
"Five Company Rule." That practice may have facilitated a 
horizontal customer allocation, see United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), but its natural effect 
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would be to raise market prices rather than reduce them. 20 
Evidence that tends to support any of these collateral con-
spiracies thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market prices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to 
engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a 
"genuine issue for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 
56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible con-
clusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if pe-
titioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if 
their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible ex-
planations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of 
conspiracy. See Cities Service, supra·, at 278-280. Here, 
the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels 
that succeeded in taking business away from respondents, 
and (ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' abil-
ity to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from go-
ing even lower). This conduct suggests either that petition-
ers behaved competitively, or that petitioners conspired to 
raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agree-
ment among 21 companies to price below market levels. 
Moreover, the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct is 
20 The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the Five Company Rule 
might tend to insulate petitioners from competition with each other. 723 
F. 2d, at 306. But this effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price preda-
torily. Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if they al-
ready are pricing belou• the level at which they could sell their goods. The 
far more plausible inference from a customer allocation agreement such as 
the Five Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise prices, 
by limiting their ability to take sales away from each other. Respond-
ents-petitioners' competitors-suffer no harm from a conspiracy to raise 
prices. Supra, at 7. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five 
Company Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the "rule" per-
mitted petitioners to sell to their American subsidiaries, and did not limit 
the number of distributors to which the subsidiaries could resell. 513 F. 
Supp. , at 1190. 
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said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls for 
petitioners to destroy companies larger and better estab-
lished than themselves, a goal that remains far distant more 
than two decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had 
they succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest that they could recover the losses 
they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in light 
of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither pe-
titioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese 
market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribu-
tion in the American market, suffice to create a "genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e). 21 ' 
On remand, the Court of Appeals_ is free to consi_der 
whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambigu-
ous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of 
any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must "tend[] to 
exclude the possibility" that petitioners underpriced respond-
ents to compete for business rather than to implement an eco-
nomically senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 
764. In the absence of such evid~nce, there is no "genuine 
issue for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
21 We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to con-
spire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspir-
acy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 
752 (1984), establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible 
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support 
even an inference of conspiracy. Id., at 763-764. See supra, at 12. 
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minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and 
the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented 
here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
This case requires that we again consider the standard dis-
trict courts must apply when deciding whether to grant sum-
mary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. 
I 
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than 
three times as long. 723 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1983); 513 F. Supp. 
1100 (ED Pa. 1981). Two respected District Judges each 
have authored a number of opinions in this case; the pub-
lished ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal 
Supplement. In addition, the parties have filed a forty-
volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the 
essence of the evidence on which the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals based their respective decisions. · 
We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated 
and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that com-
prise the record on appeal. Since we review only the stand-
ard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and 
not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we 
find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What 
follows is a summary of this case's long history. 
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A 
Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 corporations that 
manufacture or sell "consumer electronic products" (CEPs)-
for the most part, television sets. Petitioners include both 
Japanese manufacturers of CEPs and American firms, con-
trolled by Japanese parents, that sell the Japanese-manufac-
tured products. Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith 
Radio Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Cor-
poration (NUE). Zenith is an American firm that manufac-
tures and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate succes-
sor to Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that 
manufactured and sold television sets until 1970, when it 
withdrew from the market after sustaining substantial 
losses. Zenith and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, 1 claim-
ing that petitioners had illegally conspired to drive American 
firms from the American CEP market. According to re-
spondents, the gist of this conspiracy was a "'scheme to 
raise, fix and maintain artificially high prices for television 
receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same time, 
to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers ex-
ported to and sold in the United States."' 723 F. 2d, at 251 
(quoting respondents' Preliminary Pretrial Memorandum). 
These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that produced 
substantial losses for petitioners. 513 F. Supp., at 1125. 
The conspiracy allegedly began as early as 1953, and accord-
ing to respondents was in full operation by sometime in the 
late 1960's. Respondents claimed that various portions of 
this scheme violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, § 2(a) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, and 
the Antidumping Act of 1916. 
After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed 
motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. 
'NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 
1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two cases were con-
solidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. 
• 
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The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclu-
sive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded 
to trial. Respondents filed such a statement, and petitioners I 
responded with a series of motions challenging the admissibil-
ity of respondents' evidence. In three detailed opinions, the 
District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which Zenith 
and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. At bottom, the court found, respondents' claims 
rested on the inferences that could be drawn from petition-
ers' parallel conduct in the Japanese and American markets, 
and from the effects of that conduct on petitioners' American 
competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 1125-1127. After reviewing 
the evidence both by category and in toto, the court found 
that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, because 
(i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners 
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the 
evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting con-
spiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that peti-
tioners were cutting prices to compete in the American mar-
ket and not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore 
was granted on respondents' claims under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 
claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to 
monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally in-
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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distinguishable from the § 1 claims, the court dismissed them 
also. Finally, the court found that the Robinson-Patman Act 
claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as the 
Sherman Act claims. Since the court had found no genuine 
issue of fact as to the conspiracy, it entered judgment in peti-
tioners' favor on those claims as well. 3 
B 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 
The court began by examining the District Court's eviden-
tiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence ex-
cluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. 723 F. 
2d, at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. 
See 471 U. S. -- (1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). 
On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the 
court found that the District Court's summary judgment de-
c1s10n was improper. The court acknowledged that "there 
are legal limitations upon the inferences which may be drawn 
from circumstantial evidence," 723 F. 2d, at 304, but it found 
that "the legal problem ... is different" when "there is direct 
evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court con-
8 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to 
summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 
1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. 
Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the 
Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the 
opinion concerning respondents' other claims. In re Japanese Electronic 
Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. 2d 319 (CA3 1983). 
Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act de-
cision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The 
Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independ-
ently argued by the parties. See this Court's Rule 21.l(a). We therefore 
decline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those 
claims. 
' As to three of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who re-
main in the case. 
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eluded, "there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of con-
cert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tend-
ency to suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have 
occurred." Id., at 304-305. Thus, the court reasoned, 
cases concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. 
Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a 
factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: 
1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized 
by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of produc-
ers meeting regularly and exchanging information on 
price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the 
opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices 
and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack 
such a combination because the Japanese government 
imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid. 
2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than 
their American counterparts, and therefore needed to 
operate at something approaching full capacity in order 
to make a profit. Ibid. 
3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of 
the Japanese market. Ibid. 
4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with 
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs ex-
ported to the American market. Id., at 310. The par-
ties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the 
agreements that require them as the "check price 
agreements." 
5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in 
the United States according to a "five-company rule": 
each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five 
American distributors. Ibid. 
6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a 
variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners 
sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the 
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United States Customs Service and from MITI, the for-
mer to avoid various customs regulations as well as ac-
tion under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover 
up petitioners' violations of the check price agreements. 
Based on inferences from the foregoing conclusions, 5 the 
Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could 
find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in 
order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy 
was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese mar-
ket. The court apparently did not consider whether it was 
as plausible to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behav-
ior was independent and not conspiratorial. 
The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' 
claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust 
laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required peti-
tioners to enter into the check price agreements, liability 
could not be premised on those agreements. The court con-
cluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign 
compulsion, because the check price agreements were being 
used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy" and not as 
an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The 
court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact 
were mandated by the Japanese government, notwithstand-
ing a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. 
We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the 
District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held lia-
ble under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part com-
5 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert 
opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices 
which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales." 723 
F. 2d, at 311. The court did not identify any direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing; nor did it place particularly heavy reliance on this aspect of the ex-
pert evidence. See n. 19, infra. 
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pelled by a foreign sovereign. 471 U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. 
II 
We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. 
Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely 
on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because 
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive con-
ditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Alumi-
num Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416,443 (CA21945) (L. 
Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ~236d 
(1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for any con-
spiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive 
prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed 
violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940), but it could not injure re-
spondents: as petitioners' competitors, respondents stand to 
gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price in CEPs. 
6 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only 
when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A con-
spiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because 
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect 
on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for 
CEPs in the United States. 
Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japanese market could not have 
caused that effect over a period of some two decades. Once petitioners 
decided, as respondents allege, to reduce output and raise prices in the 
Japanese market, they had the option of either producing fewer goods or 
selling more goods in other markets. The most plausible conclusion is that 
petitioners chose the latter option because it would be more profitable than 
the former. That choice does not flow from the cartelization of the Japa-
nese market. On the contrary, were the Japanese market perfectly com-
petitive petitioners would still have to choose whether to sell goods over-
seas, and would still presumably make that choice based on their profit 
expectations. For this reason, respondents' theory of recovery depends 
on proof of the asserted price-cutting conspiracy in this country. 
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Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 
477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respond-
ents cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose nonprice re-
straints that have the effect of either raising market price or 
limiting output. Such restrictions, though harmful to com-
petition, actually benefit competitors by making supracom-
petitive pricing more attractive. Thus, neither petitioners' 
alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the five-com-
pany rule that limited distribution in this country, nor the 
check prices insofar as they established minimum prices in 
this country, can by themselves give respondents a cogni-
zable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. The 
Court of Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it found 
evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be "direct evidence" 
of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 723 F. 2d, at 
304-305. 
Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed con-
spiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust 
damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy 
that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American 
market by means of pricing below the market level. 7 The 
thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their 
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a con-
7 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five-company rule, 
and the price-fixing in Japan are all part of one large conspiracy that in-
cludes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. 
The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours 
of the asserted conspiracy-whether there is one conspiracy or several-
respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for 
which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors 
v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 538-540 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 488-489 
(1977); supra; see also Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the 
Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1309 (1984). That showing depends in turn 
on proof that petitioners conspired to price predatorily in the American 
market, since the other conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot 
have caused such an injury. 
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certed campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive re-
spondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of 
business. Once successful, according to respondents, peti-
tioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restrict-
ing output and raising prices above the level that fair com-
petition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, 
respondents contend, would more than compensate petition-
ers for the losses they incurred through years of pricing 
below market level. 
The Court of Appeals found that respondents' allegation of 
a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, 8 if 
proved, 9 would be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to 
price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a 
single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices 
in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter poten-
tial entrants from coming in. E.g., Southern Pacific Communications 
Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 238 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 
331-336, 740 F. 2d 980, 1002-1007 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. -
(1985). In such cases, "predatory pricing" means pricing below some ap-
propriate measure of cost. E.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp ., 724 F. 2d 227, 232-235 (CAl 1983); see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental 
Baking Co., 386 U. S. 685, 698, 701, 702, n. 14 (1967). 
There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, 
about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this de-
bate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act § 1 
case. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note that respondents have 
not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners conspired to drive re-
spondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level neces-
sary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure 
of cost. An agreement without these features would either leave respond-
ents in the same position as would market forces or would actually benefit 
respondents by raising market prices. Respondents therefore may not 
complain of conspiracies that, for example, set maximum prices above mar-
ket levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. 
9 We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a the-
ory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some meas-
ure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 697, 709-718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in§ 2 cases). 
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Act. 723 F. 2d, at 306. Petitioners did not appeal from that 
conclusion. The issue in this case thus becomes whether 
respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their 
theory to survive summary judgment. We therefore exam-
ine the principles that govern the summary judgment 
determination. 
III 
To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 re-
spondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal 
conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable in-
jury. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of 
Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 (1968). 
This showing has two components. First, respondents must 
show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust 
laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the 
illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a 
whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 
7-8. Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the 
American market through predatory pricing, these alleged 
As a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost 
pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational busi-
nesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this one. See Part IV-A, 
infra. 
10 Respondents argued before the district court that petitioners had 
failed to carry their initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
244 U. S. App. D.C. 160, 756 F. 2d 181 (1985), cert. granted, 474 U. S. 
-- (1985). That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not be-
fore us. 
11 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
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conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an 
"antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-
Mat, 429 U. S., at 489, because they actually tended to bene-
fit respondents. Supra, at 7-8. Therefore, unless, in con-
text, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a genuine 
issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing conspir-
acy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary judg-
ment motion. 
Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 56(c), (e). When the moving party has carried its 
burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F. 
2d 421, 423 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 
943 (1950); l0A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2727 (1983); Clark, Special Prob-
lems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and 
Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. Sartor v. 
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). In 
the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come 
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis 
added). See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amend-
ment of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 626 
(purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings 
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a gen-
uine need for trial"). Where the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Cities 
Service, supra, at 289. 
It follows from these settled principles that if the factual 
context renders respondents' claim implausible-if the claim 
is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents 
must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support 
12 See n. 10, supra. 
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their claim than would otherwise be necessary. Cities Serv-
ice is instructive. The issue in that case was whether proof 
of the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported 
an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an illegal 
boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that the de-
fendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 
U. S., at 278-279. The Court acknowledged that, in isola-
tion, the defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed 
to create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal 
had to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defend-
ant lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, and 
since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant's 
independent interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself 
support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. 
Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment 
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party op-
posing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U. S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case. 
Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U. S. 752 (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with per-
missible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. 
Id., at 764. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed ver-
dict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that 
the alleged conspirators acted independently. 465 U. S., at 
764. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show 
that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the 
competing inferences of independent action or collusive ac-
tion that could not have harmed respondents. See Cities 
Service, supra, at 280. 
Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this 
case. According to petitioners, the alleged conspiracy is one 
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that is economically irrational and practically infeasible. 
Consequently, petitioners contend, they had no motive to en-
gage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, 
they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner re-
spondents allege. Petitioners argue that, in light of the ab-
sence of any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of 
the evidence of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could 
find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged 
actually existed. This argument requires us to consider the 




A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires 
the conspirators to forego profits that free competition would 
offer them. The foregone profits may be considered an in-
vestment in the future. For the investment to be rational, 
the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recov-
ering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the 
losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing preda-
tory pricing by a single firm, explained: 
"Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the 
predator as well as his victims will incur losses during 
the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a ra-
tional calculation for the predator to view the losses as 
an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals 
are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where 
rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, 
appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present 
size of the losses." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 
(1978). 
See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & 
Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the 
success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run 
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loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough 
simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may 
breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the 
excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional 
gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly 
will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant 
period of time, "[t]he predator must make a substantial 
investment with no assurance that it will pay off." 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is 
a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. 
See, e. g., R. Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, 
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699 (1975); 
Easterbrook, supra; Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pric-
ing-An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 
(1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil 
(N. J.) Case, 1 J. Law & Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory 
Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ., at 292-294. See also 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 651 F. 2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) ("[N]owhere in the 
recent outpouring of literature on the subject do commen-
tators suggest that [predatory] pricing is either common or 
likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 943 (1982). 
These observations apply even to predatory pricing by a 
single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respond-
ents allege that a large number of firms have conspired over a 
period of many years to charge below-market prices in order 
to stifle competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more 
difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a 
single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to 
be sustained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also 
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allocate any gains to be realized from its success. Precisely 
because success is speculative and depends on a willingness 
to endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has 
a strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the 
losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in 
any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary alloca-
tion is therefore difficult to accomplish. Yet if conspirators 
cheat to any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, be-
cause its success depends on depressing the market price for 
all buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the artifi-
cially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the 
conspiracy can continue to sell at the "real" market price, and 
the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose. 
Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally un-
likely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the 
prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In 
order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough 
market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then 
must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess prof-
its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See 
Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 88 Harv. L. Rev., 
at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have 
commenced, 13 petitioners appear to be far from achieving this 
goal: the two largest shares of the retail market in television 
sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by any of 
the petitioners. 6 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 81-2331 
(CA3), pp. 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which to-
gether approximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably 
during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose 
rapidly during this period, from one-fifth or less of the rele-
13 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 
1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Com-
plaint ,r 52; Zenith Complaint ,r 39. 
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vant markets to close to 50%. 723 F. 2d, at 316. 14 Neither 
the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, 
that petitioners' share presently allows them to charge mo-
nopoly prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the 
conspiracy is ongoing-that petitioners are still artificially 
depressing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of 
the market. The data in the record strongly suggests that 
that goal is yet far distant. 15 
The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the 
two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that 
"During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing 
television sets declined from 19 to 13. 5 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 
81-2331 (CA3), p. 1961a. This decline continued a trend that began at 
least by 1960, when petitioners' sales in the United States market were 
negligible. Ibid. See Zenith Complaint ~~ 35, 37. 
1
• Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant 
market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would pre-
sumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review arti-
cle, offers the following sensible assessment: 
"The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or more 
at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in 
order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct cannot 
possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the Japa-
nese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could not 
recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high prices 
for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which must be 
recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try to raise 
prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There are no 
barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer and au-
dio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent United 
States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other nations make 
TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to recoup, the Japa-
nese firms would need to suppress competition among themselves. On 
plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty years, far 
longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. None 
should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each firm's 
incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The predation-
recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with the 
more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in 
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the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such 
a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" 
with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued 
over the course of two decades, the conspirators could well 
require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining 
supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued co-
operation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-
be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on 
the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their 
minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs 
more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If 
the losses have been substantial-as would likely be neces-
sary in order to drive out the competition 17-petitioners 
would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years simply 
to break even. 
Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained 
supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this 
calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of 
time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy in this country 
will eventually pay off. The courts below found no evidence 
of any such success, and-as indicated above-the facts actu-
ally are to the contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the peti-
the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition." 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984) 
(footnotes omitted). 
1
• The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can re-
coup their losses. In light of the large number of firms involved here, pe-
titioners can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price-fixing 
after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. Such 
price-fixing would, of course, be an independent violation of§ 1 of the Sher-
man Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940). 
17 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its 
objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the 
predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in mar-
ket share also means an increase in predatory losses. 
83-2004-OPINION 
18 MATSUSHITA ELEC. IND. CO. v. ZENITH RADIO 
tioners, continue to hold the largest share of the American 
retail market in color television sets. More important, there 
is nothing to suggest any relationship between petitioners' 
profits in Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to 
gain from a conspiracy to monopolize the American market. 
In the absence of any such evidence, the possible existence of 
supracompetitive profits in Japan simply cannot overcome 
the economic obstacles to the ultimate success of this alleged 
predatory conspiracy. 18 
B 
In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit 
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are im-
plausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
pro-competitive conduct. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 762-764. 
Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petition-
ers liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut 
prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy in-
directly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the 
check-price agreements and the five-company rule) whose 
natural tendency is to raise price, and through evidence of re-
bates and other price-cutting activities that respondents 
argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. 19 But 
18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that peti-
tioners may have possessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds 
domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell products abroad. 
It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than nec-
essary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing 
to lose money in the United States market without some reasonable pros-
pect of recouping their investment. 
19 Respondents also rely on an expert study suggesting that petitioners 
have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. 
The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of 
expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on 
assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those 
assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsist-
ent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., 505 F. Supp., at 1356-1363. Although the Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court's finding that the expert report was inadmissi-
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cutting price in order to increase business of ten is the very 
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases 
such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See 
Monsanto, supra, at 763-764. "[W]e must be concerned lest 
a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular 
type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT 
Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 234 (CAl 1983). 
In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the 
desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. 
That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such 
as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at 13-17, preda-
tory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in 
order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the 
gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes 
more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities 
tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: 
unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, 
failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspir-
ators. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas 
L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a 
single firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involv-
ing a large number of firms can be identified and punished 
once they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing 
agreement would be necessary in order to reap the benefits 
of predation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned 
that by granting summary judgment in cases where the evi-
dence of conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will 
encourage such conspiracies. 
ble, the court did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the factors 
that substantially undermine the probative value of that evidence. See 
723 F. 2d, at 277-282. We find the District Court's analysis persuasive. 
Accordingly, in our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing 
has little probative value in comparison with the economic factors, dis-
cussed in Part IV-A, supra, that suggest that such conduct is irrational. 
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V 
As our discussion in part IV, A shows, petitioners had no 
motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the con-
trary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had 
every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they 
are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses 
for petitioners with no corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Serv-
ice, 391 U. S., at 279. The Court of Appeals did not take ac-
count of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the 
alleged predatory pricing conspiracy. It focused instead on 
whether there was "direct evidence of concert of action." 
723 F. 2d, at 304. The Court of Appeals erred in two re-
spects: (i) the "direct evidence" on which the court relied had 
little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing con-
spiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a 
plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. 
The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was evi-
dence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing con-
spiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices 
in Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents' 
claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not 
tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. Evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum prices 
(through the "check price" agreements) for the American 
market actually works in petitioners' favor, because it sug-
gests that petitioners were seeking to place a floor under 
prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of evi-
dence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of distribu-
tors of their products in the American market-the so-called 
"Five Company Rule." That practice may have facilitated a 
horizontal territorial allocation, see United States v. Topco 
Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), but its natural effect 
would be to raise market prices rather than reduce them. 20 
20 The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the Five Company Rule 
might tend to insulate petitioners from competition with each other. 723 
F . 2d, at 306. But this effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price preda-
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Evidence that tends to support any of these collateral con-
spiracies thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a 
conspiracy to charge below-market prices in the American 
market over a period of two decades. 
That being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to 
engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a 
"genuine issue for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 
56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible con-
clusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if pe-
titioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if 
their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible ex-
planations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of 
conspiracy. See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, 
the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels 
that succeeded in taking business away from respondents, 
and (ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' abil-
ity to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from go-
ing even lower). This conduct suggests either that petition-
ers behaved competitively, or that petitioners conspired to 
raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agree-
ment among 21 companies to price below market levels. 
Moreover, the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct is 
said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls for 
petitioners to destroy companies larger and better estab-
lished than themselves, a goal that remains far distant more 
than two decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had 
torily. Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if they al-
ready are pricing below the level at which they could sell their goods. The 
far more plausible inference from a customer allocation agreement such as 
the Five Company Rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise prices, 
by limiting their ability to take sales away from each other. Respond-
ents-petitioners' competitors-suffer no harm from a conspiracy to raise 
prices. Supra, at 7. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the Five 
Company Rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the "rule" per-
mitted petitioners to sell to their American subsidiaries, and did not limit 
the number of distributors to which the subsidiaries could resell. 513 F. 
Supp., at 1190. 
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they succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest that they could recover the losses 
they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in light 
of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither pe-
titioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese 
market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribu-
tion in the American market, suffice to create a "genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e). 21 
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider 
whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambigu-
ous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired 
to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of 
any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must "tend[] to 
exclude the possibility" that petitioners underpriced respond-
ents to compete for business rather than to implement an eco-
nomically senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 U. S., at 
764. In the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine 
issue for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled 
to have summary judgment reinstated. 
VI 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign 
compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on 
that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of 
Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export 
to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore im-
mune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those 
minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in 
part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cogni-
zable injury from any action that raised prices in the Ameri-
can CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for 
21 We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to con-
spire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspir-
acy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 
752 (1984), establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible 
competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support 
even an inference of conspiracy. Id., at 763-764. See supra, at 12. 
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conduct that is distinct from the check price agreements. 
The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and 
the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented 
here. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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I assume this case will be handed down next week, so 
I've done one last close read. Absent objection, I would 
like to make the following minor changes. None is substan-
tive. 
1. Page 3: Make a clarifying change of language on 
page 3. Only respondents actually filed a "Final Pretrial 
Statement"i petitioners relied on respondents' own evidence 
in petitioners' summary judgment motions. I would replace 
the circled sentence with the sentence in the margin. (I 
enclose p. 3) • 
2. Page 11: For the same reason, I would delete the 
"as here" on page 11. 
3. Page 20: At the bottom of the page, change the 
word "customer" to "territorial". This is a minor point, 
but "territorial" may be more accurate. 
There should be no problem about recirculating this 
afternoon. 
I apologize for being so dilatory. We can carry the 





MATSl'SHITA ELEC. IND. CO. r. ZEl\ITH RADIO 3 
The District Court directed the parties · to file, with preclu-
sive effect , "Final Pretrial Statements'' listing all the docu-
mentary evidence that would be offere_d if the case proceeded 
to trial. er ese statements were fife~ the- D1stnc 
o entertained motions challeni1;1g t~e admissibilit of 
the evidence contained in th~- In three deta1 ed opinions, 
he-District Courtfounatlie bulk of the evidence on which 
Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 
The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for 
summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the 
court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged 
conspiracy. At bottom, the court found, respondents' claims 
rested on the inferences that could be drawn from petition-
ers' parallel conduct in the Japanese and American markets, 
and from the effects of that conduct on petitioners' American 
competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 1125-1127. After reviev,ing 
the evidence both by category and in toto, the court found 
that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, because 
(i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners 
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the 
evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting con-
spiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that peti-
tioners were cutting prices to compete in the American mar-
ket and not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore 
was granted on respondents' claims under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. Because the Sherman Act § 2 
claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to 
monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally in-
2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and 
reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various 
hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert 
testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. \'. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1981). 
March 20, 1986 
83-2004 Matsushita 
Dear Byron: 
1 assume this case will be handed down next week, so 
I've done one last close read. Absent objection, 1 would 
like to make the following minor changes. None is substan-
tive. 
1. Page 3z Make a clarifying change of language on 
page 3. Only respondents actually filed a "Final Pretrial 
Statement"; petitioners relied on respondents• own evidence 
in petitioners' summary iudgment motions. I would replace 
the circled sentence with the sentence in the margin. (I 
enclose p. 3). 
2. Page 11: For the same reason, 1 would delete the 
"as here" on page 11. 
3. Page 20: At the bottom of the page, change the 
word "customer" to "territorial". This is a minor point, 
but "territorial" may be more accurate. 
There should be no problem about recirculating this 
afternoon. 
l apologize for being so dilatory. We can carry the 







Justice Lewis F . Powell 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington. D.C. 20543 
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Dear Justice Powell: 
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rk_, 
Thank you so much for sending me the Hatsushita slip 
opinion and the Wall Street Journal editorial. I had seen the 
Journal editorial; a student in my current Antitrust Law 
course brought it to me, and I reproduced it for the class. 
(With great hope. the student who brought the clipping asked 
if this meant he would not have to learn the Areeda-lurner 
predation definition for the final exam!) I immediately sent 
your Hatsushita slip for photocopying and added the case to my 
course ' s assigned reading list. 
I congratulate you on your Hatsushita opinion. It is a 
masterpiece. Your treatment of predatory pricing is 
spectacularly sensible; you took an extremely complex case and 
laid bare the essentially simple reasons why it contained no 
significant antitrust hazard. This penetrating thinking is a 
model of sound competitive analysis. It is also hard to 
overstate the more general importance of your use of antitrust 
standinq doctrine. Hatsushita stands as an opportunity and 
invitation to rationalize the entire field of antitrust: 
horizontal conspiracies, vertical restraints, monopolization, 
mergers, and price discrimination. Together with your 
landmark opinion in G.T.E. Sylvania, Hatsushita establishes 
you as the Court' s premier antitrust theorist and sets down 
principles that define the very framework within which 
antitrust debate will take place. I've had my differences 
with some of your thinking in the state action field. But I 
sure think you knocked the ball out of the park this time! 
Anne joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Powell the best. ~ 
Although Anne ' s litigation practice threatens to interfere 
with her attendance of the reunion, I look forward to seeing 
you then. I hope you are feeling pretty pleased with 
yourself. After Hatsushita, you ought to be! 
Wiley 
lfp/ss 03/25/86 MAT SALLY-POW 
83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio 
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Petitioners are 
Japanese firms that manufacture and sell television sets1 
respondents are two of their American competitors. 
Respondents contend that petitioners conspired 
to sell their television sets at artificially low, or 
"predatory," prices, with the goal of driving respondents 
and other American firms out of business. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to 
the Japanese firms. The Court of Appeals reversed. 
For the reasons stated in the opinion filed today 
with the Clerk, we reverse the Court of Appeals. The 
alleged conspiracy would have required the Japanese firms 
to lose money over some two decades. Yet, they could not 
plausibly hope to recoup those losses. 
Rational businesses have no motive to enter into 
such a conspiracy. Nor does respondents' evidence exclude 
the possibility that the Japanese firms behaved 
competitively rather than conspiratorially. We therefore 
think the Court of Appeals' erred in overturning the 
District Court's summary judgment. 
2. 
We remand the case to the Court of Appeals for 
further proceedings consistent with our opinion. We found 
it unnecessary to reach the other issue on which we 
granted certiorari--whether the Japanese firms could be 
held liable under the antitrust laws for conduct compelled 
by the Japanese government. 
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice 
Stevens join. 
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83-2004 Matsushiti Electric v. Zenith 
This is · an extremely complex antitrust case, that 
comes to us from the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. 
Some idea of its complexity is suggested by the 
fact that the District Court's opinion exceeded 200 pages 
in length, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals was 69 
pages. 
) ~~ I 
A brief summary would l a~dly be informative. -~ 
~~~k I\ 
/\ 
reverse the Court of Appeals for the reasons set forth in 
eti-I" opinion filed today with the Clerk. 
'\ 
Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens have joined. 
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LFP for the Court 11/16/85 
1st draft 1/21/86 
2nd draft 1/28/86 
3rd draft 2/17/86 
4th draft 3/6/86 
5th draft 3/20/86 





1st draft 3/3/86 
Joined by WJB 3/4/86 
JPS 3/4/86 
HAB 3/4/86 
2nd draft 3/12/86 
WHR may write but will await to hear from LFP 1/31/86 
BRW will dissent 1/27/86 
JPS awaits BRW dissent 1/29/86 
HAB awaiting further writing 2/18/86 
April 1, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases held for 83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith 
Radio 
85-82 Building & Construction Trades Council v. 
Altemose Construction Co. 
This case was held for No. 83-2004 (March 26, 1986), 
Matsushita Electric Industrial co. v. Zenith Radio Corp •• 
Respondents sued petitioners (an association of construction 
unions) for an alleged antitrust conspiracy, claiming that 
petitioners combined with construction companies in the 
Philadelphia area to force non-union companies such as re-
spondents out of the construction market. The DC granted 
summary judgment, and CA3 reversed. CA3 held that (i) peti-
tioners were not statutorily e~empt from antitrust liability 
because respondents' claim was that they combined with non-
union entities: (ii) there was sufficient evidence to infer 
a conspiracy among petitioners and contractors who employed 
only union labor; and (iii) one of the respondents was not 
collaterally estopped from relitigating an adverse finding 
by the NLRB because petitioners were not parties to the rel-
evant NLRB proceeding. Petitioners seek cert on all three 
holdings. We held for Matsushita b~cause CA3 explicitly 
relied on its decision in that case in the course of analyz-
ing whether the evidence of conspiracy was sufficient to 
survive summary iudgment. 
l do not think a GVR is in order. In its analysis of 
the evidence of conspiracy, CA3 explicitly noted that there 
was evidence of conduct by contractors that was inconsistent 
with their economic self-interest: the union contractors 
had followed a practice of not giving business to non-uni.on 
pontractors, even though it was in their self-interest to 
award subcontracts to the lowest bidders. Pet. App. lOa. 
To the extent that any analogous evidence was present in 
Matsushita, it tended to suggest a combination that could 
not have harmed the plaintiffs in that case. Thus, 1 think 
2. 
CA3's application of summary judgment principles is consist-
ent with Matsushita. 
On the statutory exemption issue (question 1 in the 
petition), the SG argues that we should deny because the 
case is interlocutory and the issue would benefit from fur-
ther factual development. l agree. 1 also agree with re-
spondents and the SG that the collateral estoppel issue 
(question 3) is not certworthy. 
My vote is to deny. 
LFP/vde 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases held for 83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith 
Radio 
85-301 Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc. 
This case was held for 83-2004 (March 25, 198b), 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp •• 
Petitioners are antitrust plaintiffs who claim, inter alia,l 
that respon<lents--four banks, four law firms, and a title 
abstract company--conspired to fix artificially high real 
estate legal fees. The DC granted respondents' motion for 
summary judgment, and CAll affirmed. CAll reasoned that, 
where an antitrust plaintiff relies on circumstantial evi-
dence to show price-fixing, the plaintlff must show some-
thing more than mere parallel conduct. There mu~t be "other 
factors tending to show concerted action." Pet. App. 35. 
This analysis is consistent with Matsushita. See slip op. 
at 12 ("To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a 
directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a viola-
tion of Sl must present evidence 'that tends to exclude the 
possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independ-
ently") (quoting Monsanto v. Sprav-Rite Service Corp., 465 
u.s. 752, 764 (1984)). 
Since the case is fact-bound and CAll's decision 
seems correct, my vote is to deny cert. 
1. Petitioners also claim that respondents illegally tied 
lending and legal services, and that they illegally ex-
changed price information. Nothing in these claims is af-
fected by our decision in Matsushita, and CAll's summary 
judgment decision as to them is not independently 
certworthy. 
L.FP/vde_ 
April 1, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases held for 83-2004 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith 
Radio 
85-487 Ford Motor Co. v. Tunis Brothers Co. 
This case was held for 83-2004 (March 26, 1986), 
Matsushita electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp •• 
Respondent, a former Ford tractor dealer, claims that Ford, 
a Ford subsidiary that took over respondent's territory, and 
certain officials of both companies conspired to drive re-
spondent out of the market. The DC entered summary judgment 
for petitioners, and r.A3 reversed. Judge flunter dissented, 
arguing that the evidence clearly showed that Ford terminat-
ed respondent pursuant to a long-term marketing strategy. 
Judge Bunter also argued that ~espondent haa not brought 
for.ward any evidence that "tend[ed) to exclude the possibil-
ity" of indeP,endent acti.on. Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service 
corp. , 4 6 5 o . s. 7 5 2 , 7 6 4 ( 19 8 4) • 
My vote is to GVR in light of Matsushita. CA3 did 
not consider whether respondent "pre«;ent[edj evidence that 
•tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspir-
ators acted independently." Matsushita, slip op. at 12, 
quoting Monsanto, 465 u.s., at 764. see also Pet. App. A-42 
to A-43 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Based on the recitation 
in the court's opinion, it appears that application of that 
standard would result 'n ~einstating the DC's summary judg-
ment order: respondent had a poor sales record prior to its 
termination, and there was evidence that Ford had long 
planned to reduce the number of tractor dealerships in the 
area. See id., at A-44 (discussing evidence). 
As stated above, my vote is to GVR in light of 
Matsushita. 
LFP/vde 
•': I• REVIEW -& OUTWOK Wall Street Journal, 4/l/a 6 




'Predatory Pricing,' RIP 
'Back in 1974, lawyers for Zenith 
thQught they had a terrific antitrust 
C8.$~ against 21 Japanese television 
rn~ers. Zenith said the Japanese 
were using "predatory pricing" to 
monopolize the U.S. market. Last 
we-ek, the Supreme Court disagreed. 
From now on, the court said, lawyers 
cJail'ning predatory pricing will be 
s~own the door. 
1 
-~~nith argued that the Japanese 
firms had conspired for the past 20 
y*'ars to sell televisions in the U.S. be· 
lmv .. cost. Great news for U.S. con-
sumers if true, but would the Japa-
n~e actually do this? The court said 
tliey wouldn't, couldn't and didn't. By 
a1~-'4 ruling in Matsushita Electric et 
al.,. vs. Zenith, the justices said "the 
cl,ai,1}1 is one that simply makes no 
~nomic sense." The court found that 
Zenith and RCA still control 40% of 
th~ .U.S. TV market, about the same 
as··ill the 1970s. That, it seems to us, 
reflects credit on those two compa-
ni'es'. If their competitors have been 
predatory, it obviously hasn't done 
ti\~m much good. ' 
'.:, Predatory pricing is a notion 
cooked up by economists to explain 
how you supposedly could acquire a 
monopoly. The idea is to sell at a loss 
until competitors are driven out of the 
market. Then you raise prices to get 
rlch' monopoly profits. While this sce-
1\ario is possible to draw on a black-
board, the high tourt found no evi-
de.nce that such a conspiracy has ever 
succeeded in the real world. 
Aside from putting predatory pric-
ing to rest, this case is significant for 
showing that the justices are becom-
ing more sophisticated about econom-
ics. For several decades, the court 
had entertained antitrust cases based 
on the premise that Bigness Is Bad-
ness. This New Deal-inspired school of 
thought said that big businesses en-
gage in predatory pricing all the time, 
and that monopolists are generally 
running amok. What the judges were 
mainly witnessing was ·evidence that 
economies of scale are important in 
some, but by no means all, indus-
tries. , 
Now the court is more interested 
in economic realities. The opinion 
. cited several Chicago-school lawyers 
and economists. Judge Robert Bork of 
the D.C .. Circuit is cited for the propo-
sition that for a conspiracy to work, 
the future flow of profits must some-
how exceed the present size of the 
losses. Judge Frank Easterbrook of 
the Seventh Circuit thought the Japa-
nese ''were just engaged in hard com-
petition." ' 
The antitrust laws were supposed 
to encourage competition for the bene-
fit of consumers. Under the preda· 
tory-pricing theory, companies that 
found their market rivals becoming 
uncomfortably competitive simply 
called in the lawyers and had them go 
to court to complain. Since they could 
sue for treble damages, they had ev-
ery incentive to seek this solution to 
their problem. It seems amazing that 
courts needed so many 'years to reach 
the conclusion Justice Powell wrote in 
his Zenith decision, that "cutting price 
in order to ,increase business is the 
very essence of competition." 
After commenting on . the vast 
amount of time and effort expended in 
the case, including a 40-volume (!) 
appendix submitted to the Supreme 
Court, Justice Powell warned lower 
courts that they should quickly dis-
miss cases unless there is real evi-
dence of ~onspiracy. Otherwise com-
panies will abuse the antitrust. laws 
and "chill the very conduct the anti-
trust laws are designed to protect." 
Zenith can still pursue its $1 billion 
claim if it can establish "dumping." 
Dumping occurs when foreign compa-
nies sell their products in the U.S. at 
prices lower than in their home mar· 
kets. The justices didn't comment on 
the dumping claim here because it 
wasn't part of this appeal, but the 
court could conceivably ask questions 
about dumping similar to the ones it 
asked about predatory pricing. Dump· 
ing implies that a firm can get higher 
prices at home to subsidize its sales 
abroad, which might be possible un-
der certain circumstances. But what 
is described as dumping is sometimes 
simply companies faced with a differ-
ent set of market conditions in differ· 
ent national markets. A company try-
ing to buy its way into a foreign mar-
ket by taking losses had better know 
what it is doing if it expects to come 
out ahead in the long run. And even if 
it does, price cutting, as Justice Pow-
ell observed, is a way of competing. 
The Supreme Court is sending a 
clear message to American business. 
The antitrust laws were passed to en-
courage, not discourage, competition. 
With that point in mind, perhaps busi-
nessmen can get back to the task of 
making and selling products, rather 
than crafting ponderous legal docu-
ments. 
• .. _ ·- -- · - · 11u11r11II! LCUU1t.n 
Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington. D.C. 20543 
April 14. 1986 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Thank you so much for sending me th 
opinion and the Wall Street Journal edi orial. the 
Journal editorial; a student in my curre t Antit~ 
course brought it to me. and I reproduced · or the class. 
(With great hope. the student who brought the clipping asked 
if this meant he would not have to learn the Areeda-lurner 
predation definition for the final exam!) I immediately sent 
your Hatsushita slip for photocopying and added the case to my 
course ' s assigned reading list. 
I congratulate you on your Hatsushita opinion. It is a 
masterpiece. Your treatment of predatory pricing is 
spectacularly sensible; you took an extremely complex case and 
laid bare the essentially simple reasons why it contained no 
significant antitrust hazard. This penetrating thinking is a 
model of sound competitive analysis. It is also hard to 
overstate the more general importance of your use of antitrust 
standinq doctrine. Hatsushita stands as an opportunity and 
invitation to rationalize the entire field of antitrust: 
horizontal conspiracies. vertical restraints, monopolization, 
mergers, and price discrimination. Together with your 
landmark opinion in G.T.E. Sylvania, Hatsushita establishes 
you as the Court ' s premier antitrust theorist and sets down 
principles that define the very framework within which 
antitrust debate will take place. I ' ve had my differences 
with some of your thinking in the state action field. But I 
sure think you knocked the ball out of the park this time! 
Anne joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Powell the best. 
Although Anne ' s litigation practice threatens to interfere 
with her attendance of the reunion. I look forward to seeing 
you then. I hope you are feeling pretty pleased with 
yourself. After Hatsushita, you ought to be! 
Wiley 
